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the business community worried about its

ability to snape the post-war political and economic
reconstruction.

Industrialists had lost enormous prestige

in the depression, and during the New Deal faced sharp

challenges from liberalism and organized labor.

World War

II provided business leaders with an opportunity to

restore their reputation if not their dominance, but in
the post-war decade there were a number of major national

issues still open to debate.
reach

a

American society had yet to

consensus on the relationship of government to the

economy, on the proper size of the welfare state, and on the
scope of union power in the factory.
The business community began mobilizing to regain the

political and economic initiative in this debate.

This

study explores the business community's ideological attack

against its primary opponent, organized labor, and against
the liberal. New Deal philosophy unions represented.

It also

and
examines the ways workers and their unions both resisted

reshaped employer actions.

In the years after World War II,

i

V

the business leaders engaged in an attempt to restructure

the ideas and images that constituted America's political
culture.

They conducted

a

widespread and intensive campaign

to sell Americans on the virtues of individualism as opposed
to collectivism or unions,

freedom as opposed to state

control and centrality of the free enterprise system to the

American way of life.
The most obvious efforts to shape ideology and to

create the more conservative, consensual political climate
that historians associate with the fifties took place at

the national level.

National business organizations like

the Advertising Council orchestrated massive public

relations campaigns that relied on the mass media to sell
business and capita lism.

Employers also recognized the need

for more direct connection with the public.

Sensing that

organized labor challenged their ability to shape worker
attitudes and provide political leadership, moderate as well
a

conservative employers sought to undermine union power

through

a

program that drew upon human relations and

welfarism in order to build worker allegiance to the firm.
Fearing for lost authority beyond their factory gates,

employers also instituted sophisticated community relations
programs promoting the free enterprise system.

v
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
It has become almost axiomatic among historians to

characterize the 1950s as "the age of consensus."

Summing

up a 1956 Advertising Council "Round Table" discussion, Yale

historian David Potter outlined the important characteristics of this consensus: an equality of opportunity for

individuals; an open, classless society; an econom.y capable
of dynamic growth and change;

and a socially responsible

business community promoting the essential harmony of
interests shared by managers and workers. '

Most historians

attribute this consensus to broad historical forces -- to
the "exhaustion of ideology" in the wake of two decades of

depression and war, to the impact of the Cold War and
McCarthyism, to the spread of consumerism and mass culture,
to the failure of the New Deal to successfully challenge

American capitalism, and to the decline of labor and the
left as vital forces in American life.

Indeed, in most

as
textbook accounts the emergence of consensus is depicted
2
process.
deterministic
almost
sweeping,
a
.

.

.

nor as
Yet the post-war consensus was neither as simple

complete as these accounts suggest.
industrial relations at

a

Business purchased calm

high price, while a less conten-

tious political atmosphere masked

debate between capital and labor.

a

lively ideological
Not surprisingly, the

themselves
fundamental precepts of the consensus were

1

contested.

By focusing on the struggle between capital and

labor to shape the new political culture of post-war

America,

I

restore human agency to the process through which

"consensus" was forged, show that whatever else it may have
been,

it was the product of concrete political struggles,

that it was,

in essense,

a

political construction.

I

also

suggest the limits of consensus by exploring the "contested

terrain" of the workplace and local community.
In 1945,

the business community worried about its

ability to shape post-war political and economic reconstruction.

Industrialists had lost enormous prestige in the

depression, and during the New Deal faced sharp challenges

from liberalism and organized labor.

World War II certainly

provided business leaders with an opportunity to restore
their reputation if not their dominance, but wartime econ-

omic success evoked multiple interpretations.

To many

liberals and to much of the public, it served as proof that

government control, economic planning, and the welfare state
were key to continued prosperity.

And in spite of feverish

publicity, popular approval of business remained below pre-

depression levels.
The war also began to shift the balance of power between

employers and workers in many factories.
faced a growing challenge from unions.

Many manufacturers

Wartime regula-

tions and labor-market shortages enabled labor to

date its position and achieve significant gains.

exigencies of

a

consoliUnder the

production crisis, militant workers eroded
2

managerial authority and control on the shop floor.

More-

over, some union leaders threatened to advance negotiations

beyond the standard personnel policy and wage issues into
such previously forbidden areas of corporate policy as

pricing and investment.

Finally, many business leaders

feared that the formation of the CIO's Political Action

Committee heralded

a

more politically aggresssive labor

movement
The contentious atmosphere of industrial relations

culminated in 1946 in

American history.

a

strike wave unparalleled in

Especially frightening to the business

community was Walter Reuther's demand that GM open its books
to union contract negotiators in order to link wages, prices

and profits.

His demand exemplified the growing threat to

management rights both on and off the shop floor.

Equally

troubling to companies like General Electric was the

widespread support community leaders showed for labor in GE
cities and towns.

Company surveys found that the public

blamed the company for the strike and distrusted any cause
that industry supported.
To historians looking back from the vantage point of

the 1990s, it seems clear that by the fifties the threat

posed by the trade union movement and progressive liberalism

was more apparent than real.

Scholars have begun to explore

corporate efforts in the immediate aftermath of the war to
regain lost authority and roll back union power.

3

The first

part of this mul tipronged attack was

a

campaign by business

leaders to exploit public fears of radicalism in order to

weaken organized labor.

The resulting Taft-Hartley Act of

1947 helped curb the power of industrial unionism.

Secondly,

within the plant, corporations pursued aggressive collective
bargaining and applied sophisticated personnel administration and industrial relations techniques.-^

Scholars from

a

variety of disciplines have argued that

by the early fifties business had defused organized labor's

threat within the factory and beyond its gates.

Each of

these fields have employed different terminology -- the
accord, the truce, or the social contract -- to describe

a

cooperative relationship between industrial unions and

management.

The basis of this arrangement was organized

labor's consent to join in a new political and economic

consensus built upon economic growth through greater producUnions promised to respect

tivity and anti-communism.

managerial prerogatives relating to production and to aid in
the drive for productivity in return for recognition of a

limited role on the shop floor and for periodic wage and
benefit increases. 4
At the same time, outside the factory, some historians

contend that organized labor was leading American workers

away from meaningful political alternatives.

They assert

that in the wake of Taft-Hartley the CIO cemented an

alliance with the Democratic Party that entailed driving out

4

the communists and undermining the militancy and radicalism
of the rank and file.
To American businessmen in 1945, however, very little
of this was self-evident.

Unions were still growing

in size and the shop floor remained a "contested terrain."
In addition,

businessmen were frightened by organized

labor's successful campaign to reelect Harry Truman in 1948.

They also continued to fear that the liberal agenda and New
Deal traditions espoused by the labor movement rang true for

much of the American public.

Thus, in the late forties,

the

business community redoubled its efforts to undermine the

power of organized labor and the discredit its philosophy.
Essentially, business leaders sought to formulate the ideas

and images that constituted America's political culture.
Even

a

brief survey of the business press of the period

suggests that corporate leaders understood the importance of

carrying the battle over political culture into the

workplace and local community.
The most visible aspects of the battle for power took

place over major policy issues at the national level,
pitting executives of large firms and major business organizations, like the National Association of Manufacturers and
the United States Chamber of Commerce, against liberal

Democratic and union leaders.

Less visible but equally

significant was the struggle led by these national business
leaders and smaller employers at the local level.

5

In many

factories, employers resorted to personnel and industrial

relations policies designed to build allegiance among

employees to the company at the expense of the union.

This

managerial approach, known as the "human relations" philosophy,

blended the techniques of welfare capitalism with the

insights of industrial psychology.

Morale surveys, recrea-

tion, or profit sharing were not new to the post-war, but

employers expanded and made more sophisticated use of these
practices

Understanding the importance of the outside world in
shaping the limits of workplace legitimacy, business leaders
also challenged their opponents for power and influence

beyond the factory gates.

Their goals were twofold:

first,

to build good will in the community in order to create a

favorable climate for economic expansion; second, to shift
political dialogue to

a

more conservative position in order

to weaken organized labor and the liberal ideals upon which

unions stood.

To achieve their first goal,

business leaders

tried to demonstrate both their newly developed social

consciousness and the importance of the company to the
community.

Efforts ranged from publicizing company contri-

butions to the local economy to beautifying their plants and
The key to the employers'

opening them to the public.

second goal was restoration of business dominance over

institutional life that had characterized many cities prior
to the depression.

The business community wanted to impose

6

its conservative stamp on schools, churches, and
other

community institutions.
But employers were not a hegemonic group capable of

manipulating people and institutions at will.

They

themselves were at times divided over how best to perserve
the capitalist system.

Business organizations like the

National Association of Manufactuers and the Committee for

Economic Development worked hard to educate business leaders
as to their class interests.

In addition,

it is important

to understand the ways that business interacted with its

opposition, primarily organized labor.

Unions had their own

political agenda, and like business, competed for influence
not only on the shop floor but in the community.

Rather

than viewing business ideology and practices as simply being

imposed on workers, this study explores the ways workers and
their unions both resisted and reshaped employer actions.

Assessing the impact of the business community's

campaign to shape political culture is

Even most companies took it as

a

a

difficult task.

matter of faith that the

dollars they invested in national educational campaigns and
in workplace or community programs often paid off only in

intangible ways.

But,

by the end of the 1950s, the business

community could point to favorable results.

The momentum of

New Deal liberalism and the welfare state had been
contained.

Union representation of the labor force had

begun its decline and the popular image of organized labor

7

nad shifted from heroic defenders of the New Deal to just
another special interest group.

Labor was less of

a

threat

to the American free enterprise system, but not because of

corrupt pact or a self-serving accord.

Instead,

a

it took the

unflagging energy and abundant resources of business leaders
to create the political atmosphere historians have come to

identify as consensus.
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CHAPTER

2

NOTHING LESS THAN CATASTROPIC CIVIL WAR

During the winter of 1945-1946,

a

strike wave of

massive proportions swept the United States.
American businessmen these strikes signalled

To many
a

grave social,

political, and economic crisis that threatened the free

enterprise system.

By January 1946, business writer Whiting

Williams proclaimed that what originally seemed "an
inconvenient but more or less harmless series of industrial
disputes has now become so widespread and so threatening as
to look like nothing less than catastrophic civil

war."-'-

Williams's analogy of the strike wave as civil war seemed
increasily relevant to many businessmen.

During the war,

labor unions, with the assistance of the federal government,
had consolidated and expanded their position in American
industry.

In some industries, moreover, militant workers

were challenging managerial authority for control of the
workplace.

Many employers feared that the post-war strike

wave augured yet another chapter in labor's growing power.
An equally troubling component of the strike wave for

businessmen was the evidence of the growing influence of
Keynesian liberalism, with its emphasis on state involvement
in the economy and the redistribution of income.

Striking

unionists, advancing a Keynesian analysis of the economy,

argued that wages must increase substantially to sustain

working-class purchasing power and thus avoid the the widely
10

anticipated and greatly feared postwar depression.

This

argument meshed with the liberal vision of high consumption
levels,

full employment, and social planning.

The support

of the Truman administration for this Keynesian-based wage-

price theory caused alarm in the business community.

Concomitantly, the introduction of legislation designed
to ensure full employment, even before the war's end,

dramatized the increased political power of organized labor
and the ongoing alliance between unions and New Deal
liberals. This alliance gave vivid expression to the

increasing popular support for expanded government

participation in the economy through planning and through
encouraging the development of a social wage.
1945,

Thus, in

the business community faced the twin challenges of a

struggle for control within the workplace and the defense of
the free enterprise system from the growing intrusi venes s of
the state.

Equally important, the business community itself

was struggling to find a unified voice, hindering effective

employer opposition to labor and liberalism.
I

By the end of World War II, nearly two decades of

political and economic change had produced an anxious

managerial class.

widened

a

community.

The dramatic economic collapse after 1929

chasm between factions of the American business
On one side was a bloc of ardent economic

11

nationalists made up principally of labor-intensive firms
relying on high tariffs and rabid anti-unionism.

On the

other side were the largest, most capital-intensive, and

most mass-consumption-oriented firms, run by businessmen who
opted for international free trade because of their

competitive advantages and for more conciliatory labor
policies.

Faced with

a

deepening depression, the large,

internationalist group of business leaders abandoned the
protectionist and anti-union Republican Party for the more
liberal Franklin Roosevelt, hoping to influence policies for

economic recovery.
At the same time, organized labor pressed its own

program of recovery.

Unions experienced

a

resurgence in

1933-34 in part due to section 7a of the National Recovery
Act.

But labor's disappointment with government enforcement

of the Act's provisions triggered a wave of bitter strikes

in 1934.

At the polls,

a

new mass political mobilization

recruited the urban working class, particularly second-

generation immigrant wage earners, into the Democratic Party

where immigrant labor leaders like Sidney Hillman were

forming an alliance with the more progressive
internationalist business leaders.
in 1934,

The Democratic victories

together with the lingering threat of mass upheaval

looming in the background, set the stage for the "second New
Deal" which included the Wagner Act, the Social Security
Act, the public utility holding company act, and a wealth

tax act, among other laws; in short, the creation of a
12

welfare state.

This legislation, resulting from a crisis

alliance of mass-consumption-oriented businessmen and new
CIO unionists, not only gave labor increased power but also

changed the government's role in the economy from protecting
business profits to intrusively stimulating mass
consumption.
The more "aggressively statist ideas" of the New Deal

coalition did not proceed unchallenged.
protectionist,

The bloc of

labor-intensive firms formed the Liberty

League to promote Republican Party opposition to Roosevelt
in 1936.

Other companies initiated legal challenges to the

Wagner Act and extra-legal resistance to unionism from 1937
until the onset of World War

II.

iMoreover, craft unionists

in the AFL had their own reasons for despising the New Deal,

particularly the National Labor Relations Board's unit
determinations, whereby it gave preference to the CIO over
the AFL.

The two national labor organizations waged

a

damaging civil war for much of the next twenty years.
Consequently, when

a

new recession in 1937-38 halted

economic recovery, Roosevelt refused to side with organized
labor in the momentous struggles against the Little Steel

companies, the Mohawk Valley formula, or the solidly antiunion South.
The startling changes initiated by New Deal order,
then,

rested on shaky ground.

Even the CIO found the

pluralistic industrial relations system established by the

13

Wagner Act to be far less empowering than it expected, while

more radical hopes for the New Deal foundered.

Moreover,

during World War II the business community regained some of
its lost power and prestige.

The wartime "miracle of

production" brought renewed authority as industry's leaders

demanded and received the largest voice in establishing
policy concerning economic mobilization.

Businessmen drew

on their new influence with government to encourage the more

conservative wartime Congress to begin dismantling some of
the New Deal.^
For corporate leaders war production symbolized one of

the finest hours of the free enterprise system.

General

Motors Vice Chairman Donaldson Brown attributed successful

economic mobilization to the "exercise of individual
initiative" and to the "efficiency inspired by long years of

competitive effort strenghtened by the stimulus and
incentive of the profit motive."

This was the message that

conservative businessmen sought to spread during the

war.-^

Wartime economic successes, however, meant different
things to different people.

To many liberals and to much of

the public it showed that government control, economic

planning, and the welfare state were key to continued

prosperity.

They contended the war proved that what

historian Robert Collins calls "left-wing" Keynesian

economics worked.

That is, through deficit spending, the

government could support high consumption levels and create
jobs.

Thus,

liberals believed the only way to prevent the
14

widely expected postwar depression was not only continued
but expanded government participation in the economy.

The

liberal economic vision had special resonance for workers.

Battered by the depression and fearing that wartime
affluence was temporary at best, workers sought above all
else security from the ravages of the business cycle.

Organized labor sought some remedies in such collective

bargaining provisions as seniority, but unions also looked
to government to even out the peaks and valleys of
production.

Working with other liberal groups,

labor's

quest for security found expression in the Roosevelt

administration's 1944 Economic Bill of Rights, which seemed
to endorse a fundamental reconstruction of American society

through the expansion of state power.

That document

suggested that such personal needs as health, education and
c.

housing were tantamount to basic human rights."
Industry's war-time accomplishments, then, in some ways

undercut the business vision of free enterprise because

mobilization had taken place within the context of

government regulation and regimentation.

Even during the

war, businessmen feared the consequences of military

necessity which would dictate government planning and
control of the economy.

Writing only six months after the

bombing of Pearl Harbor, General Motors' vice-chairman of
the board Donaldson Brown already worried that the "public

has not come to distinguish between the necessity of

15

centralized planning and regimention in time of
war, and the
exercise of corresponding functions on the part
of

government in the time of peace."

Brown feared that those

with "ulterior motives" were going to "seize the
occasion to
contend that the wartime system under which industrial
production has worked sucn wonders could be extended and
applied with equal benefit and effectiveness in the post-war

economy

.

7

While questions concerning the direction of America's

postwar economic policy troubled businessmen, many had even
more immediate concerns.

Far more worrisome was the

unprecedented challenge posed by organized labor within
their firms.

On the whole, the war provided

a

favorable

environment for the growth of the labor movement.

Mobiliza-

tion had ended the Depression and brought a tight labor

market which enabled unions to make significant organizational and economic gains.

During the conflict, the number

of union members increased from less than nine to almost

fifteen million.

o

After Pearl Harbor, the government's wartime labor

policy provided unions with organizational security through

maintenance of membership contract clauses.

This enabled

organized labor to consolidate its position by breaking down

many of the bastions of anti-unionism including the "Little
Steel" companies.

Governmental guarantees, however, were

not without cost to unions.

The National War Labor Board

demanded not only adherence to
16

a

"no-strike" pledge but also

union responsibility.

Under these pressures unions became

increasingly centralized and bureaucratic as they policed

discontent on the shop floor through the establishment of
formal grievance and arbitration procedures^.

Many managers, however, found little comfort in the
concept of responsible unionism.
tions, including scarce labor,

Wartime economic condi-

"cost plus" financing, and

the necessity for continuous production, contributed both to
the growth of unions and to the undermining of managerial

authority and control on the shop floor.

War-time wildcat

strikes in defiance of the no-strike pledge were just the

most dramatic symbols of the decline of managerial power.
In many factories, discipline was lax and workers defiant.

Aggressive union representatives demanded and received
voice in setting and enforcing production standards.

a

As

a

result, employers charged that worker power in unions and in
the labor market resulted in declining productivity.-'-^

The alienation of the first line of supervision exacer-

bated the shop floor crisis.
instance, was weakened.

The authority of foremen,

for

During the war militant union shop

stewards successfully challenged foremen's authority over
the rank and file.
own.

Moreover foremen had grievances of their

Without overtime pay, salaried foremen's wages barely

exceded those they supervised.

Without grievance procedures

or formal job security, foremen feared unemployment would

accompany the postwar cutbacks.

17

Many former production

workers, pulled into management by the massive expansion
of
the wartime labor pool, had experience with the benefits
of

unionization and responded readily to the organization of
the Foreman's Association of America and other supervisory
unions.

Their actual membership was small but employers

believed that even this limited unionization of the
line of supervision represented

a

first

virus that was attacking

productivity and shop floor discipline.
As the war ended,

managers fretted that virtually none

of their rights were secure.

Participants at

a

1944 Ameri-

can Management Association round table discussion observed

that "management has had an uneasy feeling that its prerogatives are slipping from it into the hands of unions. "'-^

Through the National War Labor Board's expansion of the
scope of collective bargaining, unions had made significant

inroads into the functions of management.

To business

writers like Whiting Williams, the government appeared to be
in "active partnership" with the CIO, particularly when the

Board granted labor input over such issues as wages, seniority,

1 3
and protection from arbitrary dismissal.

Even more ominously, unions were attempting to bargain
for such devices as mutual consent clauses, which limited

management's right to initiate change, or the establishment
of joint committees that would give labor equal voice in

planning and decision making. '^

Thomas Roy Jones,

president of American Type Founders, foresaw no limit to the
future demands of power hungry labor leaders. "Annual wages,
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private social security systems, early retiremerxts

,

long

vacations, 25-hour weeks— are completely within the realm of

economic possiblity."

So too,

he continued was control of

management, "the distribution of profits; and advertising
policy;

and marketing and production methods."

charged,

"there have been bargained away,

Already,

he

in favor of labor,

many of the rights of stockholders, the customer, the
government, and the public."
trend,

Roy predicted,

"a

If business did not halt this

condition of industrial chaos

eventually will ensue. "'"^

Businessmen doubtless exaggerated the seriousness of
labor's threat during the war.

But their anxieties surfaced

early, and management did not allow the war to interfere

with its efforts to curb the power of labor.

As early as

1943, with conversion problems solved, some companies

tightened up discipline and stopped making concessions to
ensure uninterrupted production.

Workers, particularly in

the auto industry, responded with

a

strikes

^

wave of unauthorized

"

Wildcat strikes, labeled by the mass media as an
unpatriotic torpedoing of defense production, reinforced

growing public sentiment hostile to unions.

a

An increasingly

powerful Congressional coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats, encouraged by businessmen, capitalized on
labor's shrinking public approval by enacting anti-labor

legislation.

The Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act, passed
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in mid-1943, aimed to limit union political and
economic

rights by banning contributions to political candidates,

mandating that unions give

30-day notice prior to

a

striking, and allowing for federal seizure of a struck
plant.

State campaigns accompanied this national effort to

control unions, and in 1943 twelve states wrote into their
laws restrictions on union activities.

From the point of

view of business, these laws did little to moderate shopfloor militancy or derail the union drive against managerial

prerogatives.

Indeed,

workers used the strike vote required

under the Smith-Connal ly Act to increase the bargaining

power of their unions. •'^
The success of this legislative anti-union drive

revitalized the oppositional politics of the labor movement.
In mid-1943, the CIO sought to counter this conservative

shift in domestic politics by forming

Committee.

Political Action

a

The PAC was intended to provide the structure to

enable the labor movement to play
nation's political life.

a

decisive role in the

During the 1944 presidential

campaign, the PAC supported

a

broad liberal program and

helped mobilize the New Deal coalition.

1

8

After reelecting Roosevelt and defeating some Con-

gressional reactionaries, the CIO seemed to be laying the

groundwork for

a

progressive post-war reconstruction effort.

Above all, labor feared the return of mass unemployment.

Many unionists looked to the government to guarantee continued high level economic activity.
20

In preparation for

reconversion, the CIO proposed

a

program of Keynesian social

planning which included the expansion of the welfare
state.
Labor's economic vision,

which meshed with that of many New

Deal liberals including Roosevelt, found legislative

expression in January 1945 with the introduction of the

full-employment bill.

Written by liberal economists

working in wartime regulatory agencies, it promised to
institutionalize the wartime state management of the economy
and to make Keynesian spending public policy.

employment bill had the support of

a

The full

broad liberal-labor

coalition that included the AFL, the CIO, the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the
National Farmers Union.

In early 1945, given the widespread

concern reflected in opinion polls about economic readjust-

ment during the postwar, the measure seemed destined to

become

law.-*-^

The PAC gained an undeserved reputation for political

power.

Its attempt to supplement collective bargaining with

political activity, however, succeeded in alarming elements
"From the standpoint of the

of the business community.

ultimate welfare of the people of the United States," wrote
one Missouri business executive, "I think there is no

question but that if labor is permitted to consolidate its

power and to use that power to elect more Claude Peppers and
Henry Wallaces to positions of authority, we shall find

ourselves in

a

position in which labor is stronger than the
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government of the United States and

is able to

dictate to

it. "20

The end of the war in August 1945, ignited the already

explosive atmosphere of labor-capital relations.

Immediate

cancellation of wartime contracts led to massive layoffs and
the initiation of the eventual demobilization of twelve

million service men and women threatened to further swell
the ranks of the unemployed.

One quarter of all war workers

had lost their jobs by the winter of 1945.

Among the

employed, income dropped as the return to the normal work

week resulted in the loss of overtime earnings.

Workers

also suffered from down-grading to lower-paying jobs. At the

same time, within the factories, employers took advantage of
the return of unemployment to intensify their efforts to

restore managerial control.
In response,

o

1

unions ended their no-strike pledge and

frustrated workers walked out, initiating one of the largest
strike waves in American history.

In the year after V-J

Day, there were 4,630 work stoppages, involving almost five

million workers, resulting in the loss of 119.8 million mandays of production.
in the auto,

Many were wildcat strikes, while others

steel, electrical, and packinghouse industries

were officially sanctioned both to alleviate pent-up wartime
tensions and to place pressure on employers to meet union
demands.

Labor struggles in communities like Stamford,

Connecticut, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and Rochester, New
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York,

took on the characteristics of class
warfare,

expanding into city-wide general strikes. ^2
Implicit in these industry-wide strikes was

a

broader

trade-union interpretation of the implications of
Keynesian
economics.

The AFL and CIO argued that

a

healthy economy

required the redistribution of income— even if necessary
at
the expense of corporate prof its--through government

spending and taxes and through

a

relations bargaining structure.

pluralistic industrial
Through meaningful collec-

tive bargaining, labor would guarantee the success of

Keynesianism by gaining higher wages for its members and
stable prices for all consumers.

Increased wage levels,

without price increases, were necessary to offset the reconversion drop in worker income and to sustain

purchasing power.
argued that

a

working-class

Labor economists, like Solomon Barkin,

high volume of demand fueling mass production

was the critical element of full employment and

prosperity
Organized labor's wage-price theory triggered
vigorous debate.

a

Trade unionists argued that productivity

gains and the massive increase in corporate profits during
the war meant that industry could absorb the requested pay

increases without resorting to price increases.

In October

1945, government economists supported this interpretation,

arguing that industry could increase wages by 24 percent and

keep production going
levels.

while still earning profits at prewar

Shortly afterwards, President Truman also endorsed
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wage increases "to sustain adequate purchasing
power and to
raise the national income. "^"^
The business community cried foul, asserting that

government and labor economists had distorted projected
profit margins.

Businessmen argued that forced redistribu-

tion of income would serve only to undermine the free enterprise system.

Profits should not be related to wages as

they were critical to fueling further economic growth.

The

only legitimate source of higher wages, asserted the

business journal Factory M anage m ent and M aintenance

,

was

"increased out-put per man-hour of work;" that is,

intensified production.
Most alarming for the business community were the
issues raised in the General Motors strike which began in
late November 1945.

One student of the strike concluded

that Walter Reuther "consciously politicized the GM strike
by challenging managerial control of product pricing and by

emphasizing the stake the consuming public had in the
victory of the auto workers."

"

His demand that the auto

company open its books to union contract negotiators in
order to specifically link wages and prices to profits

seemed to businessmen to strike at the very essence of
capitalism.

Moreover, by treading on the most sacred of

managerial prerogatives, Reuther epitomized the mounting
threat unions posed to employer control over their own
firms.

In opposing Reuther, Leonard Westrate declared in
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Automotive Industries, General iMotors was
"fighting the
battle for all American industry and the free
enterprise
system.

"^"^

The results of the National Labor-Management
Con-

ference,

which took place during the GM strike, demonstrated

to many businessmen that Reuther's challenge to the

employers' right to manage represented just the spearhead of
an ever larger attack.

Neither side could reach an agree-

ment on "either the prerogatives of management or the scope
of legitimate union demands. "28

delegate Lee

H.

Management conference

Hill reported that "high-handed" union

leaders with unlimited ambitions demanded either exclusive

union or joint control of many mangement functions.

The

conference, asserted this former Al lis-Chalmers executive,

should have made clear even to sympathetic liberals in the

Administration that union leaders were "unswervingly

committed to programs
lessy unfair,

.

.

.

which in many parts are hope-

preposterous, and unworkable. "^

All of this led many businessmen to believe that

America was in the midst of

economic crisis.

a

serious social, political, and

Some placed the blame entirely on "the

entrenched monopolistic power of enormous international
unions," exercised by a handful of irresponsible labor
leaders.

National Association of Manufacturers Chairman

Ira Mosher asserted that "we are now in the midst of one of
the greatest emergencies the country ever experienced."

Production was in

a

shambles because of the Truman
25

administration's wage-price "squeeze" and
because of the
mass strikes that constituted an "insurrection."
Indeed
businessmen's very economic existence was held in
the palm
of labor leaders' hands.
Mosher bluntly charged
that:

"Reuther decides whether or not we can have automobiles.

Murray decides when we can have steel to build automobiles
or refigerators or homes.

Lewis determines whether we shall

have coal to turn the wheel of our industry, to heat and
light our homes."

And finally "as if this were not enough,

Petrillo decides when and how we can have music. "^'II

There was

a

wide spectum of views among businessmen

over how best to preserve the capitalistic system in the
face of the crisis created by advocates of New Deal liberal-

ism and the labor movement.

The answers posed by corporate

leaders roughly reflected the division of the business

community into two ideological camps that in many respects
reflected distinct segments of American industry.

Tradi-

tional or practical conservatives often associated with the

National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of

Commerce tended to come from smaller companies or from

a

bloc of inf rastructural and primary goods industries like
steel.

They generally distrusted the state and called for

the dismantling of much of the New Deal and all of the war-

time regulations.

They especially denounced the meddling of
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the government in a peacetime economy
through wage and price

controls or through Keynesian fiscal policies. ^2

men like Donaldson Brown of General Motors,
Sun Oil, and Ernest

T.

J.

Business-

Howard Pew of

Weir of National steel Corporation

spoke of the centrality of freedom and the value of individual initiative and competition.

Abridgement of economic

freedom would inevitably lead to such disasters as compulsory state control, collectivism, and possibly even facism.
Thus, the vice-chairman of the United Aircraft Corporation,

Eugene

E.

Wilson, warned that unless America returned to its

fundamental principles "Christian freedom will give way to

atheistic slavery, cooperation to compulsion, hope to fear,
equality of opportunity to privilege, and the dead hand of

bureaucracy will close the throttle on progress."
Traditional conservatives particularly chafed at the

abridgement of their economic freedom in the realm of industrial relations.

The growth of unionism in the 1930s and

especially under the auspices of the National War Labor
Board seemingly imposed strict limits on employer freedom of
action.

Conservative businessmen viewed unions as illegiti-

mate, outside forces that fomented trouble and undermined

the naturally close relations between worker and employer.

Some staunch anti-union firms, like Weirton Steel and
Dupont, successfully opposed organizing drives.

Companies

like General Motors, forced by the state to recognize

unions, still refused to accept their permanence. Even after

participating in collective bargaining, GM worked hard to
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contain or weaken the power of organized
labor.

At the same

time, within the political realm, the owners
of these firms
backed the National Association of Manufacturers
in its

campaign for the repeal or amendment of the Wagner
Act to
protect employers against the "monopolistic power" of
unions 34
At the other end of the spectum were the more sophisti-

cated conservatives or moderates who joined together in

organizations like the Business Advisory Council and the

Committee for Economic Development.

Tending to come from

newer mass consumption-oriented industries or firms with
strong international connections, these corporate leaders

were less concerned with protecting competition.

They

sought to moderate the New Deal, not destroy

In

it.

contrast with Donaldson Brown, CED founders like Marion
Folson of Eastman Kodak, Ralph Flanders, and Paul

G.

Hoffman

of Studebaker Auto Company looked to central economic

planning, albeit primarily influenced by business, to ensure

postwar prosperity.

Hoffman borrowed

a

line from the NAM

conservatives when he dramatically warned in 1943 that

collectivism could come to postwar America, but only if
business did not protect against mass unemployment through
planning.

It would come by default rather than "design on

3 S
the part of revolutionaries."

The CED asserted that America could no longer afford

wild economic fluctuations.
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Instead of "ignorant opposition

to change/' businessmen should help define
a new role for

the state to promote economic growth and stability.
1946,

in

Hoffman challenged corporate leaders to "look one

important fact squarely in the face--that the Federal

Government has
system."

a

vital role to play in our capitalistic

NAM conservatives "who claim that all that

is

necessary is to 'unshackle free enterprise' are guilty of an

irresponsible statement," he went

on.

"Those who say that

the Federal Government's role is only that of an umpire have

their heads in the sand." The CED's message was that enlightened businessmen should not reject the state but should

provide positive policy programs to guide the government in
the correct direct ion.

Moderates tended to take an accomodationist attitude

towards organized labor.

Rather than fearing unions, some

welcomed them with open arms.

Progressive industrialists,

like Henry Kaiser or Eric Johnston, believed that if

properly directed, unions could "contribute to increased
industrial efficiency and social responsibility." 1
They acknowledged unions as legitimate representatives of

their employees and welcomed the cooperative arrangements
Through

that government agencies promoted during the war.

these means and without giving up real power, these executives hoped to gain organized labor's cooperation in

increasing productivity and industrial stability.

To these

businessmen, the NLRB was not an enemy but an ally in the
O O

development of responsible unions.
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Any attempt to categorize businessmen into two
camps

obviously slights many shadings and variations.

The busi-

ness community had many divisions within it and
individual

businessmen often demonstrated little ideological consistency.

Many members of the CED like Henning

W.

Prentis of

Armstrong Cork or Clarence Francis of General Foods were
also prominent NAM activists.

These men might accept an

enlightened attitudes towards an activist state but scowl at
progressive labor policy within their own plants.
in fact,

The CED,

worked hard not to alienate more conservative

businessmen, and individuals like Walter

D.

Fuller, presi-

dent of Curtis Publishing Company, could direct information

committees for both organizations.

Fuller seemingly had

little difficulty with spreading the contradictory messages
of the NAM and CED to the business community and to the

public.
III

Mobilization of the business community actually began
during the war.

The CED had as its principal founding goals

in 1942 the formulation of constructive postwar economic

policy.

It sponsored research into reconversion problems

and through its Field Development Division and Information

Department sought to educate businessmen and popularize its

economic vision.

By the end of the war over 2,800 autono-

mous CED committees of businessmen were working to achieve
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the CED objectives of postwar business
expansion and level

employment.

These committees, however, were to be

shortlived.

in order to assuage the suspicions of the

older business organizations, like the NAM and the Chamber
of Commerce,

the CED promised to disband its local groups at

the end of the conflict.

Although its emphasis was

primarily on educating the business community, the CED
reached out to the public through

a

weekly national radio

program to allay the "fear of fear itself" and ensure that
the people were "informed on what the problems of reconver-

sion are,

and how they are being met."^^

The older business organizations were not far behind
the CED.

In 1942, the Chamber of Commerce initiated

structural changes to reinvigorate the organization.

In

order to enhance its political influence the Chamber of

Commmerce established
to lobby Congress.

a

Department of Governmental Affairs

It also formed 800 local level national

affairs committees to mobilize public opinion and apply
political pressure.

The leadership of the organization

shifted hands from an old guard of traditional conservatives
to a new group of cautious moderates led by Eric

Johnston.

A.

Under Johnston's leadership, the Chamber offi-

cially moved closer to the sort of economic policies

endorsed by the CED.

That is,

it accepted the inevitablity

of government intervention in the economy but was prepared

to act decisively in defining the state's
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role.'*-'-

In contrast, the National Association
of Manufacturers

continued its steadfast support for individualism
and
freedom from government interference. The need
for wartime
unity, however, stopped outright attacks against
New Deal

Liberalism. The organization moved towards refurbishing
its

negative image and rebuilding business leadership.
tinued

a

it con-

public relations program that began in the 1930s

but in more muted, subtle terms.

Through newspaper adver-

tisements, radio programs, and other forms of mass

communications, the NAM stressed protection of free enterprise and the harmony of all classes.

corporations followed in the NAM

's

individual

steps with advertisements

in popular weekly magazines like The Saturday Evening Post

or Collier ^s

emphasizing freedom of enterprise and rugged

,

individualism.

A Nash-Kelvinator Corporation piece, for

example, quotes an American soldier:
marbles.

I'm fighting for freedom.

"I'm not playing

for

I'm fighting for the

things that made America the greatest place in the world to

live in.

changed.

.

.

.

So don't anybody tell me I'll find America

.

Don't anybody tell me there's

opportunity to make

a

a

ceiling on my

million or be President. "^^

Fearing for the survival of private enterprise during
the war, the NAM tried to activate the business community in
its defense.

Thus,

the organization supplemented its

earlier public relations efforts with

relations forums.

a

program of public

These meetings were designed to educate

businessmen as to the importance of spreading the kind of
32

message found in the Nash-Kel vinator advertisement
and to
provide practical lessons. Two held during the
war and one
shortly after spoke to the need for a broaa, active
conser-

vative business response to the problem of excessive

government intervention in the economy. ^'^
Although the NAM 's economic message certainly conflicted with that of the CED, both organizations agreed on the

necessity of mobilizing the business community.

The

principal point of agreement appeared to be the effort to

offset the growing influence of organized labor.

Indeed,

battles fought in the immediate post-war years over full

employment, price controls, and labor legislation drew the
groups closer together and encouraged businessmen to seek

greater cooperation on at least the basic issues of the

post-war economy.
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CHAPTER

3

DEFENDING THE FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, 1945-1955
In early 1946 sociologist Robert Lynd observed
that

"the old liberal enterprise system is on the way out and

business must organize and fight for its life."

While

acknowledging ideological differences within the business
community, Lynd asserted that there was broad agreement

among employers that their two most critical problems were
defining the role of the state and of organized labor within
the economy.

Business, he claimed, was prepared to "spend

unlimited money" in search of

a

solution.

Two years later

Lynd perceptively outlined the strategic program embarked
upon by corporate leaders to regain political and economic

influence in the immediate post-war period.

The business

community was determined "to organize its power more
systematically and continuously

...

to control the federal

government" and "to curb the growing power of labor."

According to Lynd, the business' most insidious tactic was
the "selling of the 'private enterprise system' on the

theory that if you control public opinion you have the
2
government in your hand and labor behind the eight ball."

In the post-war decade, there were a number of major

national issues still open to debate.

American society had

yet to reach consensus on the relationship of government to
the economy, on the proper size of the welfare state, and on

the scope of union power in the factory.
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The two most

central actors in this debate, the business
community and
organized labor, had both awakened to the
importance of

public opinion.

Between 1945 and 1955, each launched

strenuous campaigns to shape national politics and
create
favorable climate of opinion for their opposing views.

many respects, these national campaigns framed

a

a

In

debate that

would reach into factories, schools, churches, and communities over the next decade.

At stake was the future of the

American economy.

Labor, particularly the CIO, had an aggressive political program for post-war reconstruction.

With liberal

Democrats and the support of the Truman administration,
labor's legislative agenda included tax reform,

unemployment insurance, price controls, and
wage.

The legislative centerpiece of

a

1

a

expanded

higher minimum

iberal -labor vision

of the post-war order, however, was the Full Employment
Bi 1

1

.

Labor demanded that government assure sufficient

employment opportunities for all Americans through support
of private investments and, if necessary

spending.

,

by government

Full employment was to be the opening wedge for

post-war economic expansion and the Keynesian program of
using government spending to guarantee prosperity and

security
Factions of the business community mobilized to either

oppose or mediate the content of government-guaranteed full
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employment.

To members of the NAM and local chambers of

commerce, the bill epitomized the long slide towards
state
socialism.

These business leaders denounced the Full

Employment Bill and initiated

a

lobbying campaign against

its passage and against the institutionalization of govern-

ment involvement in the economy.^

Instead of outright

opposition, moderate businessmen responded in

ticated manner.

Adhering to

a

a

more sophis-

policy of providing positive

guidance the Business Advisory Council and the Council of

Economic Development diseminated reports on the employment
issue that accepted the idea of

a

limited federal involve-

ment in the economy but rejected compensatory government
spending as the solution to unemployment.

Corporate

liberals like George M. Humphrey of the M.A. Hanna Company,

Ralph Flanders, Paul Hoffman, and Chamber of Commerce presi-

dent Eric Johnston worked quietly behind the scene to

provide support for conservative Congressmen who sought to

water down but not destroy the

bill.*^

Moderate businessmen enjoyed the most success.

When

the Employment Act passed in 1946, gone from the final

version was the government commitment to full employment and
the provisions for mandatory spending.
the specifications of the CED perfectly.

What was left met
The Act provided

that government should affirm an interest in maintaining

maximum employment through the establishment

of research

machinery to evaluate the state of the economy.
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The

responsiblity for providing employment, however,
would
continue to reside in the private sector, it
was, according
to one Business Council activist a "pretty
innocuous"
bill.

Moderates had taken important first steps in shaping
the
limits of the debate over the role of the state.
If the

employment act was

a

victory for the moderate

arm of the business community, conservatives could rejoice
in their role in eliminating governmental control over

prices.

The Office of Price Control had been effective in

stablizing prices during the war.

But important elements of

the business community chafed under its regulation and

complained about its inflexibility and restrictions on
profits.^

Moreover, business analyst Harold Fleming charged

that the OPA was stacked with people "with no business

experience and hostile to business wellbeing and indifferent
to business

failure.""^

At the end of the war, many liberals joined with

organized labor in strongly advocating continuance of the
OPA to check inflation.

The response of corporate leaders

reflected the divisions in the business community.

The

Committee for Economic Development and moderate businessmen
like Eric Johnston acknowledged their dislike for economic

controls in peacetime but stood in fear of the dangers of
inflationary pressures generated by the war.

context of

a

commitment of

a

free price system, the CED

quietly advocated renewal of the OPA on
and gradual relaxation of controls.
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Within the

o

a

temporary basis

Destruction of the OPA became the rallying cry of
laissez faire businessmen as its continuance during peace-

time epitomized to them America's drift towards collectivism.

In late 1945, with the aid of industrial and

commerical trade associations, the NAM spearheaded "one of
the most carefully planned lobbying campaigns in legislative
history."^

The campaign was aimed both at the Congress,

which was considering renewal of the agency, and at the
public.

In a lobbying effort similar to the one conducted

against the Full Employment Bill, yet more intense, the NAM
and other business groups testified before Congressional

commitees and pressured individual legislators.

The NAM

alone spent over three million dollars in 1946 to destroy
the OPA.

page

Half of that went to newspaper advertising.

Full

advertisements directed towards consumers began:

"VJould you like some BUTTER or a ROAST of BEEF" and alleged

that OPA controls had discouraged the production of butter

and driven meat into the black market. ''^
The NAM held a series of meetings with industrialists
to whip up local enthusiasm for the drive against price

controls.

It also sent speakers to make hundreds of talks

before civic organizations, women's clubs and college
students.

NAM publications barraged over one hundred

thousand school teachers, clergy, farm leaders, women's
clubs directors and over ten thousand weekly newspapers and

columists with anti-OPA statements.^ ^
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"Take the wraps--

wartime price controls-off peace production
and there will
be such an abundance of things to buy as
America has never
known" the NAM proclaimed. It promised that
"if price
controls are removed goods will then pour into
the market,
and then, within a reasonable time, prices will
adjust

themselves--naturally--as they always have--in line with the
real worth of things. "^2

yes,

said the NAM,

it supported

price control but "price control by the American housewife,
not by bureaucrats in Washington."^

Fearful of a repeat of the disasterous inflation that

followed World War

I,

organized labor fought vigorously to

protect the wartime controls that were due to expire in June
1946.

groups,

It joined in a liberal alliance of teachers,

consumer

veterans and civic organizations to stave off

ride to disaster."

"joy

a

A "March of Housewives" paraded into

Washington in April 1946 and two thousand women representing
consumer groups demonstrated outside the Capitol. ''^
President

R.J.

UAW

Thomas warned autoworkers that the removal of

price controls threatened recently achieved wage increases.
The nam's full page ads proved that "dominant manufacturing

companies are 'hell bent' for inflation."

manufacturers of "conducting

a

Thomas accused

strike which makes the labor

strikes look puny by comparison.

This strike is against the

general public, and its objective is higher prices."

The

UAW president urged the union members to organize their
local communities and vowed that "we most definitely have
"^5
the political power to help stop this drive to inflation.
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R.J.

Thomas was wrong.

A congressional coalition of

Republicans and Southern Democrats gutted the OPA and the
NAM cheerfully took credit.

Prices immediately jumped, some

as much as twenty-five percent in two weeks.

Labor news-

papers admitted to the effectiveness of the employer
campaign, conceding that some of the public and even some
trade unionists had fallen for the NAM
technique."

's

"big lie

A UAW local paper quoted the editor of a small

Pennsylvania weekly:

"When we saw that OPA was on the way

out, we joined in the snake dance that was led by the

National Association of Manufactures and unwittingly

swallowed the platitudes put out by that organization that
the end of price control would increase production and lower
costs."

But,

he continued,

"After several months of eye-

rubbing, during which prices continued their steady climb
.

.

.

we began to awaken to the fact that the NAM eyewash was

irritating rather than soothing."

Having learned their

lesson "we had the courage to ask for the return of the OPA
if prices could not be controlled."^

The struggles against the Full Employment Act and price

controls were the beginning of

a

larger effort on the part

of the business community to undermine liberal and left-wing

influence on American society and to shift the political

climate in

a

more conservative direction.

The tenacity of

liberal support for measures like price controls seemed to

demonstrate that the conservative business community's worst
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fears about the lessons the public would take from
the

depression and wartime experiences were not unfounded.
Despite these early legislative successes, an expanded role
for the state and government guarantees of security for

workers through mechanisms like deficit spending appeared to
be highly popular.

In October 1946,

Corporation Vice President

F.D.

Westinghouse Electric

Newbury found "no clear

demand by the American people, or program from the Washington Administration, for returning to the tested principles

and practices of free private enterprise.

Instead there

were "strong pressures within the Administration to

perpetuate as much planning and control as the people would
accept. "^^

Conservative businessmen trying to mobilize the
business community issued repeated and at times almost
hysterical warnings that the American way of life was under
attack.

One business journal in 1947 found that the world

was in "the throes of

a

cataclysmic conflict.

of the conflict are clearly drawn.

.

.

The lines

The collectivist system

on the one side, the capitalistic system on the other.

test for survival is in progress. "'•^

A

Leading the assault

on business and the American way of life were trade unions

assisted by the "pseudo-liberals, academic busy-bodies,
columnists,
and

a

'enlightened' newspaper men, radio commentators

galaxy of associated malcontents."

Their "tirades"

against free enterprise were not new but the threat of
20
Communism overseas intensified the domestic danger.

46

From every direction, businessmen found evidence
of the
effectiveness of the liberal -trade union indoctrination
of

the public.

Despite industry's war production record, the

business journal Factory warned that business was again on
the defensive and almost back into its prewar doghouse. ^1

The public tended to be suspicious of industry and had

little understanding of the American economic system.
result,

As a

workers bought trade union "propaganda" about

bloated corporate profits.

Public Relations News found

"incontrovertible" evidence that almost the entire public

believed that corporate profits were from double to ten

times their actual rate.^^

In contrast, the labor movement

"retains the public's good will

— or

at least its patient

indulgence--in spite of stopping the public's trains,
planes, boats, trolleys, elevators, and even turning off its
lights."

Beebe,

According to California businessman James

L.

"the people of the United States have been fed and

I

think most of them have believed, that the state can provide
jobs; that capitalism is on its way out;.

.

.

and that it is

the duty of the state to provide security (so-called) for
all of its people. "^^

Opinion surveys seemed to substantiate Beebe's fears.

Factory 's 1946 survey found that forty-seven percent of
factory workers thought that the government would do most in

providing new peacetime jobs.^^

Similarily, the Opinion

Research Corporation discovered that over seventy percent of
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workers believed that the government should
guarantee
jobs. 26

For some corporate leaders the most startling

revelation in terms of the outlook for business
growth and

survival was

Fortune poll that showed less than half of
those interviewed believed hard work would pay off.
All
a

these findings seemed to demonstrate

a

lack of confidence

among the public in the free enterprise system.
There were differences within the business community as
to the seriousness of the threat to capitalism.

Most

alarmist were the traditional conservatives associated with
the NAiM who had been finding evidence of

a

since the days of the New Deal.

Clark of The

American Economic Foundation,

a

Fred

G.

coming cataclysm

conservative think tank

founded in the thirties, asserted that businessmen from
across the country agreed "that America is sitting on

a

volcano," and that an overall plan should be adopted "at the

earliest possible moment" to "save America."

Public rela-

tions experts, eager to promote their function in the

corporate hierarchy, provided

a

steady stream of dire pre-

dictions to add to the anxieties of these business leaders.
One public relations firm, for example, warned in 1947 that

"our present economic system, and the men who run it, have

three years

— maybe

five at the outside--to resell our so-far

preferred way of life as against competing systems."
the firm claimed,
in the world.
is

..2

Ours,

was "the 'last exhibit' of free enterprise

If we yield it by default,

8
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that's all there

Sophisticated moderates, who accepted

growing role

a

for the government, were less likely to shout
about

America's drift towards statism.

They turned for evidence

to the findings of opinion polster Elmo Roper who
emphasized
the fundamental belief of Americans in the values upon which

the free enterprise system was based.

But even the

leaders of the CED agreed that the business community needed
to protect its reputation and ability to decisively influ-

ence America's political culture.

Paul

G.

Hoffman argued

that it was "high time that we devote time and thought in
bringing about public understanding of the role of profits
in a free economy. "-^^

II

In the battle to save the "American way of life,"

businessmen utilized
After World War

I,

a

combination of attack and persuasion.

conservative business organizations had

exploited public fears over radicalism as
ing organized labor.

a

means of attack-

Growing concerns about domestic

subversion and the Soviet Union again provided business with
the opportunity to utilize anti-communism as

against liberals and labor.
zations,

In late 1945,

a

weapon

business organi-

like the Chamber of Commerce, allied with patriotic

groups, such as the American Legion, initiated

a

propaganda

campaign against communism in government and in the labor
movement.

Warnings of Communist infiltration of American
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institutions helped foster an atmosphere of
intolerance. ^ 1

Symptomatic of their success in changing the political
climate was the firing during 1946 of dozens of liberal
radio broadcasters.

Business sponsors also pressured other

reporters to "tone down" news sympathetic to organized
labor,

Russia or liberal causes. -^^

The flipside of the battle against radicalism was the

promotion of

a

ultra patriotism.

If international

Communism

and domestic subversion threatened American values, what was
needed, according to Advertising Council director Thomas
D'Arcy Brophy, was a patriotic campaign which "would help by

attacking the root of the evil, which is the loss of faith
in our traditions.

And it would help by selling the rewards

still open to us individually and collectively, if we are

willing to put American grit and sweat into our jobs."
From this concern over the subversion of American values

came educational-patriotic programs like the Freedom Train,
a red,

white, and blue train that carried

a

cargo of his-

toric documents to communities throughout the country.

Initiated and strongly supported by the business community,
this patriotic campaign, which began in 1947, was designed
to re-sell Americanism to Americans.

partisan,

Although labeled non-

the emphasis on individual rights and freedom from

coersion constituted

a

subtle attack on the values promoted

by liberals and trade unioni st s.
In Detroit,

the campaign to associate patriotism with

anti-unionism was less subtle.
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Support of American values

could easily be extended to include support
of business as
one of the America's central institutions.
"An American's
Pledge of Loyalty." regularly broadcast in 1947
and 1948
over

a

Detroit radio station, implied that patriotic workers

owed their allegiance to more than their flag and country.
It read "I pledge devotion to God and the brotherhood
His

word proclaims:

I

offer loyalty to the United Nations and

the world order it is maintaining:

and the opportunities it contains;

I

I

vow to defend America

promise to give my best

to America and American Industry and the homes it sustains."

UAW Local 600 caustically noted that such sentiments implied
that my country right or wrong had become my employer right
or wrong.

Local 600 sarcastically asked workers:

"Did you

give your best to American industry today. "-^'^
The business campaign to sell patriotism merged into an

equally fervent if even more intense campaign of persuasion
to sell Americans on the benefits of capitalism.

men believed in the importance of public opinion.

BusinessIf the

public held industry in low esteem, it was because of

a

general misunderstanding fostered by organized labor through
its denunciation of exhorbiant corporate profits.

Employers found justification for their faith in public
relations in the words of Abraham Lincoln, quoting his 1860

statement that "with public sentiment nothing can fail.
Without

it,

nothing can succeed.

Consequently, he who molds

public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or
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pronounces decisions--he makes statutes or decisions

possible or impossible to execute.

it

seemed increas-

ingly clear that the business community needed to mold

public opinion in a more systematic way.

As a result,

business leaders from across the ideological spectrum vowed
to reeducate their employees and the public in the prin-

ciples and benefits of the American economic system.

Between 1945 and 1947, new organizations emerged with
the purpose of aiding the business community in restoring

"American" values.

Among them were the Foundation for

Economic Education, formed in 1946, the Industrial Information Institute, established in 1947,

the American Heritage

Foundation, organized in 1947 to sponsor the Freedom Train,
and the Advertising Council, reorganized in 1945 from

wartime agency.

a

Ostensibly non-partisan, these groups

cooperated with such older opponents of New Deal liberalism
as the Tax Foundation and the American Economic Foundation.

Financial support came from the largest manufacturing

corporations and combined firms with ultra-conservative
outlooks (the DuPont Company, Sun Oil, and Republic Steel)

with others at the more liberal end of the business
political spectrum, such as Ford and
There was

a

U.S.

Steel. 3 7

certain variety in the messages emanating

from these organizations as well as from individual
companies.

The most conservative, like the Foundation for

Economic Education,

emphasized absolute protection of its

version of America's freedom, particularly economic freedom
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Those representing the more liberal wing
of the business
community, like the Advertising Council,
recognized labor's
right to free collective bargaining and
acknowledged the
necessity of government involvement in economic
affairs

where private interests proved inadequate.

But, there were

certain themes common to almost all the business efforts
at

mass persuasion.

Among them were importance of individual

initiative and opportunity, the role of competition, and the

legitimacy and economic necessity of profits.
&

An N.W. Ayer

Son advertisment, for example, explained that profits were

used "for practically the same purposes as the wages

husband brings home Fridays."
ting the public's

a

Much effort went into correc-

"f antastic"ideas

about the rate of

business profits and in easily understood language showing
the relationship of profits to investment and the growth of

the American economy.
Finally, business groups hammered home the necessity of

expanding productivity through the application of increased
mechanization, power, and efficiency.
lar,

Workers, in particu-

needed to understand that, despite union calls for

higher wages at the expense of profits, increased real wages
and an improved standard of living actually depended upon

greater productivity.

The business journal Factory warned

in 1947 that workers "led by mistaken, overzealous, or

ignorant prophets, can price themselves out of jobs, and

industry along with them out of markets," unless they gave
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the "cooperation necessary for the
production job that must
be done."
in 1948, a Warner & Swasey advertisement
asserted
that "It's just that simple:
if you want lower prices, a

steady job, and more pay, you start with more
efficient
production.

And there's no other way."^^

At the forefront of the effort to correct the
public's

thinking was the National Association of Manufacturers.

At

the end of the war, the NAM gave top priority to expanding
and intensifying its already long-established public

relations campaign against what it called collectivism.

It

asserted that the "battle between the advocates of collec-

tivism and those who believe in freedom and opportunity" had
been rejoined after the armistice imposed by all-out war.
The NAM believed it had to work quickly, contending that New
Deal liberals had joined forces with the CIO in an attempt
to "sell their respective 'bil 1-of-goods

people" in order to prepare them for
in the nation's economy."

a

'

to the American

"revolutionary change

The strike wave, price controls,

the "fallacious" principle of ability to pay as

a

factor in

fixing wage scales, and continued deficit spending and heavy

taxation constituted

a

"master plan to remake America."

NAM was determined to help lead the counter-attack. '^^
1946-47,

The
In

it raised a multi-million dollar war chest to sell

the free enterprise story, with additional funds allocated
for its more specific campaigns,

such as those against the

full employment bill and price controls.

Financial support

from the membership increased eacn year after the war.
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While 6,000 of the 16,000 members of the NAM
contributed to
its public relations fund in 1946, over
11,000 contributed
the following

year.^-'-

The organization revamped its public relations program
in 1946.

Members and advertising experts had criticized the

nam's earlier efforts,

asserting that it was suspect "by the

people whom management must reach."

Too often,

according to

advertising consultants, NAM publicity in defense of the
free enterprise sytem could be subverted and used by labor
to label industry as selfish and greedy.

The NAM leadership

answered these concerns by trying to improve its advertising
techniques.

It hired the Opinion Research Corporation to

field-test potential advertisements in order to establish in
advance their ability to "convey an idea and enlist sympa-

thetic consideration." 4 9
The NAM began a more aggressive public relations

campaign.

"The story of business economics and philosophy

needs to be told" declared Holcombe Parkes, NAM vice

president for public relations, "simply, understandably,
repetitious ly and without dilution or distortion --to broad

masses of the people."

Accordingly,

it issued a constant

stream of paid advertisements, news releases, speeches,
posters,

leaflets, and magazines.

The Industrial Press

Service, for example, sent free material to 7,500 country

papers and 2,500 company journals, while the organization's
literature department distributed in 1947 over two million
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pamphlets.

The NAM newspaper and magazine advertising

campaigns, focusing on the three roadblocks to
prosperityprice controls, labor relations, government
spending, and

taxes were brought to the public in early

19

4 6

through paid

ads in 265 daily papers and 1,876 small town papers.

Similarily, it ran ads explaining profits in popular

magazines like Harper ^s and Saturday Evening Post

.

Half of

the nam's two-and-a-half million dollar public relations

budget in 1947 went to national advertising and publicity.
Furthermore, newspapers often picked up NAM material and ran
it free of charge,

while the complementary efforts of other

trade organizations to explain the workings of the American

economic system gave NAM 's program even broader exposure.
The NAM supplemented its written appeals with copy on

other media.

It regularly distributed "Briefs for Broad-

casters" to 1,000 radio commentators and program directors.
In addition,

NAM representatives made personal contacts with

network officers, local station managers, program directors
and com.m>entators.

In 1946 it sought to recruit and train a

staff of full-time radio debaters for participation in the

popular forum-style programs like Town Hall.

Busy and

oftimes unprepared industrialists, complained the NAM, had
not been particularly effective against the opposition that

assigned "someone trained in public brawling, armed to the

hilt with facts and figures, and bug-eyed with zeal for the
Leftist side of any debate. ""^^

Also,

beginning in 1947,

instead of just relying on free radio time from the
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networks, the NAM bought its own airtime and began "visiting

some 3,000,000 American homes" with
Business Reporter."

a

radio series,

"Your

The program emphasized the need for

"keeping firm faith in the benefits and opportunities

provided by the American system of free enterprise in the
face of constant attacks from the

Moreover,

left."'^^

the organization expanded its motion picture

service to develop

a

wider audience before groups of

employees, club members, educators and students.

Films,

like "American Anniversary" and "Your Town--A Story of

America" demonstrated the relationship of American freedoms
and opportunites to all other freedoms and showed the value
of individual initiative and the dependence of the community

on the industrial payroll.

By 1948,

yearly attendance at

NAM films had reached over two-and-a-half million people

a

year 47
The barrage of business messages appeared to deliver
In the 1946 congressional

immediate political gains.

elections. Republicans rolled to
a

a

stunning victory, gaining

majority in both houses for the first time since 1928.

Businessmen read the results of the 1946 congressional election as evidence of the initial success of their prostely-

tizing campaign.

Much of the public, wearied by constant

industrial strife and

frustrated by the galloping infla-

tion, ever higher prices, and scarcity of consumer goods

seemed to accept the business explanation that organized

57

labor was to blame for the country's economic
woes.

Exploiting their impatience, Republicans campaigned
on the
issues of curbing union power and the excesses of
federal

authority, repeatedly asking "Had Enough?"

Conservative

businessmen supported red-baiting Republican tactics and
linked labor disturbances to the "international Communist
conspiracy." The Chamber of Commerce, for instance, released
a report,

entitled "Communist Infiltration in the United

States," at the height of the campaign.

Meanwhile, in

cities like Milwaukee, division within the labor movement
over Communism helped undercut labor's political power.

The NAM interpreted the results of the election as
public mandate.

a

The message was "We are tired of government

regimentation and boot-strap economics."

It seemed clear

that the public was turning back to the business community
for leadership:

"let's see what business can do to lead us

to better days.

Let's give business a fair chance to prove

that our way of life is better than any other system in the
world. ""^^

Similarily, the election said to Charles

E.

Wilson of General Motors that "America has chosen the fork
in the road that leads to freedom and personal liberty.

The

majority of our citizens have had enough, enough of bureaucratic government planning

.

.

.

enough of unbalanced budget

and governmental extravagances; enough of organized

unemployment.
The conservative political resurgence combined with the

apparent decline in labor's public esteem gave the business
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community more power and unity in its growing battle
against
unions.

Heeding Thomas Roy Jones's call that "Management

must wake up" to the dangers of the labor movement's "mad
lust for power" business leaders had reached consensus
over
the future direction of labor relations policy.

This convergence of opinion added strength to the

emerging corporate strategy designed to restore management's
lost authority and roll back union power.

prominently in this first step towards

a

The NAM figured

successful

"recovery of the initiative" in labor relations.

At the end

of the war, attempting to change its negative image,

the NAM

muted its attack on labor by abandoning the demand for
industrial self-rule, laissez faire, and the repeal of the

Wagner Act.

NAM leaders publicly acknowledged workers'

rights to engage in collective bargaining but called for

changes in public policy that would enable the state to

intervene on behalf of employers.

While some corporate

liberal businessmen might publicly applaud the efforts of

progressives like Eric Johnston, Paul Hoffman of Studebaker

Motors and Henry Kaiser to promote union-management accomodation, most, even in the CED, joined the NAM conservatives
in promoting a strategy that historian Howell John Harris

has labeled "realism."

It entailed reluctant acceptance of

the principle of unionism while actively attempting to

restrict the scope of collective bargaining and to contain
labor power.

By early 1946,
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it was clear to sociologist

Robert Lynd that in labor relations, liberal
and conservative businessmen had become "brothers under
the skin."^^

The first part of this multi-pronged attack
on labor

involved "the confinement and gradual reduction" of
the
scope of collective bargaining and union influence
within
the factory.

This effort had begun towards the end of the

war and intensified during reconversion, with the auto

companies setting the trend during the 1945-1946 bargaining
Determined to save "our American system and keep it

round.

from evolving into an alien form imported from east of the
Rhine," General Motors refused to negotiate with Reuther

over corporate investment and pricing policy.

Moreover,

it provoked a work stoppage rather than capitulate to

labor's attempt to expand the scope of collective bargaining

into the realm of management decision making.

Henceforth,

bargaining would be limited to such issues as wages, hours
and working conditions.

Similarily, seeking improved

control, stability and predictability. Ford Motor Company

demanded and received security from the UAW against unauthorized strikes and freedomi to maximize product ion. S 6^
late 1946, management consultant Ralph

A.

In

Lind observed that

never before had management been so conscious of the need to

make collective bargaining

"a

two-sided proposition."

Employers were "becoming increasingly insistent that the
unions

.

.

.

recognize the rights of management and the

5 7
obligations of employees and union officials."
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The second part of the struggle to curb the
power of
industrial unionism involved weakening government
support of
organized labor through revision of the Wagner Act.
The

NAM, together with such organizations as the Business

Advisory Council, developed

a

relatively moderate set of

legislative proposals that reflected the emerging business
consensus on labor. The NAM argued that the business program

was not punitive but was designed to make collective bargaining work in the public interest.
Act,

Under the Wagner

former NAM president H.W. Prentis argued, unions had

gained unlimited monopoly power without any legal responsibility.

They intimidated their members and the public

through mass picketing, boycotting, and violence and had

crippled the country's economic progress through restrictive
practices that undermined productivity.

Even more fundamen-

tally troubling to Prentis was the "ominous rise of class

consciousness, engendered by legalized labor union
activity."

C Q

The "House of Labor," intoned Detroit manu-

facturer Frank Rising, had become

neighborhood.

ft
""

"a

nuisance in the

f)

What business spokesmen demanded was legislation that
The

would bring balance between labor and management.
absence of true equality and the failure to protect

employees and the public from unions had resulted in the
growth of the monopoly power of labor which was the cause of
the ever increasing levels of industrial strife.

This was

the message that the NAM broadcast in a series of newspaper
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.

ads in February 1946.

It proposed to protect employees

through guaranteeing employer free speech, prohibition
of
union security clause to ensure the right to work,
and

regulation of union's internal affairs.

The public rights

would be guarded by regulating strikes that threatened the
nation's safety and by outlawing sympathetic and jurisdic-

tional strikes as well as secondary boycotts.

In addition,

requirement of proof that union officers were not communists
would help rid the labor movement of subversive influence,
while prohibitions against union contributions to federal
political campaigns would limit organized labor's political
power.

Finally, the exclusion of foremen from collective

bargaining would provide safeguards for the rights of

management and help offset the union challenge to managerial
prerogatives

6

1

In the spring of 1947, aided by the Chamber of

Commerce, employer associations, and individual corporations,

the NAM threw its full strength behind the Taft-

Hartley bill, the labor reform legislation that came out of
the Republican dominated eightieth Congress.

The Associa-

tion conducted an intense lobbying campaign in Washington.
It attached equal im.portance to obtaining public support and

utilized the public relations mechanisms at both the com-

munity and national levels that had helped destroy price
controls and promote

a

conservative political atmosphere.

The NAM alone spent over three million dollars in the public

62

.

relations drive that featured full page ads
in 287 daily
papers in 193 key industrial centers. Always,
employers

couched their arguments for labor reform constructively,
"in
the puplic interest. "^-^
A compliant press aided business in mobilizing public
opinion.

The weekly Quincy Record of Illinois, for example,

engaged in

a

blitz of pro-Taf t-Hart ley coverage.

it re-

printed the bi-weekly talks of Henry

J.

Motors sponsored radio commentator.

Playing on public fears

Taylor, the General

of radicalism, Taylor charged that those who oppose labor

reform were Communist fellow-travellers who sought to weaken

America by "hamstringing our individual effort through
lopsided labor law

.

.

.

through sponsoring false economic

doctrines that can bust us, along with political action
dedicated to tying up management so that it

cannot possibly

manage." The paper endorsed Taylor's ideas and contended

that Taft-Hartley was not anti-labor; it really protected

workingmen "from coercions from any source." It asked
workers to look beyond their narrow class interests, arguing

that the legislation would be used as

a

tool in the public

interest to fight inflation through lifting arbitrary union

rules "which exploit the worker in his other role as
customer of goods and services."

a

Arguments such as these

flooded the newspapers and airways.

In June 1947 conserva-

tives and the business community celebrated victory when

Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over
veto 64
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a

presidential

:

Ill

The labor movement did not just surrender
before this

managerial onslaught.
gies.

First,

Its defense centered on two strate-

trade unionists, the labor press, and their

allies tried to counter employer propaganda efforts.

In

late 1947, for example. Senator Harley Kilgore blasted
the

NAM before the Senate, exposing the various techniques used
by the organization to "soften up the country" and denounced
its role in killing price controls, wrecking the Wagner Act,

and attempting to "emasculate" the wage and hour law.^^

For

their part, trade union leaders were alarmed over employer

public relations programs.

They paid close attention to the

activities of the NAM and individual employers like General
Motors.

funding

Labor papers warned workers that business was
"a

vast outpouring of propaganda

— millions

of

printed words and thousand of hours of radio time" designed
"to convince the American people that labor is a

'monopoly'

and that its organizations should be weakened to "give

business an even break. "^^ Indiana State CIO president Neal

Edwards sent letters to the membership pointing out the NAM
tricks
"Read carefully between the line and do your own
Take such NAM propaganda with a grain of
thinking.
salt.
Your own power of reasoning, based on true facts,
will aid tremendously in our efforts to expose the NAM
industrialists organized for the
for what it is,
soul purpose of protecting their profit-bursting
.

pocketbooks

.

"

.

.
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Organized labor also warned workers to be wary
of the
seemingly non-partisan campaigns to sell free
enterprise

orginating from liberal business organizations like
the
Advertising Council.
While the Council's campaign

was in

its planning stages in early 1948, the labor press
pointed

out that the project, which would overshadow the NAM 's

national advertising,

was an "audacious billion-dollar plan"

designed to "sell the American people on the virtues of big
business."

Trade unionists chortled with glee when Marshall

Adams, a director of the Association of National Advertisers, denounced the campaign, which boiled "down to an

effort to cover up the evils of the private enterprise

system and to propagandize against changes to improve that
system."

The average "Joe Doakes," Adams declared,

need to be sold on 'the American way of life."^^

"doesn't

Similarily

the Railway workers journal. Labor, ridiculed these efforts

calling them the "biggest 'ballyhoo campaign in history."

What is wrong with free enterprise, the paper asked if
"after having its own way all these years, it must now be
'sold' in this

lavish way?"^^

Trade unionists asserted that the class nature of mass

communications prevented fair coverage.

The CIO News

charged that most daily newspapers and radio stations had
close ties to an interlocking web of such large corporations
as Eastman Kodak, General Mills, U.S. Steel, International

Paper Company, and AT&T.

would follow

a

It was only natural that the press

policy of "damming labor at every opportunity
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while carefully glossing over the sins of
the banking and
industrial magnates who really control the
nation. "^0
In

1946,

the Greater Buffalo Industrial Union, infuriated
at

the "anti-labor" and "anti-CIO" coverage of the
Buffalo

Evening News, resolved to expose the paper's intent
to

destroy the public's civil liberties and legal rights.

^^

Similarly, Pennsylvania unionists warned members against

newscasters like Fulton Lewis

Jr.,

a

propagandist in the

employ of the NAM and the Republican Party, while labor
leaders at the Ford Motor's Company's River Rouge plant

cautioned fellow workers that the Detroit daily press was

spreading lies day and night to "demoralize the rank and
file of our great union."

simply urged:

UAW foundry worker Leroy Krawford

"Believe only our union press and radio

hookup which is paid for by you and staged by you to tell
you the score.

""^^

"Watch out," organized labor also told its members, for

those "phony" opinion polls that always seemed to provide

ammunition to employers.

A 1947 Opinion Research Corpora-

tion poll, for instance, apparently showed that while most

workers opposed the Taft-Hartely Act, they supported ten of
the most important provisions of the Act when presented

These findings were publicized in

separately.

a

Look

Magazine article and in full page advertisements sponsored
by companies,

Carbide and

like General Electric, General Motors, Union

J.I.

Case as well as widely distributed among
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factory employees and editorial writers.

Labor and Nation

charged that this poll was simply "planned conf
us ion."'^
In an effort to undercut the political
uses of these

polls in 1948, the Building Services Employees
Union engaged

pollster Robert

C.

Myers who reported that "much of the

polling reported in today's newspapers and magazines is
unscientific, biased, and slipshod."

Similarily the AFL

accused pollsters of the "worst kind of fraud.

They are big

business organizations which are used to influence rather
than measure public opinion. ""^^

Trade unionists also

pointed to sociologist Arthur Kornhauser's 1946 study of

major public-opinion polling agenices, which found that the
questions on labor were biased towards
view.

a

management point of

Not surprisingly, since polling was

a

profit making

enterprise, according to the Pennsylvania Labor News

corporation pollsters were featured speakers at

a

,

pro-

NAM public

relations conference.
The second part of the labor union defense against

business aggressiveness involved publicizing the union point
of view, both to activate the rank and file and to gain a

more sympathetic hearing from the public.

In general,

however, unions reacted to an agenda set by the business

community.

A great deal of effort, for example, went into

refuting employer calls for higher productivity.

Walter

Reuther declared that the employer propaganda campaign on

productivity was an "effort by management to swell already
scandalously high profits by sweating still more profits out
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of workers.

Similarily, much union ink was spilled
in an
effort to disprove employer charges that
wage increases
led

to inflation.

Following Keysenian reasoning, the CIO argued
that, rather than harming the economy, wage
increases were
necessary to sustain mass purchasing power and
prevent
depression.

in 1946,

a

it widely publicized the Nathan

Report, which demonstated that wages could be increased

thirty-eight percent without price increaes and without
affecting profit levels.

declared

a

The post-war strike wave,

resolution sent by New York workers to their

Congressional representatives, arose from workers' attempt
to sustain their standard of living and should not be blamed
on unions but "on the bosses who are constantly refusing to

meet the workers' needs. "^^
The CIO asserted that inflation actually came from

shortages manufactured by employers to drive up prices and
profits.

To prove this,

labor papers constantly charted

increases in corporate profits in articles like one published in the United Auto m obile W orker entitled "Golden

Goose Hangs High, Profit Orgy Paves Way to Depression."

Big

business, asserted the CIO, was "having about as much luck
as the mahout who tried to hide his elephant in a pup tent"
in selling the public on the idea that corporate profits

were not too high.°
Unions rarely had the means to compete with biased

newspapers in terms of news coverage, nor could they compete
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with business groups in purchasing extensive
newspaper
advertising.
Consequently, the labor movement
looked

increasily towards radio as
union programs.

in 1939,

casters had adopted

a

means of gaining support for

a

the National Association of Broad-

code that prohibited the discussion of

controversial issues except for political broadcasts on
the
radio.

Many radio stations used the code to effectively bar

unions from the airways while providing time to business

groups like the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce.
in 1944,

Beginning

the AFL and the CIO began pressuring radio stations

and the Federal Communications Commission for access and in
1945, ABC provided airtime to the CIO which produced a

weekly program "Labor-U.S.A."^^

The program used music,

stories and interviews to explain labor's views on current
issues.

The CIO promoted other labor radio programs as "a

good antidote to the anti-strike poison you get from newspapers and from many radio commentators." The CIO gleefully

reported that

a

Variety review of the competing business and

labor radio programs found that "'Labor' is warm,

ingratiating, human," while the "exact antonyms characterize
the

'business' pitch'"

It

wasn't possible,

according to

Variety to balance the voice of ex-NAM president Ira Mosher
against Tom Glaser singing

a

ballad like 'Money in the

Pocket" and "expect anyone to cheer for the NAM.

isn't in the cards."

It

just

o n

To gain greater exposure, the CIO asked affiliates to

urge their local radio stations to broadcast the program as
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well as

a

second network program spnsored by
CBS,

Section— CIO. "

"Cross-

Local unions and central bodies also
began

sponsoring programs.

in 1946,

began a radio program,

Lansing, Michigan, UAW locals

"Labor Speaks," to support their

strike against General Motors.

Finally,

in January 1948,

the CIO tried to broaden its appeal, producing the
first

weekly labor quiz show.

"It's

in the Family" featured two

rank-and-file families competing for

a

savings bond by an-

swering questions about labor, the CIO, and current
event s

^
.

As the anti-labor assault intensified, unions began to

aggressively challenge the coverage of labor on commercially

owned stations.

In January 1948, the UAW petitioned the FCC

for a hearing on censorship,

charging that

station had refused to broadcast

a

a

Cincinnati

program by the Catholic

Church regarding its position on organized labor. ^'^

About

the same time, the Geneva Federation of Labor, incensed at

Fulton Lewis Jr.'s attacks on social security and the labor

movement, tried to drive him off the air by boycotting his
o c

local sponsor, the Geneva Federal Loan.°

The trade union public relations efforts, however,

lacked the resources and the sophistication of the business

community's free enterprise campaign.

Of the national

unions, the UAW and the United Electrical Workers were

perhaps the most active.

The class oriented nature of the

left-wing UE program partially backfired, however, for it
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,

provided fuel to business claims of Communist
indoctrination
of the working class. Finding that their
own members as well
as the public were "subjected hour after hour
and day after

day to employer propaganda," the UE launched its
program in
1946 to counteract these "forces of confusion and reaction

at work throughout our nation."

its activities included

the establishment of the first union weekly news broadcast,

entitled "An Informed America is

distribution of

a

a Free

America," the

modest amount of literature, including

a

guide to community action and pamphlets directed at the

public schools, and the production and distribution of

motion pictures.
News,

The business journal, Public Relations

characterized "Deadline for Action," the UE's first

picture, as an "exceptionally well made and compelling movie

which castigates business and industry as
profiteers

a

gang of

war m ongers and slave drivers. " The film became

almost as popular among businessmen as among workers as
business groups bought copies to demonstrate the dangers
facing America.

oc

The struggle against the passage of Taft-Hartley

revealed union limitations in the realm of moral suasion.
In early 1947,

the specter of anti-labor legislation

energized the labor movement.

Unions lobbied furiously in

Washington, organized a massive letter writing campaign and,
in the weeks prior to passage held huge public protest

rallies to arouse their membership and the public.

promoted

a

The CIO

publicity campaign entitled "Defend Labor Month"
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in an effort to mobilize local communities
against the

legislation.

CIO Publicity Director, Len DeCaux, urging

affilitates to gain radio time to present labor's
position,

distributed radio spot announcements and scripts for
speeches and interviews. ^"^ Emulating the NAM, the AFL
ran
five advertisements in one hundred leading newspapers

warning "Don't be

a

NAM fool".

It declared that Taft-

Hartley sought to "destroy free enterprise by destroying
labor."

In an appeal to anti-radical sentiments.

The AFL

contended that "by prohibiting free bargaining among
freemen," Taft-Hartley "would wreck our nation's position as
the defender of democracy and the champion of freedom in the

fight to halt further expansion of Communism."

In the last

weeks of the campaign, the AFL topped off its written
appeals with a daily soap opera that began "Lady, down in

Washington they're trying to push through

a

slave-labor bill

that will slice your husband's envelope right down the

middle," and with weekly variety shows featuring such

popular stars as Milton Berle and Jimmy Durante.

o o

Despite labor's efforts, the Taft-Hartley bill became
law.

The business community seemingly had helped shape

public opinion more effectively than the unions.
to one commentator,

According

"the words 'radical labor leaders' have

been linked together in people's minds as ineradicably as
the phrase,

'damyankees

,

'

is

in Georgia. "^^

Similarily,

local UAW leaders found that thousands of their fellow
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workers had "been stampeded into making
grave mistakes due
to the vast propaganda arms of the corporations." ^ 0
Critics
charged that labor's effort to derail labor
reform had been
too little, too late, uncoordinated, and ill
conceived.

liberal journal Labor and Nation found that despite

The

few

a

publicity campaigns the crucial period of political maneuvering prior to the introduction of Taft-Hartley was

distinguised "by

a

general passivity on the part of labor

in the face of increasingly vocal attacks. "^^

The apathy of labor during the 1946 campaign helped

anti-labor forces plant the idea that the public had given

mandate to curb unions.

a

It was only at the very last minute

that unions actively resisted the Congressional drive and

then their campaign
alized.

was not effectivly organized or gener-

Moreover, contended economist C.W. Anrod in

a

post

mortem, the split in the house of labor between the AFL and
CIO handicapped unions while industry proceeded along an

united well coordinated front.
Nation

,

Labor, agreed Labor and

offered only opposition and never "united in

a

positive statement of aims" designed to guide workers and
progressives and win public support. 9 2
The passage of Taft-Hartley and the success of conser-

vative initiatives during the Eightieth Congress seemed to
indicate that the Republicans were gaining political momentum.

Thus,

the Republican Party and their business

supporters approached the 1948 election with great confidence prepared to cement their accession to political power
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by capturing the presidency.

The splintering of the

Democratic party with the emergence of two
third party
candidates combined with the nomination of
the unpopular
Harry Truman also added strength to the predicted
guarantee
of a Republican victory.
Taft-Hartley, however, had galvanized the labor

movement.

Hoping for the law's repeal and the defeat of the

"reactionary" eightieth Congress,

unions recognized the need

for the full mobilization of labor's political power.

in

January 1948, CIO Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey declared
that purely economic action would not solve labor's
problems.

It had become clear that gains achieved on the

picket line could be easily erased by political action.
"Organized labor must not and will not," he continued "take

these political and legislative defeats standing still.

Organized labor must develop new and more effective political weapons, not only to repeal vicious anti-labor legisla-

tion, but to remove from office those lackeys of big

business responsible for its passage. "^^

New more effective political action entailed the AFL's

formation of

Labor's League for Political Education and its

formal participation for the first time in
campaign.

a

presidential

Wedded to the emerging anti -communist liberal

consensus, the CIO rejected Henry's Wallace's Progressive

third-party candidancy and joined in an alliance with
Truman, who had mended his fences with labor by vetoing
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Taft-Hartley.

The alliance with the Democrats was so

intense that in some states, like Michigan,
the CIO's
Political Action Committee actually took over

the party.^^

The PAC designed a new strategy for the 1948
campaign,

carefully divorcing unions from Communism and reaching

beyond labor circles for support by emphasizing that unions
supported objectives that were "shared by the overwhelming

majority of Americans."

These included the maintenance of

a

domestic economy that guaranteed full employment, adequate
housing, health care, education and social security, and the

assurance of full political and civil equality and equal

economic opportunities for all "men and women in our country
of every race,

creed or color. "^^

Above all, both the AFL

and CIO emphasized overcoming rank-and-file apathy by

getting out the labor vote, arguing, that low turnout by

workers frustrated with Truman had been
the 1946 defeat.

a

decisive factor in

Labor made a heroic effort to help elect

Democratic candidates, distributing literature, sponsoring
radio programs, and fielding an army of precinct workers to
get voters to the polls. q

-j

Finally,

labor participation

m

the 1948 election involved setting aside in some locales of

the bitter struggle between the AFL and CIO.

In Massachu-

setts, for instance, faced with three "vicious anti-labor

referenda," the AFL, the CIO and the liberal organization,
the Americans for Democratic Action, formed a "historic

pact" to overcome the disunity in the ranks of organized
QQ

labor that had contributed to the 1946 "debacle."^"
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in turn appealed for working class
support by

Truir.an

conducting

a

slashing anti-business campaign.

He charged

that the Republican party was in the hands
of big business.
Before farmers, he accused Wall Street "gluttons
of

privilege" of attacking the structure of agricultural
price
supports.
Truman challenged conservative fears of

collectivism.

In late October in Chicago, for instance, he

drew an apocalypic image of the American way of life under
attack. The danger came not from the obvious threat of

Communism but from "powerful reactionary forces which are
silenty undermining our democratic institutions."

Those

behind these forces were men "who are striving to concentrate great economic power in their own hands."

Truman

warned that great corporations had been steadily expanding
their power.

They controlled the Republican Party which

recently had delivered gains to the private power, big oil,
railroad and real estate lobbies.

Big business,

was responsible for the high cost of living.

not labor,

Wrapping

himself around the image of the New Deal, Truman reminded
his Chicago audience that in 1933, the Democratic party
"drove the money-changers out of the temple and brought new

life to our democracy. "^^
In one of the sharpest class votes in American history,

Truman won an unexpected victory over Thomas Dewey, his
Republican opponent, and the Democrats regained control of
Congress.

Labor played

a

special part in that victory. -'^^
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William Belanger, president of the
Massachusetts State
CIO, which had been part of the coalition
that
J.

helped defeat

that state's anti-labor referendum, concluded
that organized
labor's venture into politics had succeeded.
Labor, united

with liberal forces, had overcome power of "selfish
wealth."
In the period after the war these men had "combined
as never
before to destroy us," Belanger continued.
"The great

powers of their minion press, the persuasive voices of their
radio hirelings, the inaccurate minds of the political
pollsters, merged their power.
.

.

.

but reckoned without

.

the sound and patriotic common sense of the little men and

women. "^^^

Trade unionists celebrated the victory as an

endorsement of liberalism and

a

the New Deal.

Pennsylvania AFL paper, tne

According to

a

election marked an "awakening of

call for the extension of

a

new political conscious-

ness." The people had "delivered a mandate for free labor

unions, for extended social security, for increased educa-

tion opportunity for all Americans, for civil right for all,
for the end to dangerous profits and for control of

inflation. "^02
IV

The result of the 1948 election stunned the business

community.

It indicated that the hold of conservatives over

Business ideologues apparently

the public seemed tenuous.

had not succeeded in convincing voters that freedom from

"government paternalism" was more important than the
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economic security promoted by both labor
and the Democratic
party.

Indeed, Truman had effectively campaigned
on a

program calling for the repeal of Taf t-Hartely

,

the restora-

tion of price controls to protect earnings,
and the
expansion of government spending. To a shaken
business

community, it was not inconceivable that many of their

achievements would be rolled back.
President Thomas

G.

General Foods Vice

Spates observed that "when the smoke of

last November's election had cleared away there was revealed
a

.

.

.

rededication to the policy of achieving the more

abundant life through more taxes, more spending, more
controls and less liberty, and

a

clear declaration that the

government should stand for the welfare of the people."
These goals, according to Spates, were actually inconsistent

with the American idea of government as the servant of the
people and "a guarantor of equality of opportunity."-^ '^^
Moreover, the critical role of labor in the campaign

convinced Spates and other businessmen that unions were even

more politically powerful than they had feared.

Week editor Merlyn Pitzler warned

a

Business

United States Chamber of

Commerce gathering that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act
had "committed the unions to political activity on

a

scale

and at a pace never before approached." Taft-Hartley,

designed in part to weaken labor politically, had seemingly
backf ired.

^^"^
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What then, asked businessmen, was the
lesson to be
learned from the 1948 election?
Was it impossible for the
business community to sell its values and its
world view to
the American public?
No, thundered speaker

vmiiam

McMillen to the December

1

948 convention of the Nation

Association of Manufacturers.

The election showed that:

"You just haven't done enough of what you have been
doing."

Businessmen, McMillen demanded, must intensify their efforts
"to convince those American who are confused that the road

to statism, tyranny, and slavery is paved with good inten-

tions and lighted with great 'welfare' schemes." Freedom

indivisible and unimpaired, he continued, was "the only
fertilizer of well-being," and "teamwork based on mutual

understanding is the only guarantee of either individual or
collective happiness."

Business leader Thomas

added urgency to McMillen's call for

a

G.

Spates

renewed commitment

from the business community, warning in early 1949 that time
was short but there still was

"a

fighting change" to save

"this nation as a democracy.

Both moderate and conservative business organizations

vowed to redouble their efforts.

The first major campaign,

emanating from the more moderate wing of the business
community, began the week after the election.

Fearful that

ignorance of the benefits of the American economic system

increased the public's susceptiblity to Communist subversion,

in 1947 the Advertising Council had started planning

its economic education campaign.
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The Council's Industries

Advisory Committee,

led by General Foods and General

Electric donations of $100,000,

spearheaded fundraising.

Other substantial donors included General
Motors, Johnson
and Johnson, Procter and Gamble, Goodrich,
Republic Steel,

Remington Rand, while four advertising agencies
volunteered
their services to create the campaign. By late
1949,

advertisers, media,

and agencies had supplied $3,000,000 in

time and space.
The Council's message stressed the need for free enter-

prise to expand productivity through mechanization and

increased efficiency.

During the first six months, radio

spots barraged the public, and the four major networks each

pledged half-hour special programs on economic education.

Within two years newspapers ordered over

13

million lines of

advertising, national advertisers and publishers sponsored

over 600 pages of magazine ads,

300,000 car cards,

billboards extolling the virtues of capitalism.

same period, the Council distributed
free pamphlet on the advertisements.

1.5

and 8,000

During the

million copies of

a

In "The Miracle of

America," Uncle Sam explained "Why Americans live better,"
"How machines make jobs," and "Why freedom and security go
together."
41

Look,

the Scholastic magazines. Opportunity and

company publications also reprinted or digested the

pamphlet.

The publisher of Junior Scholastic magazine

guaranteed that the March 1950 issue, incorporating the

complete "Miracle of America," would be the "main subject of
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discussion" in 15,000 junior and senior
high schools
throughout the country, '-^^
The NAM intensified its education activities
while

other trade associations, including the American
Petroleum
Institute, the National Association of Electric
Power

Companies and the American Medical Association, began
major
public relations campaigns to derail Fair Deal programs
on

such issues as natural resources, public power, and
health
care.

J.

Warren Kinsman, chairman of the NAM's Public

Relations Advisory Committee and vice president of Dupont,

reminded businessmen that "in the everlasting battle for the

minds of men" the tools of public relations were the only
weapons "powerful enough to arouse public opinion sufficiently to check the steady, insidious and current drift

toward Socialism."
battle by

The NAM contributed to this ideological

stepping up distribution of its pamphlets.

increased its production from

million in 1949, to nearly

8

2.5

million in 1948 to

million in

It
6.5

1950.-^^^

The media also became a more important vehicle for

carrying the business story to the public.

As part of its

commitment to reach more people, in early 1949 the NAM began
a

new $1.5 million weekly program featuring singers and

interviews with businessmen.

Early on, the association

recognized television's potential.

In 1950,

weekly program, "Industry on Parade."

it

launched

Unlike NAM radio

programs which emphasized the association's position on
business, economic, and social problems, the television
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a

program took a more subtle approach.

it

showcased

companies, explained how products were made,
and demonstrated what industry gave to individuals,
communities and
the nation.

The goal was to make industry, as opposed
to

organized labor, "the symbol of progress and hope for
the

majority of people."

The program had an immediate impact.

In early 1952 Oklahoma City reported that the series
ranked

among the first five programs in popularity, and Milwaukee
gave "Industry on Parade" a higher audience rating than
"Meet the Press," telecast in the same time segment.

Corporations as well as the NAM also showed greater

interest in movies and television.

companies like Ford, Dupont,

U.S.

Since the thirties,
Steel, and Firestone had

sponsored highly prestigous classical music and serious

drama programs designed to improve the corporate image.
They sold ideas as well as products.
J.

Ford executive William

Cameron incensed labor with his intermission talks on the

"Ford Sunday Evening Hour" which attacked New Deal programs

and government interference in business.

In the late

forties and fifties, corporations shifted some of this kind
of programming into television.

They also dramatically

expanded their production of movies for rent-free distribution to clubs, schools, churches, and theaters as well as to
television.

By late 1951, business-sponsored movies reached

an audience of 20 million people every week, more than

third of the nation's weekly attendance at commercial
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a

movies.

That represented a 30 percent larger
audience than
in 1950 and a 500 percent increase since
1946.

Some films simply promoted products or,
like "The
DuPont Story/' showcased a firm's history.
others had much
more explicit economic messages, like the films
distributed
by the National Education Program, an ultra
conservative

organization founded in 1948 on the campus of Harding
College in Arkansas.

Between 1949 and 1951, Alfred

P.

Sloan

of General Motors gave the NEP $600,000 to establish a

motion picture service to produce and distribute films
attacking communism, teaching the facts of the American

private enterprise system and warning that government
interference in the economy led to social ism.

^

Corporations also stepped up their efforts to create

nationwide legion of articulate business spokespersons.
1

949,

a joint

a

In

committee of the Association of National

Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising
Agencies instituted "Freedom Forums" which were held on
regular basis at Harding College.

a

At the first meeting,

over 100 industrialists from companies like Armco,

J.I.

Case, Genral Electric, General Mills, Kohler, Quaker Oats,

and Chrysler sat through "long sessions of indoctrination in
the fundamentals of our economic system."

They discussed

"the most effective channels of communication needed to give

an understanding of America to those who are confused or

apathetic," and left "determined to interpret the system in

understandable terms to both management and
83

labor.""'"-'"''"

^

unions attempted to counter the
business message. Both
the AFL and CIO defended Truman's
Fair Deal, arguing that
employers opposed expanding social security,
unemployment

compensation and health insurance but favored
"welfare
state" projects which helped business,
like government
subsidized airports, factories and roads.

As the New York

State CIO put it,

labor stood for the "welfare state" as

opposed to the "special interest state."

Labor endorsed

"government for the people" not "government for
special
privilege. "112

To reach the general public with this under-

standing of politics and the economy, in 1949 the AFL

initiated

a

Edwards.

Broadcast to

news and commentary program featuring Frank
7

million listeners

stations at the cost of $350,000 per year,

establish

a

a

week over 176

its goal was "to

standard of full and accurate coverage of the

news, fair presentation of the news and intelligent inter-

pretation of the news from the liberal point of

view."-*-!^

Edwards's broadcasts rankled the business community.

Business Week, for instance, charged him with "merchandising
verbal poison."

To refute Edwards,

Council of Utah,

a

the Industrial Relations

group of employers, hired ex-CBS news-

caster Paul Sullivan to give industry's side of the news

immediately after labor's broadcast. ^ ^
Domestic and foreign policy events, however, combined
to help create a more receptive audience for business,

inexorably shifting the political center of gravity from
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liberalism.

Anti-communism, not UberaUsm,
became the
primary political motif. Between
1948 and 1950, Communist
revolution in China, the Soviet
acquisition of the atomxc
bomb, espionage cases, and
McCarthy's accusations of
communist infiltration of the government
created an atmosphere

of

crisis and tension.

with the the outbreak of the
Korean
war, Truman, who had met stiff
resistance to the expansion
Of the welfare state from a coalition
of southern Democrats
and Republicans, sacrificed what
was left of the Pair
Deal

on the altar of anti-communism.

All this and the renewed

inflation touched off by the war lent
credibility to the
business warning that something was
fundamentally wrong with
America .^^^

Contributing to the nation's drift to the right
was
labor's own internal anticommunism.

in 1949 after years of

struggle between left and right, the CIO expelled
eleven

allegedly Communist-controlled unions.

An internecine

battle ensued that crippled the unions of the electrical
and

farm equipment workers among others.

communist purges also played

a

The feuds and anti-

role in the collapse of

"Operation Dixie," the CIO's Southern organizing drive.

Within the broader context of Southern racism and antiunionism, the CIO internal struggle over communism and the

continuing rivalry between the AFL and CIO to ensured the
failure of any significant organizing in the South. -^'-^
In this political atmosphere,

political goals.

labor had to narrow its

Labor's hopes for a sweeping expansion of
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the welfare state and for
the repeal of
Taft-Hartley
disappeared.
Unable to achxeve seour.ty
for all workers
through poltics, CIO unions
pushed for worker security
through the collective bargaining
syste..
1949 and 1950,
unions like the UAW and the
Steelworkers achieved significant victories on the issues
of wages and fringe
benefits.
But they also conceded much
to the employer drive to

m

increase productivity at the expense
of union rights on the
shop floor. ^^"^
The 1950 election revealed the
increasingly conservative tenor of American politics and
the political limitations of labor.
In Maryland, California, North
Carolina,
and elsewhere. Republicans rode the issue
of anti-communism
to victory.

m

Ohio, the struggle was even more clearly
one

of business against labor.

in late 1949,

the business

journal Factory had warned that unions planned
to flex their

political muscle by punishing those politicians who
had
opposed Fair Deal legislation.

it foresaw that 1950

"promises to be a year of decision of American industry— in
fact,

for the economy as a whole."

to attack labor's growing power

It called upon business

"by collective action,

molding the opinions of large groups."
of enemies was Robert Taft,

by

Top on labor's list

leader of the conservative

branch of the Republican party and coauthor of the Taft-

Hartley bill.
a

Business leaders rallied around Taft, who ran

successful campaign appealing to rank and file workers.
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wage earners, according to
poUtrcal analyst Sa.uel Lubell,
"seized upon Taft's candrdacy
to voxce a protest
against
their own union chiefs." Ohio
workers, he contended,

disliked being told how to vote
by national union leaders
and they bought the Republican
argument that a PAC victory
implied that labor was "running the
country."118

Determined that the conservative
cause should not lose
momentum as it had after the 1946
election, business

leaders

moved to select
1952.

Republican candidate who could win
in
Dwight Eisenhower seemed the perfect
choice.
a

A World

war II hero, he had broad popular
appeal.

His political and

economic ideas meshed closely with the
moderate wing of the
business community associated with the
Committee for
Economic Development and the Advertising Council.

But his

concern over "the insidious inclination toward
statism" made
him acceptable to corporate conservatives.
Moderate

businessmen led by Paul Hoffman of Studebaker, Thomas

Watson of IBM, and Harry

A.

J.

Bullis of General Mills helped

mobilize the initial grass-roots support for Eisenhower's
candidacy.

organized

Adlai Stevenson won the support of liberals and
labor.

The most heralded issues of the election were

communism, corruption, and Korea.
however,

The business community,

continued to stress the threat "Big Labor" and "Big

Government" posed to American liberty and freedom.

September 1952, NAM President William

J.

Grede charged that

"dictatorial union bosses" sought to "establish in
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In late

Washington

-

name

a

government whxch

as well as in fact."

nients in popular

win

be a Labor Government
in

Busrness-sponsored advertise-

magazines like Newsweek, The
Saturday

ivenina Post, and CoUierls inveighed
against the dangers of
government dictation asserting that
the welfare state

crushes freedom.

One ad began,

"THEY

DorT KEEP FEEDING YOU

CHEESE AFTER THE TRAP IS SPRUNG," and
cautioned that "to
vote into office a welfare state
is to 'find you have voted
away your f reedom.

Eisenhower struck

a

responsive chord with the American

public, winning in a landslide and carrying
the Republicans
to control of the House and Senate.
For the first time in

twenty years, friends of business dominated
government in
Washington.
The business community joined in the
victory

celebration and looked forward to
and economic climate.
Steel,

a

more favorable political

"Business" observed the journal.

was "no longer on the outside looking

in."

Contem-

plating the implications of the election, Henry Ford II

wrote in the Saturday Revie w:

"This is an opportunity that

we in business must not fail to meet.

For years we have

talked glibly of the superiority of the American way and of
our ability, if given the chance, to correct many of the

evils which beset us and the other peoples of the world."
Finally,

he continued "we have that chance."-'-
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V

one victory, however, did not
mean tnat employers could
safely abandon their public
relations efforts. while
some
business leaders argued that the
change in political

administration meant that the business
had "done its job/'
most contended that the struggle to
shape the economic and
political atmosphere was a continuing
process.
December
1952, the Joint Committee of the
Association of

m

National

Advertisers and the American Association
of Advertising
Agencies pointed out that forty percent
of American workers
and forty-nine percent of farmers still
felt that business
profits were too high.122
election victory could easily
prove to be hollow.
A Warner and Swasey advertisement
warned that "One day of feeling better doesn't
mean you're
cured.

knew,

For years the world has been sick."
the ad continued,

was dangerous:

the first surge of "feeling better"

"A relapse could kill us."

which commited itself to

As every doctor

a

Similarily,

NAM,

"continued program of economic

education," observed that Eisenhower's election should be

viewed more as
Deal."

Louis

B.

a

"reprieve than an acquittal from the Fair
Seltzer,

editor of The Cleveland Press

cheered the NAM 's decision, contending that the results of
the election magnified rather than lessened the public rela-

tions responsibilities of American business.

He called upon

the business community to "intensify in all directions the
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30. Of getting across to the American
people rts own
the real story of modern
America. "123

story-

Business leaders continued to
worry in part because the
CIO decided to intensify rts
public relations work in
the
wake of the 1952 defeat.
early 1953, shocked that
perhaps 40 percent of blue collar
workers had voted for
Eisenhower, the CIO appropriated one
milUon dollars for a
public relations program to contest
business domination of
political dialogue.
The main component of the program
was a
fifteen minute radio program broadcast
on 150

m

stations,

featuring the news commentary of John

w.

Vandercook and

commercials promoting the CIO views on political
and
economic issues. The purpose of the radio
program was to
provide an "additional liberal voice on the
nation's

airwaves," and to offset "the one-party press
which

dominates so much of the country."

According to Reuther,

the CIO was reaching out to "the cross section
of the public
of America which was either neutral in its attitude
toward

CIO or in large measure antagonistic."

The CIO,

he

continued, was trying to convince the public that labor was
"not another public economic pressure group trying to make

progress for itself at the expense of free society" but
instead sought "solutions of the problems of all of the
people."

Within six months, the CIO reported that

Vandercook attracted equal or larger audiences than conservative Fulton Lewis Jr.'s in
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13

of 36 surveyed cities. ^^4

Desp.te CIO co.pet.txon, by
1955 the business co..unity
could discern concrete results
fro. the co..xtn.ent
.ade ten
years earlier to reshape America's
cUmate
of opinion,

conservative businessmen were
disappointed that Eisenhower
did not dismantle the New Deal,
but were elated that much
of
the momentum toward an invigorated
welfare state was
stopped.

Tax cuts in

1

954,

the abolishing of the Recon-

struction Finance Corporation, the
decline of anti-trust
activity, and the passage of legislation
giving business

access to oil-rich coastal lands all
testified to the
emergence of a more pro-business political
climate.

Although the Democratic Party regained
majorities

m

the

House and Senate with labor assistance in
1954, the party's
return to control did little to alter the
political atmosphere in Congress since much of its strength came
from the

conservative South. Indeed Americans for Democratic Action

chairman Joseph Rauh charged that "the Congressional
Democrats have become practically indistinguishable from the
party they allegedly oppose. "-'^^

Organized labor, though certainly still strong, took

beating under the Republican administration.

a

Business

succeeded in defeating efforts to revise Taft-Hartley, and
the rulings of the Eisenhower-appointed National Labor

Relations Board made the law more and more restrictive of
unions.

Violence associated with bitter strikes at Kohler

in Wisconsin and Perfect Circle in Indiana demonstrated a

growing recalcitrance among some employers and blackened the
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reputatxon of labor.

So too dxd the f.ndxngs
of Congres-

sional probes during 1953, 1954
and 1955 on labor
"racketeering, extortion and
gangsterism." Weakened by
internecine struggles over Communisra
and competition with
the AFL, the CIO was faltering.
Bitter divisions between
Reuther and David McDonald of the
Steelworkers led conservative labor columnist Victor Riesel to
predict in early 1954
that the "odds are that CIO may not
survive
the year."

Enough of the fire had been extinguished
from the ciO's
social unionism that in 1954 it began
negotiating a merger
with the AFL.-'-^^

Employers could also find good news in the
opinion
polls of the mid-fifties.

Corporation conducted

a

in early 1955,

Opinion Research

poll for the NAM and found that the

climate of opinion in which industry was operating had
improved.

Noting that opinion changed "relatively slowly,"

it contended that the public was rejecting the "Marxian
idea
of an inevitable class struggle between Labor and Manage-

ment."

Sixty-one percent of those polled believed that the

interests of employers and workers were the same, an eleven

point gain over five years.

A similar survey conducted by

ORC for Look magazine found that the American people

approved of large corporations by

a ten to one

margin.

Three times as many were concerned about the power of big
labor as opposed to the power of big business.

Nearly two-

thirds felt that the present laws regulating business were
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broad and strong enough whrle
nearly that .any beUeved
big
labor groups was "getting out
of hand."
From all this ORC
concluded that the country was
definitely "in a swing to
«-icj.xiiii:eiy
7
the
" 127
right

m

.

At the national level, business
had scored major
victories. still, xt worried about
how much labor had
already won. Moreover, through
1955, the labor movement

continued to grow.

who knew what impact the proposed
merger

of the AFL and CIO might have on union
power?

business community took nothing for
granted.

Certainly the
Beneath the

apparent consensus of the 1950s, much
contention remained.
TO gain a better understanding of that
contention,
as well

as the effort of both business and labor
to shift political

discourse, we need to move from the national level
to the
struggle that took place within communities and at
worksites
to define the meaning of Americanism.
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CHAPTER

4

BUILDING COMPANY CONSCIOUSNESS
The economic and political
struggles between capital
and labor in the 1930s and
1940s raised, as we have
seen,
fundamental questions of power. who
would make the critical
decisions affecting hours, wages, and
the conditions
of

work?

Who would control the shop floor?

Some labor

leaders, such as Walter Reuther,
raised the specter of codetermination of investment and pricing.
Beyond the terrain
of production, moreover, labor and
capital also struggled to
shape the larger social and political
economy of the postwar
era.
At the heart of this conflict was a
fundamental

struggle over tne consciousness and loyalties
of American
workers.
The rise of labor unions had moblilized
workers

around new and powerful loyalties.

These unions, business

leaders complained, had drenched the minds of workers
"in

a

reckless propaganda of distortion, deceit and phoney economics."^

Fearing the new loyalties of their workers and

sensing that in these ties lay not only

threat to their

a

control of the workplace but beyond that

a

threat to the

future shape of America itself, businessmen thus sought

victory not only at the bargaining table and in the halls of

Congress but sought to win as well the hearts and minds of
American workers.
Moderate and conservative businessmen, particularly
those in organizations like the National Association of
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Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Cc.erce, vowed to regain
fro. unions both undisputed
control over therr
factories and
the allegiance of their
workers.
Collective bargaxn.ng
advances had achieved some of
these goals by
lin^itrng the

structural power of unrons.

Equally important were
employer
efforts to undermine organized
labor's ideological hold
over
the working class.
To win their employees'
loyalty,

managers reshaped their personnel
policies by drawing on
insights from psychology and sociology.
Througn mechanisms
such as human relations and welfarism,
the business
com-

munity hoped to recapture

a

social order they nostalgically

remembered as one dominated by corporate
leaders, but where
business created a contented and productive
"body of under-

standing employees. "2

This chapter will focus on human

relations while the next will examine the
revita 1 ization of
welfare capitalism.

Employers in the immediate post-war years wanted to
regain control over the shop floor in order to cut costs
and
restore the productivity necessary to meet rising consumer
demand.

There were several responses to the labor problem.

A significant sector of American industry, located in the

South and Southwest but also including small nationwide

firms and companies involved in extremely capital-intensive,

continuous flow
refining,

production,

like chemicals and oil

continued to resist unions.
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Alternatively, a

small group of progressive employers,
primarily in the
garment and electrical industries,
along with some smaller
steel making and fabricating firms,
looked to unionmanagement cooperation or accomodation
as a means of gaming
control over the labor force.
This distinctly minority
approach entailed respecting the union's
"dignity as an

institution" and abandoning any efforts
to compete for
worker allegiance.-^
The majority of large corporations,
however, tended to

take

a

more moderate "realistic" approach to
industrial

relations.

They reluctantly accepted organized labor
but

hoped that an aggressive collective bargaining
strategy
would enable them to contain union power and achieve
productivity goals. The initial post-war contract negotiations

in

the auto industry that confined the scope of collective

bargaining to wages, hours, and working conditions were the
first steps in this direction.

in 1948 General Motors

proposed linking wage rates to increased productivity.

At

least at the national level, unions were to trade job

control for periodic wage increases and benefits.

The

inclusion of no-strike clauses in postwar contracts and an

increasingly elaborate grievance system were designed to
ensure that union leaders shared responsiblity

with manage-

ment to tighten up worker discipline and prevent interruptions to production.

concludes,

By 1950,

historian Howell Harris

large corporations like GM, Ford,
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U.S.

Steel and

^

Westinghouse Electric had made
sxgn.fxcant progress towards
achieving stable and efficient
labor relations.
It is tempting to draw broader
generalizations from the
willingness of some corporations to
concede higher wages and

benefits.

However it neither signaled the
formation of
"social contract" between capital and
labor

a

nor ended

genuine conflict, as many historians have
argued.
Employer
intransigence in the area of managerial
prerogative had
forced unions to give up some structural
power.

fight for economic security,

a goal

desired by their members, was

But the

genuinely and strongly

a real struggle.

Firms only

offered wage increases and benefits because organized
labor
posed a threat to capital.
Indeed, it took a series
of

major confrontations to achieve the beginnings of economic
security for union members. The business community learned
that it could not manipulate the industrial relations sytem
at will and would come to see higher wages and benefits as

a

necessary cost for keeping factories in operation.^
Gains for wage earners came from struggle, not

accomodation.

The Steelworkers

,

for example, demonstrated

their power and solidarity during the 1946 strike, wresting
a

wage hike from

to come easily.

a

reluctant industry.

Benefits also failed

Employers had no desire to allow unions to

take credit for or share in the control of employee benefit
plans with unions.

Over half of the strikes in 1949 and

seventy percent during the first half of 1950 were over
health and welfare issues in labor contracts.
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Indeed,

^

General Motors' concession
of pensions in I950
ca.e only
after a longstanding uaw
campaign for
old age security.

Just

year earlier, the steel
industry refused a sx.ilar
demand from the United steel
Workers, labeling the
proposed
pension system "socialistic" and
claiming that pension costs
would destroy the steel industry's
profitability.
it took
the 1949 strike by steel workers,
combined with government
intervention to make pensions a reality.
a

National collective bargaining
agreements also fail to
give an accurate portrayal of the
ongoing struggle during
the forties and fifties to control
the shop floor.
Here the
business community discovered the
limitations of reliance on
collective bargaining alone.
in late 1949, labor analysist

Edward

T.

Cheyfitz observed that "Labor-management
relations

in America are continuing in the pattern
of a power
struggle.

That is the outstanding fact characterizing

industrial relations today." Local unions and
management

fought endlessly over the pace and organization of
work.
Moreover, seniority and grievance systems, which at
times

certainly stifled worker militancy, also placed substantial
•a.

constraints on managerial discipline and personnel
deployment.

Even in plants where the collective bargaining

system was weak and the union non-conf rontational

,

informal

work groups served to challenge managerial authority.
cohesive units of workers, protected by the grievance
system, used a variety of tactics including informal
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These

bargaining with foremen, slowdowns,
wor.-to-rule ca.paxgns,
and wildcat strikes to push for
greater control over the
production process. Thus, despite
agreements on the
national level to promote productivity
and smother conflict,
contention continued to characterize
the shop
floor.^

Continuing conflict evoked two sharply
different interpretations within the business community.
The
small core of

moderates accepted as inevitable that
significant differences of interest and social philosophy
separated employees
and management.
Business leaders like Paul Hoffman
of

Studebaker, Robert Wood Johnson of Johnson

&

Johnson

pharmaceuticals, and Meyer Kestnbaum of the garment
firm
Hart, Schaffner

&

Marx recognized organized labor as the

legitimate representatives of workers' interests.

They

believed that unions served as the channel and instrument
but not source of worker protest and discontent.^

Dependent

upon each other for survival, unions and management needed
to find a way to overcome their differences.

develop

a

"We must

relationship between management and union which is

neither based on the assumption of permanent industrial
warfare, nor on the equally false hope that we can eliminate
all the conflicts within enterprise," asserted railway

executive Charles

R.

Hook.

Instead, we must,

make the conflict itself constructive and
Collective bargaining was

a

"find a way to

fruitful."-'-^

workable, practical, and demo-

cratic vehicle for resolving conflicting interests.

Through

the collective bargaining process, progressives hoped to
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^

make the union an "intearal
r^^^y-t ^-f
xnregral part
of

a

program of teamwork,

communication and participation.
For progressive employers like
Robert Wood Johnson, no
contradiction existed between workers'
loyalty to both

company and union.

He observed that life "is
full of

multiple loyalties which can be adjusted
by common sense."12
Similarly a Raytheon Company executive
contended that

employees could have "dual loyalties, just
as
have loyalty to his employees as well
as

a

foreman must

to the management.

This duality need not present serious
conflict or create
adversaries." Workers could be pro-management
and pro-union
at the same time. Continuing conflict, then,
simply symbolized the expression of divergent opinions and
perspectives.

When capital and labor achieved mutual accommodation
of
their legitimate differences then industrial peace would

become

a reality.

Industrial relations professionals

applauded and encouraged this vision of labor relations.

Most conservative businessmen, in contrast to the small
core of liberals, held
society.

a

harmonious, consensual vision of

To them, no inevitable conflict existed between

labor and management.

Workers and employers were partners

in a community of interest dominated by employers.-'-'^
in 1946 industrial relations expert

E.

Thus,

Wright Bakke found

that managers viewed employees as "'our men', not workers in
general, not members of the union," and certainly not

organized labor.

-"-^

"We are all workers," declared NAM
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8

^

president Wallace

Bennett in ly^y,
I949 "w^
.
we are
all capitalists."
Employers, not unions, were
the natural allies of
workers, and yet, Bennett
continued, "we have allowed
our
detractors to put over on us their
symbols, with certain
F.

words spelled with capitals to
spell out classes which
compartimentalize us."^^
Still,

it was impossible to deny
the existence of

conflict in postwar industrial
relations.

Employers pointed

to two interrelated causes for the
disruption of harmony
within the plant. Assuming that at
some point in a mythic
past managers and workers had shared a
similar vision of the
world, some employers blamed the nature
of the organization
of work in the modern factory.
Huge plants and mass production methods had driven a wedge between
management and
labor.

Division of labor and specialization had robbed

workers of an understanding of the functioning of
the free
market and the benefits of competition. Without a

sense of

economic significance, frustrated workers were more apt to
"listen to the glittering promises of

a

demagogue. " ^

That demagogue, of course, was organized labor.

Unions

exploited managerial difficulties created by the modern
factory.

They divided workers from the employer, whom

businessmen felt was the "logical leader of labor," and were
responsible for an "artifically created" ideological
chasm. 1

Indeed,

some businessmen blamed organized labor and

what they saw as its the collectivist philosophy more than
any problems inherent in the labor process for the
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^

continuing turmoU on the shop
floor.

Labor relations

consultant Mart.n Dodge accused
unxons of poisoning the
minds of workers with a "barrage
of irresponsible
invective,
false economics, distorted
statist.es, and general accusations that front offices are largely
filled with
a

conspiring coterie of lying leeches."

Many employers

believed that workers, whose intelligence
they tended to
hold
low esteem, were the most suceptible
of all elements
of society to these kinds of
"falsifications" and attacks

m

on

the virture of a free economy.^
In a series of public forums, NAM
leaders angrily

repudiated

a 1950

Harvard Business Review article by Solomon

Barkin, director of Research of the Textile
Workers Union,

which asserted that

a

fundamental conflict existed between

workers and management. The source of this conflict
was the
helplessness of the individual worker in the face of the

economic and social power of the employer.

Unions, repre-

senting workers as a group, empowered employees, fulfilling
their aspirations and reflecting their needs.

Accordingly,

Barkin contended the worker's primary loyalty was to the
union, not the firm.^^

NAM Managing Director Earl Bunting

challenged Barkin's assumptions, asserting that approaching
industrial relations "on the basis of mass and class is

repugnant to our ideals" for the United States has "attained
a

classless society which other countries dream of."

He

declared that trade unionists had finally shown their true
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colors and condemned Barkin's
xAxn s "frank
trank ^r.^
ana open acceptance of
the class conflict approach. "21
Yet there appeared to be ample
evidence that large
numbers of workers accepted Barkin's
interpretation of class
relations. Opinion polls concluded
that many workers

distrusted their employers and doubted
the virture of the
free enterprise system itself.
Surprisingly large numbers
of workers favored government ownership
or control of
the

economy and even greater numbers wanted
governmental guarantees of economic security.
1946, the

m

Psychological

Corporation found that 43 percent of surveyed
workers
believed they would do as well or better if
American

manufacturing firms were run entirely by the
government.

A

1950 Opinion Research Corporation sample of industrial

workers found that over 30 percent believed that the
govern-

ment should control prices and limit profits, 26 percent
wanted to see the government limit salaries of top executives and 21 percent would vote for government ownership of
four key industries.

The same workers who trusted the government had little

faith in management's concern for their welfare.

Attitude

surveys reflected a rejection the traditional managerial

philosophy that individual effort as opposed to collective
action led to success and advancement.

As a result,

skeptical, group-minded employees were suspicious of

employer appeals for greater productivity.

Fifty-eight

percent of manual workers surveyed by ORC responded to
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a

call for increased effort
w.th the answer "That's
the SPEED

Means they want more work for
the same pay."
number rejected the idea that
UP.

A similar

workers benefxtted from

increased productivity, and over

a

third of these workers

believed that labor saving machinery
destroyed jobs.23
Polls demonstrating that over
half of American workers
believed that corporations earned
profits topping 25 percent
each year also alerted industrialists
that significant
economic misunderstandings clouded
the relationship between
worker and employer.
"No partnership can be expected
to
work very well," Henry Ford II told
United States Chamber of
commerce in 1947, "when 75 percent of
industry's employees
think stockholders and top mangement of
corporations
take

more out of business than employees."

m

reality,

according

to the automaker, industry profits averaged
less than five

percent and employees received almost six times
as much as
the amount paid to stockholders. ^4

Employers believed that these negative attitudes
towards the American economic system manifested themselves
on the shop floor.

Workers who felt that they only received

the "crumbs" had little incentive to work hard.

Within this

context traditional managerial complaints about low productivity assumed

a

new, more ominous significance.

In 1946,

73 percent of executives surveyed by M ill and Factory blamed
"a

general indifference on the part of the workers" as the

prime cause of declining labor productivity.
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Similarily,

American Thread Company executive
Guy b. Arthur, Jr. noted
that employees, who "years ago
were as regular as the
sunrxse/- routinely skipped work
or produced as Ixttle
as
necesary, feeling no obligation
to "trade a fair day's
work
for a farr day's pay."
Part of the problem,
continued
Arthur, was that the worker no
longer accepted responsibility for his security, expecting
"the government to take
care of his future." Most disquieting,
however, was the
"subordination of the individual to the
group" as workers
relied on seniority rather than ability
or merit for

advancement

.

^

^

Public relations experts, concerned
individual

employers, and an array of business organizations,
ranging
from the conservative National Association of
iManuf acturers
and the Chamber of Commerce to the more liberal
Advertising
Council, attempted to alert the business community
to the

dangers

a

misled working class posed to each firm as well as

the future welfare of America. ^"^

They warned that by exploiting employer silence,

organized labor was winning the battle for the loyalty of
workers, which enabled increasingly powerful unions to

undercut business control and influence both in the economic
and political realms.

President Austin

S.

Management, declared General Foods

Ingleheart "has left open

a

wide hole

through which its adversaries are driving half-truths and
false-hoods."^^

Factory

,

M.J.

In a

1949 article, associate editor of

Murphy, described the results of employer
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reticence to challenge un.ons at
every level.
union power over the shop floor,
he charged,

Continuing
was

gamed

primarily through ideological
manipulation of employees,
organized labor's ability to limit
output through its

influence over the work force threatened
the economic
viability of every firm. 29
the contest for worker
loyalty during the post-war years,
labor had the early
advantage. Labor columnist Victor Riesel
admonished
businessmen at the 1950 NAM convention
"You are not

competing [effectively] for the credi tabi
1 ity of your
company with your working people, and I say
that

with the

rush to the left, you will get washed aside in
the years to
come

.

"

^0

In response to these warnings particularly
after the

1948 election came the call for business to protect its

class interests by selling itself and the free enterprise

system to American workers.

It was imperative for the

business community to "make an organized effort to recapture
the American mind, to

.

.

.

that individual freedom is

re-establish its conviction
the key to happiness."

More

than creative or tough collective bargaining was needed to
gain worker acceptance of the business agenda and thereby

thwart the power and influence of unions on and off the shop
f

loor .^^
A large segment of the business community responded to

the ideological and economic challenge posed by unions with
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an aggressive strategy to
w.n over workers.

Large unionized

firms like General Motors as
well as small unorganized
fxrms
like Stanley Home Products
sought to undercut or
prevent
unionism by creating a separate
company identity or company
consciousness among therr employees.
This involved convincing workers to identify their
socral, economic, and political well being with that of therr
specific employer and more
broadly with the free enterprise system.32
^ ^^^^^^^
conscious worker, rather like the
idealized boy scout, was
not only productive but took pride in
his job and demonstrated loyalty and allegiance to the
firm.
One component
of company consciousness drew from the
insights of human
relations.
Through human relations, managers planned
to
gain the willing cooperation of workers in
expanding productivity and to restore "the natural and sincere
friendship
that should exist" between worker and employer.
II

The origins of the human relations theory of management

can be traced to the Hawthorne experiments conducted by

sociologist Elton Mayo and his Harvard Business School

associates beginning in the mid 1920s and to the theories
published by psychologist Abraham

World War

II.

H.

Maslow during and after

The Hawthorne researchers discovered that

informal work groups exerted tremendous influence over

worker behavior and productivity.

Informal organization

grew out of the employee's social needs, the desire for
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recognition and dignity, as well
as the natural
co.raderie
Of the Shop floor.
Sociologists used these
insights to
challenge the dominant managerial
ideology that treated
workers simply as a source of
labor services driven
by
economic incentives. instead,
these social scientists
contended that employees were
motivated by

social as well as

economic rewards. They needed to be
treated as
being related to others
a complex

m

a

"social

social organization."

increased productivity depended on
securing the cooperation
of the small work group and
providing employees with greater
social and psychological satisfaction
on the job.
Mayo
sought to enlist group cooperation
through various
mechanisms designed to satisfy the
individual's desire for
meaningful work and recognition among their
fellow workers.
Participation in decision making, better
communication,

improved supervisory training, and other measures
including
counseling would improve interpersonal relations
and thus

raise morale and productivity.^"^
In an influential article published in
1943,

gist Abraham

H.

Mas low provided the basis for a more sophis-

ticated understanding of motivation by

basic needs.

psycholo-

a

hierarchy of man's

He identified five sets of needs,

including

physiological, safety, affection, esteem and self -actualization or accomplishment.

when the most basic drives were

satisfied, they no longer motivated behavior.

Drawing on

Maslow's findings, human relations oriented social
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scientists contended that employers
could not depend on
higher wages alone as a substitute
for fulfxll.ng the entire
range of workers' needs.
They linked employee
discontent
and falling productivity to the
failure to meet workershigher needs on the job and asserted
that these problems
could be alieviated only through
the enhancement
of the

social aspects of the workplace.

Maslow's ideas reinforced

the insights gained from the Hawthorne
experiments. ^5
Mayo's and Maslow's work had great
appeal in the

business community.

Like many employers. Mayo assumed
that

company and employee formed
geneous interests.

a

community that reflected homo-

Conflict was not natural but simply the

result of misunderstanding.

if

management could gain the

cooperation or control of the informal groups of
workers
then the need for trade unions would disappear. ^6
Building
on Mayo's work psychologist Robert N. McMurry
argued
that

workers joined unions to express frustration at the
company's failure to satisfy their emotional and social
needs.

Here was "scientific" verification that collective

action was not

a

natural phenonomen.

Reflecting this inter-

pretation. General Foods Vice-President Thomas

G.

Spates

argued that the "militancy and the crusading spirit of the
labor movement" was nurtured by the failure of management to

satisfy the non -economic needs" of workers.

In turn, Maslow

provided proof that workers didn't really want more money.

Demands for higher wage rates were simply an expression of
worker discontent at their firm's failure to meet their
123

higher needs.

PuUfUUng

such non-econo..c wants
was the

key to industrial peace.37

Human relations theory
of worker
behavior along with Maslow's
f.ndxngs became a blueprint
to
guide managers in their effort
to regaxn the loyalty
of

their employees.

m

combination they would become
the
building blocks upon which employers
would reshape
traditional managerial ideology.
Practical application of human
relations theory within
the firm grew slowly.
Even prior to the Hawthorne
experiments there had been some discussion
but generally little
sustained effort to improve morale and
supervision. But the
rise of industrial unionism during
the thirties and the

demands of wartime production triggered
experimentation
with employee morale and job satisfaction.
What employees
thought about their company assumed a growing
importance.

Charles Crawford of Thompson Products, for
instance, became
an advocate of human relations, asserting that
contented

employees were not only more productive but were
indifferent
or hostile to union organizers.

Other companies conducted

attitude surveys, initiated consueling programs, and began

instructing foremen on the application of human relations
supervision

-^^
.

The post war labor crisis widened the audience for

human relations.

One scholar notes that after 1946 "the

managerial conviction that problems of human relations were

important knew virtually no bounds. "^^
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That same year,

Henry Ford II asserted that one
of the greatest problems
confronting American industry
concerned "human

relationshrps-relationships which can
either aid or xmpede
our efforts to achieve greater
industrial ef f iciency."40
Fowler McCormick, Chairman of the
Board of International
Harvester Company, predicted more
devasting results if

managers continued to overlook the human
element, contending
that "the very existence of American
industry depends
on the

success of its human relations."

Unless the people of this

country believe in industry, he continued,
"American
industry will not last."^^

Employers looked to personnel programs based
on human
relations approach not only to restore workers'
belief in

American industry but also to combat the growing power
of
organized labor.
Business journals like Factory and
American Business constantly reiterated that only by
adopting human relations techniques could employers gain the

willing cooperation of their workers.

In 1949,

Factory

advised that an equally important payoff for good human
relations was
Editor

L.C.

disarmed or weakened union movement.

a

Morrow predicted that even in union shops labor

leaders would have difficulty stirring up workers who had

received "long and consistent proper treatment from manage-

ment" and "all of us know of instances where workers are so
well satisfied

.

.

.

that union leaders have not been able

even to organize them.""^^
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Factory's arguments touched

a

responsive chord in the

business community, especially among
non-union employers and
those committed to containing the
scope of industrial
relations. The number of articles on
the topic increased
dramatically.49
^he early 50s, there were
courses,
bulletins, and even national meetings
devoted to human
relations. To its boosters, human relations
promised to
revitalize managerial initiative. Raymond
Livingstone, Vice

President for Personnel for Thompson Products,
observed that
"management interest in building good employee
relations has

surged higher and in

a

shorter period of time than interest

in any other business subject

I

have ever known."

Virtually

every employer, he continued "will tell you that good human

relations pay-off not only as
good business."

By 1952,

a

matter of morality, but of

the news magazine Time pronounced

that a second Industrial Revolution, "quieter but more
profound,

is sweeping through U.S.

industry.

its name:

Human Relations in Industry. ""^^
Employers with widely differing ideological perspectives adopted the language of human relations.

Liberal

businessmen liKe Robert Woods Johnson as well as the
National Association of Manufacturers, the voice of unrecon-

structed conservatism, agreed that companies needed to treat

workers with dignity and fulfill their desires for selfesteem.

Liberal businessmen, however, tended to see human

relations more as

a

means of enhancing productivity than

way of weakening unions.

a

A recitation of Maslow's hierarchy
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of needs became commonplace
in the business literature.

Hotpoint President James Nance, for
example, reminded fellow
executives that we "must not forget
that the man on the line
wants the same feeling of accomplishing
something

worthwhile, or recognition, and of being
an integral part of
a human organization that
management wants. "^'^

Few employers, however, accepted all
the implications
of sociological human relations theory,
particularly the
concept of the primacy of the work group.
These informal
organizations of workers, which in the minds of
many
employers had become linked to organized labor,

could not be

allowed to usurp or challenge older patterns of
managerial
authority. Instead, managers grafted the terminology
and

some of the insights of human relations research onto the
traditional authority relationship within the factory.

The

lesson postwar employers took from Mayo and Maslow was the

need to reforge

a

personal relationship with each worker by

appealing to his or her non-financial,

social needs.

The individual remained of central importance in post-

war personnel policy.

Fowler McCormick of International

Harvester stated unequivocally that "without denying the

importance of group relations

.

.

.

nothing is more impor-

tant than individual personal relations. "'^^

Workers needed

recognition as individuals and individualism was the
"keystone" of the American enterprise system.

It was wrong,

asserted Ford's John Bugas, to assume that unions and
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.

employees were identical or that
their interests were
necessarily the same.
1951, NAM President Willia.
Ruffm
claimed that management had "rejected
the

m

idea that any

human being is an inarticulate member
of
treating workers as a mass in an

a

common herd," for

impersonal atmosphere

encouraged group behavior.

As William

B.

Given of

American Brake Shoe declared: "We must
stop thinking of them
as union members, or as a group, and
think of them as
individuals "^^
There was more to the human relations
movement than
simply a change in corporate language. A
number of firms,

both large and small, formally launched
systematic human
relations programs on the heels the postwar strike
wave,

1946 and 1947, George

D.

in

Roper Company, the Aluminum Company

of America (ALCOA), the Steel Improvement and
Forge Company,

the Borg-Warner Company, the Monsanto Chemical Company,
and

the giant International Harvester Company, among others,

turned to human relations as

a

means of mending fences with

employees, following repressive attacks on their unions.
In developing a new relationship with its employees,

the

Columbia Steel and Shafting Company was determined to "place
entirely from our minds the fact that we have

a Union."

Instead, the firm sought to emphasize "what can be done to
contribute to the personal dignity of the employment of the
individual," and "what can be done to make the individual
honor the privilege of being part of the enterprise."

meshed with business' postwar political attack on the
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This

unAmerxcan character of class and
collectives..
corporate .ottos were to be
"understanding"

The new

and "together-

ness."

in 1948 Cloud Wa.pler,

head of Carreer Corporation,

determined that "happy relationships
shall prevaxl" between
the corporation and xts employees.
He instructed management
to "treat our fellow employees
as associates in the
Carrier

enterprise."

Labor was not to be regarded as
and supervisors were not to "forget
that

a

commodity

'feelings' as well

as reason enter into human reactions. "^0

Ford Motor Company and General Electric
represented two
of the most prominent firms to adopt
the new human relations
approach.
Turbulence had characterized labor relations
at
Ford before and during the war.
Seeking to reduce the
gulf that had arisen between management and
worker, Henry
Ford II inaguarated a human relations program
which committed the company to treating each worker as "an
individual

human being" and to providing opportunities for employees
to
"reasonably satisfy many of those normal desires which

motivate all of us."^^

Similarily, an extensive reorienta-

tion of management's thinking followed the 1946 strike at
GE.

Human relations, which promoted

"a

greater sense of

identification on the part of individual employees with the
interest of the company," was to be the core of

a

broader

strategy to reduce the influence of unionism at GE.^^
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Ill

Human relations, in large part,
relied on

a sophisti-

cated, xf poUtically loaded,
understanding of communications, a key to building "company
consciousness." Effective

communications would help fulfill workers'
higher needs by
giving men and women a "sense of
'belonging' in the plants

where they work," so its advocates
claimed,

it would create

new kind of interaction between employer
and employee,
designed to bring cooperation and integration
to
a

the enter-

prise.

It would build confidence in
management and clear up

misunderstandings that separated worker and manager."
Companies earlier had used various communication
techniques to forestall unionization after World
War
in the thirties. 54

The passage of the Wagner Act,

made this an unfair labor practice.

I

and

however,

For a decade employers

found their communications restricted. In

1

947 the passage

of the Taft-Hartley Act brought employers greater freedom
of

expression within their firms.

J. p.

Woodard, Director of

Industrial Relations for the Johns-Manvi 1 le Corporation,

observed that "perhaps the principal advantage granted to
the employer by the new Act lies in the opportunity for top

management--directly, through management authority channels
to convey its opinions and advice to all employees."

Within

months of the law's passage. M odern Industry observed that

companies liKe International Harvester were exercising to
the fullest their newly defined right of freedom of speech
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an. we.e .....n, t.e
of.ens.ve against t.e
attacks .a.e upon
tne American economic
syste. by the Co„„uni3ts
and by their
propagandists within the unions. "55
The National Association
of Manufacturers,
established
communication conferences and
cUnxcs around the country.
Other groups, including the
Chamber of Commerce and
such
local employer associations
as the Merchants and
Manufacturers Association of Los
Angeles, the Mountain states
Employers Council and the Associated
Industries
of

Cleveland, quickly followed suit.

Between 1948 and 1950,

the NAM conducted 1,000 clinics
and distributed thousands
of
communication manuals.
1953, the Association established
a special task force devoted
to increasing the quantity and
quality of information available to
employees. its efforts
in this area continued through
the 1950s. 56 The Chamber's

m

work meshed with that of the the NAM,
sponsoring 227
meetings during the first eight months of

1950 alone.

Each

organization also issued monthly newletters
devoted to
communications transmission, complete with ideas,

sugges-

tions, and case histories.

Company produced

a

In 1956 Champion Paper and Fibre

film focusing attention on the importance

of communication to happiness and well being.

More than six

hundred prints of Production 5118 circulated among firms
like Dupont, Ford,

IBM and International Paper Company. 5^

Reflecting the growth of the movement, private manage-

ment communications consultants emerged, offering to design

tailor-made programs for firms.
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The formation in 1953 of

the Employers Labor Relations
Information Committee
(ERLIC,
testified to the significance
of communications,
its

Officers and advrsory commrttee
represented some of the
most important firms in the
country
including,

b.F.

Goodrich, GE, Ford, Westinghouse,
standard Oil, sears,
Monsanto, Kennecott Copper, United
states steel, and
Goodyear. ERLIC helped managers
develop more purposeful
communications designed to draw "the
corporate family
together." It promised to aid
companies in overcoming the
"songs of class strugglec aiiu
and lear
fear" em^npiir.^ ^
emanating
from unions and
in winning the "emotional allegiance"
of their workers.
ERLIC asserted that the failure of
employers to correct
'

n

misunderstandings propagated by unions and
other leftist
organizations was the cause of most
labor-management
conflict and the reason for America's drift
towards "alien
ideologies ."58
The andidote was "information."

Companies would

rebuild their relationship with employees by
communicating

directly with the individual.

in 1950,

Ivan Willis,

International Harvester's vice-president for industrial
relations vowed:
we are finished with the idea of letting unions tell
our story to our people.
We are going to do that for
ourselves and we are going to do it in competition
with a union or any other agency which attempts to
do it.
We recognize the rights of a union as the
employes' spokesman, their lawyer if you like, on a
specific topic. But we do not consider employes the
union's employes.
They are our employes.
We are
attempting to establish a relationship directly with
our people so that regardless of what union they
132

Herman Steinkraus, president of
Bridgeport Brass bluntly
declared that while an employee may

belong to the union, he

"belongs to the company first. "^^

communication, however, did not
necessarily imply an
open attack on organized labor.
indeed, the small group of
firms committed to accomodation used
the union as a
channel

for the increased level of communication
with employees.

it

was ridiculus advised Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Labor Relations
Director, Herbert Eby, to try to "out-race
and out-maneuver
the union in getting a message across
to
employees."

Others, following a more moderate program,
agreed that any

attempt to discredit unions might backfire
and alienate
workers.

Instead, these firms, except during strikes,

implicitly discounted the significance or legitimacy
of
organized labor, bypassing or totally ignoring the union.
Firms bombarded their workers with pamphlets, comic
books, posters, bulletin boards, letters home, company

annual reports, magazines, newspapers, films, and even

matchbooks.

In 1949,

for instance. General Motors became

the first company to install information racks in its
plants. It distributed seven million pamphlets in a single
year.

By 1958, three thousand companies utilized reading

racks, and firms,

like Employee Relations Inc., emerged to

provide a steady stream of booklets.
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Often,

the mainstay of employee
communxcatxon was the
employee magazine or newspaper.
some of these publ.catxons
dated to the Progressive Era
but many were drscont.nued
dur.ng the thxrt.es.
World War li and the
post-war campaign
to build company consciousness
sparked the revival of
this
medium of communication. The number
of titles jumped from
1,000 in 1940 to 6,500 ten years later,
with a circulation
of 80 million and at the cost of
over 100

million dollars

a

year.

Universities began offering training
for company
editors and newsletters and journals
like Quotes Ending and
Stet shared ideas and encouraged prof
essional ism. ^
The story management communications
sought to convey
had two interrelated parts.

The first part was

a

timeless

industrial message concerning managerial
authority and
worker morale. Moderate as well as conservative
employers
were attracted to a variety of communication
mechanisms

portraying the individual firm's financial position,
operations, products and problems to give employees
feeling of closeness to the firm.

a

Explanations of the

significance of each operation to the finished product were

designed to help create

a

sense of purpose, pride, and

dignity even among those frustrated by subdivided and
alienating labor.

Moreover, information about the company

was to clarify for workers the mutual aims and shared
interests of the "employee-company family. "^^
The second part spoke more specifically to current

political and economic issues.
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Particularly in the years

fro. the end of World War li
to the election of
Eisenhower
co.panxes engaged in an al.ost
hysterical propaganda to

teach general lessons on the
workings of the American
economic system to enhance workers'
apprecxatxon of free
enterprise.
Conservative employers, tended
to emphasize the
importance of freedom from government
regulation to prevent
the supposed arift toward statist
collectivism. Businesssponsored associations like the NAM,
the Advertising
Council, and the American Economic
Foundation provided
editorials and ads to company journals
and urged
ever

greater efforts in publicizing the
"economic facts. "^S
Story after story in company publications
focused on
tne theme that the high American standard
of

living was the

direct result of business enterprise and
profits.
Meddling
with profits, warned a 1950 editorial the
Packard Cablegra m
"carries every last one of us dangerously closer
to the

tyranny of systems in which we want no part."^^

The Allis

Chalmers Company paper published an employee poem entitled
"My Name is Profit" that began "I have been maligned
and

have been praised.

Commerce prosper.

I

My name is hallowed where Industry and

Where

I

Bankruptcy takes over."^^
cal and economic messages.

am unknown Enterprises cease and
Booklets carried similar politi-

American Steel and Wire

Company's rack service included The Chips are Down -- The
Story of Com munism

's

'War to Death' W ith Capitalis m and The

Three Headed M onster by Sherman Rogers, an attack on
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government spending and high
taxes,

sixty-two percent of

the workers at the Philadelphia
plant of Yale and Towne
read
Free Men vs the union Closed
Shog.
Much to the ohagr.n of
the union, twenty-six percent
rated it the best booklet
on
the rack.^^
Often, employers tried to
overcome worker resistance
by
masking their message. Company
journals buxlt readership by
integrating news about the firm and
economics with recreational and educational activities,
department gossip, and
announcements of special events in the
lives of employees.

Reading rack services mixed innocuous
literature on hobbies
and home improvement projects with
those carrying
an

explicit economic message to encourage
employees to form the
habit of picking up every booklet from the
racks and taking
them home.^^

Employers also used more direct means, such as
letters,
to personalize communications with individual
employees.

The

Public Opinion Index for Industry found that the
proportion
of surveyed firms writing to employees increased
from 28

percent in 1947 to 82 percent in 1955.^0

reported that 99 percent of East

St.

Another researcher

Louis Swift Company

workers liked company letters; women enjoyed them even more
than men.

Letters from the plant manager or company presi-

dent provided the personal touch.

"It's

warm," asserted

James Black, the Director of Public Relations for the

Associated Industries of Cleveland,

"It goes right into the

home of the worker and his family, and it takes the company
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,

With

.t."

Beg.nn.ng in

Henry Pord ix annually
sent
Chr.st.as letters to every
employee and his fa.ily.
1

946,

To

build

spirit Of co.pet.t.on xn the
workforce and a greater
interest in the ,ob, co.pan.es
wrote to employees about
competing firms, customers, future
business prospects, and
new methods and machinery.
Letters, U,e many other
forms
of corporate communication,
bypassed organized labor.
Black
advised employers to disregard
union objections
a

for "You re

not sending letters to the union's
members, but to your
employees." During times of conflict,
employers felt these
letters served as an important bridge
to employees,

international Harvester and Chrysler,
among others, wrote
almost daily to employees during strikes. "^^

Some firms went to great lengths to ensure
that workers
listened to their message.
in 1956, Kaiser steel
Company,

put its annual report in
showed it along with

a

motion picture film and then

Hollywood premiere at company-

a

sponsored theatre parties to 30,000 people.

other companies

recorded their presidents' reports and sent the phonograph
records to the employees homes.

Corporation conducted

a

General Aniline

&

Film

game called Qunch (quiz-at-lunch)

testing workers on their knowledge, gained from annual
reports, booklets, magazines and plant papers, of company

economics, products, people and history. "^^

Managers argued that effective communication involved
listening as much as telling.
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Two-way communication was

essential for verifying if
workers were absorbrng the
employer's message. Attitude
surveys were one means
for
determining what was on employees"
minds and Uke other
communication techniques their
utilization increased after
the war.
By the mid-fifties, v^iic
one in
ill live
five tirms
f,-,-m= were
surveying their employees.
The Ford Motor Company began
f

its

communication program after an opinion
survey revealed
rather unfavorable level of employee
morale,

a

a thirty

minute quiz developed in 1952 by
Employee Attitude Research
Group at the University of Chicago
promised to determine
"what keeps the worker happy, enthusiastic,
loyal to
his

employer." The inventory was adopted by

including Sears, Roebuck

&

number of firms

Company, Campbell Soup Company,

New York Central System, Johnson
Corporation

a

&

Johnson, and The Visking

^
.

Meetings, particularly in small and medium sized
firms,

complemented surveys by providing
contact with management.

a

forum for face-to-face

Corporate officers from firms like

Pitney-Bowes, Elgin National Watch Company, Esso Standard
Oil Company and Sharp

&

Dohme met annually with groups of

employees to explain their firm's business condition and
outlook and to field questions.

In 1949,

15,000 Johnson and

Johnson employees periodically stopped work to hear company
chairman's Robert Wood Johnson's 44 tape recorded talks and

then participate in discussions that made "the employees
feel they had a personal part in the success of the

business."

Weekly "Understanding Luncheons" provided an
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"open forum" at Stanley Home
uiut^ Products
t-roaucts, ^a .small
1
Massachusetts
firm. During 1953, Trmken Roller
Bearing Company encouraged
two-way communxcat.on by .nvit.ng
all li,000

rank-and-file

employees, agaxn xn small groups,
to lunch with management.
Thompson Products, an auto parts
manufacturer, relied on
frequent meetings over dinner or
lunch in xts successful
effort to keep its firm non-union.^5

some firms, like Crouse-Hinds

,

a

Syracuse electrical

products manufacturer, combined meetings
with plant tours,
enabling employees to integrate their

jobs into the firm's

overall operation.

Luncheon meetings with

ranking company

a

officer after the tour dealt with such
"touchy subjects" as
job ratings and specific grievances.
Similarily, Chicago
bolt and screw producer, Pheoll Manfacturing
Company,

employing 1500 workers, ended its tour with
with General Manager
timid at first,

A.E.

Johnson.

a

conference

The employee-tourists,

soon were "talking openly and with feeling

about matters that are of deep concern to them."
year company veteran gained

company and

a

a

One ten-

new understanding of the

sense of pride in his work.

He observed:

man^can work all day long at a packing table but he
doesn't have any particular feeling about what he is
doing.
Here today I have watched this whole process, from
beginning to end. For the first time I see my own job in
a

its real light.
I see that it is important to other
jobs.
And I see where other people in this plant can't
get along without me. You hear a lot of talk about teamwork in the plant. Now I see clearly what it means.^'

This kind of response kept managers enthusiastic about

communications.

In 1950,

Lockheed's tour dramatized the
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value Of good workmanship
when xt chartered

company

buUt Constellations

a

flock of

and flew 11,000 employees
on

company time over Southern
California to enable them
to see
how the planes they built performed
in the air. 78

companies devised some of the most
innovative communication techniques
an effort to impress upon
employees the
danger of big government and high
taxes.
Here the overtly
political nature of the communications
movement became even
clearer. Concerned that few employees
understood

m

their tax

burden,

Dupont dramatized the impact of
"hidden taxes," by
having an employee and his family to
pick out all" the
merchanidise they might have purchased with
the money they
had paid in taxes between 1947 and 1954
and photographing
the collection for its journal.

m

1952,

FE Myers

&

Brothers Company held meetings with employees
that began
with Controller iM.C. Moses stacking $5,000 on
a table.

An

employee volunteer counted out the money he had spent
during
the year for real estate, gasoline, cigarette, excise,
and
sales taxes, with Moses making running comments about what
the worker could have done with "all that money."

The

controller then computed what the whole plant including

employees and company paid in taxes.

After the meeting, the

firm distributed special kits with instructions and $5,000
in stage money called "Big Tax Money" to enable each worker
to determine their personal tax bite.^^
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other companies specifically
mobilized workers to
demand lower taxes and the creation
of a "better business
environment." On March 5, 1953, Quaker
Oats Company
initiated the "non-partisan" Ighat
(l m Gonna Holler
About
Taxes) campaign in seventeen major
plants. Employees

circulated Ighat petitions which they
sent along with
letters and postcards to their
Congressmen

urging support of

legislation to reduce the tax burden.
Quaker Oats maintenance man, who won

William Kohs,
a

a

contest by collecting

anti-tax petition signatures, shouted "IGHAT"
at Senator
Everett Dirksen over the telephone.
the

m

spring of 1957,

companies worked hard to rouse worker opposition
to
proposed graduated corporate income tax. Dupont,

a

for

instance, warned its employees that this legislation
would
lead to higher consumer prices and discourage corporate

expansion which provided new jobs.

GE responded with

a

special three week campaign called "Freedom in Action."

Conducted in plants across the nation, it encouraged
employees to write to their congressional representatives on

government spending, taxes, and "the Freedom of Initiative
Climate for Economic Growth. "^^
IV
In the post-war decade, industrialists added a greater

sophistication to selling their version of the American

economic system.

A dozen educational and business organiza-

tions and over thirty large firms, ranging from
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progres-

sives like Johnson

Johnson to such staunch
ant.-union
conservatives of IBM and Dupont,
developed economic education programs, n^any of which were
distributed nationwide to
other firms. These entailed taking
workers or supervisors
off the Shop floor for one or more
days for a period of
three to fifteen hours to participate
in discussion classes.
105,000 Westinghouse, 180,000 U.S. Steel
and 20,000 Swift
Company employees were among the first
to be exposed
.

to this

new technique.

GE demonstrated its commitment to
promoting

better understanding of our American
way of life" by
assigning an executive fulltime as "Manager
of Economic
Training." in early 1951, a leading management
consultant
observed in the Harvard Business Revie w that
"practically
"a

every prominent leader of business in the United
States
today is talking about teaching economics to employees.

Many of the largest corporations have launched economiceducation programs."^

'•

Two of the most popular courses, "How Our Business
System Operates" (HOBSO) and "In Our Hands" were initially
created by the Dupont Company and the Borg Warner Company
and Inland Steel for their employees, but then given to the

National Association of Manufacturers and the American

Economic Foundation for national distribution.

The NAM

conducted eight day institutes for the training of HOBSO

discussion leaders at sites throughout the country.

By the

mid-fifties over 500 firms had participated in training

142

^

sessions and were equipped
to present the program
and rts
sequel, HOBSO II, to t.e.r
wor.ers.B2 3eginnrng
.n 1950 the
American Economic Foundation
began distributing "m
Our
Hands," the Inland Steel and
Borg Warner course.
within
three years one and a half
million workers had participated
in this program.
Nineteen firms in Latrobe,
Pennsylvania,
for example, co-sponsored the
AEF program enabling half
the
workers of that town to "study
economics" The Latrobe
Bulletin observed that "we still cannot
get used to hearing
economics being casually discussed on
buses, on street
corners and in the lunchrooms and
taverns." Both these
programs emphasized the importance of
worker participation,
because "conclusions reached through
participation
are

understood, accepted, believed, and remembered."

facilitate participation,

To

"In Our Hands" limited group size

to fifteen and relied on "unsupervised"
discussion led by

rank and file workers.

But the movies and flipcharts

utilized by both programs tended to steer discussion
to the
conclusions desired by management. ^
In terms of content, these courses fell into three

groups, evangelistic, academic, and company oriented.
V

Although there were significant differences in approach, all

ultimately led to the goal of generating support for free
enterprise.

Evangelistic programs like, HOBSO and "In Our

Hands," taught "Free Enterprise economics" by focusing on the

accomplishments of the American business system and exploiting the fear of losing its benefits to encroaching

143

soc.ausm.

HOBSO also e^phasi.ed the
importance of profits,
competition and individual freedom,
and defended the
"capitalistxc standard of living
against central government
control." After the HOBSO
sessions one Dupont worker

commented

realize what could happen under
a socialistic
government and now I am going to do all
i can to prevent
our
Government from going social istic."^^
"I

Academic programs, like the one
developed by the
university of Chicago for 3,000 Republic
Steel

supervisors

shunned emotional appeals about the
dangers of socialism for
a more subtle approach.
Such programs proported to teach
the basic principles of economics,
including
issues like

costs, stock investment and the banking
system, in order to

provide a framework for analyzing economic
and social
problems.
After participating in fifteen educational
sessions. Republic Steel foremen were to have
developed "an

appreciation of the values, benefits and rewards to
the
individual as part of the Corporation and the Economic
system" and an ability to correct workers misconceptions.

Foreman Chris Cutropia reported that the course enabled him
to effectively respond to a disgruntled worker who
snapped

"Why should

I

knock myself out for Republic?

out of every billet of steel and

I

They make $75

get nothing."

Cutropia,

who took the "griper" aside and convinced him that the
company would be lucky to make seventy-five cents
recalled that "three months ago
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I

a billet,

wouldn't have been able to

say anything."85

3^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^

typified company oriented economic
education.
They presented to all their employees
information specifically
about
the company to enhance
organizational rapport
in the belief

that the best way to generate
approval of the economic
system was to create feelings of
identity with the fxrm.86
Economic education advocates pointed
to the opinion
polls conducted before and after the
presentations to demonstrate how they reshaped worker
attitudes.
1951, before
participating in the "in Our Hands"
discussions half the
rank and file workers of Sharon steel
Corporation believed
there was no real danger to personal
freedom if the government took over industry, that the way to
increase prosperity
was to circulate more money, and that a strong
union was the
best protection for job security. The
post-course survey

m

showed only one quarter of the workers agreed with
these
propositions.

"in Our Hands" also seemingly changed

workers' ideas about the best way to improve their
standard
of living.

percent of

Fifty-three percent as against thirty-three
a

pre-course audience agreed that the solution

was greater production. ^

Similarily an informal survey

showed that at least some Latrobe workers had absorbed the
program's message.

Paul Palmer of the Toyad Company

reported he had learned that "People benefit when the tools
of production are in the hands of private individuals rather

than under the control and supervision of the government."

Without the

profit motive, he continued, "inefficiency is
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9

bound to creep into our
industrial pattern and the
would be passed on to the
taxpayers. "88

1

OSS

Often, economic education
^ciuxon programs
nmnr-^rr^c: had
k-,^
more immediate
political goals.
the early fxfties moboli.ing
support
for the Republican Party drove
many programs. Although
the
political message of "m Our Hands"
was very subtle, another
program, "This Is Our Problem",
developed by the arch

m

conservative Harding College and
presented to workers at
General Motors and Swift Company and
throughout the midwest,
openly attacked the Democractic Party.
The growth pattern
of economic education programs
reflected their use
as a

political weapon.

while economic training increased

steadily after 1948, the biggest jump
occurred during the
year prior to the 1952 presidential election,
when the

percentage of participating firms increased to
forty-four
percent from twenty percent. After the Republican

victory

the number of firms utilizing formal economic
training

receded back to one in five.

NAM President Charles Sligh

pleaded against backsliding, warning "the spirit of peace
and sweet reasonableness is not going to descend automatically."

A political change in Washington would not guaran-

tee better relations with employees.

In 1955, an Opinion

Research Corporation Vice President admitted that "the

Republican victory in the national elections has removed the
need for explaining so thoroughly the basis of the enter-

prise system and the threats to its continuation. "8
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V

Gaining worker consent to the
messages of economic
education was intimately connected
to the operation of
the
shop floor. Many companies recognized
that all the energy
and money expended on communication
would be worthless if
"Ivan the Terrible is walking up
and down
the aisles, or

Mortimer the Dumb is posing in the garb
of foreman."90
Thus, human relations oriented
personnel

administration

often integrated communication programs
with the development
of more effective supervision.
Most managers agreed that
foremen were the key figure in labor relations.
They
believed that the degree of worker identification
with the
firm and possibly with the free enterprise system
itself was

intimately linked to the employee's relationship with
their
supervisor.

Following the war, many firms increased the size of
their supervisory force.

Dupont maintained

fifteen workers to one foreman.

a

ratio of

At the same time, to

stregthen foremen vis a vis union shop floor leadership,
corporations negotiated for the reductions in the number of
stewards.
firms,

Supervisory training programs proliferated as

like GE, Armstrong Cork, Alcoa, and Ford, sought to

increase the prestige, effectiveness, and loyalty of their
foreman.

A few firms had initially offered these courses

after World War

rising unionism..

I

and during the late thirties to combat
In addition,
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the government had sponsored

foreman training during World War
Ii92
post-war programs had two goals.

First,

^^^^ extensive
they attempted to

rehabrl.tate foremen as an integral
part of management.
The
Taft-Hartley Act had destroyed supervisory
unionization but
failed to solve the problem of the
alienation of front line
supervisors.
To bolster supervisors' prestige
and improve
their loyalty to the firm, employers
provided foreman with
greater job security and established a
sharp differentiation
between supervisors and the rank and file.
Companies

increasingly placed foremen on salary, invited
them to
special meetings and dinners, tailored special
economic
education programs to them, and gave them offices

or desks,

telephones and special parking privileges.

in 1948,

American Type Founders invited all its management staff
to
three day conference at a hotel that included a program of

a

banquets, entertainment and sports, with the entire bill

picked up by the firm.^^
Secondly, supervisory development promised to boost

foremen's ability to serve more effectively as the first
line of defense against unionism.

Companies would win

worker back their their side with proper, fair, and sympathetic treatment from their immediate supervisors.

This

strategy was employed not only by large non-union firms like

Thompson Products, American Rolling Mill and Kodak, but also
by companies committed to a realistic approach to industrial

relations, such as International Harvester, General Motors,
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and Ford.

Courses taught foreman how
to use their own
personaUty to develop d.scrpUne
and .nstUl loyalty
a.ong
workers. Authoritarianism
was no longer acceptable;
instead, huznan relations theory
called for persuasxon and
friendly, caring leadership.
"when there is a human
personal relationship, a feeling
of belonging to the
team,
when there is mutual under standing
confidence and respectadvised Joseph G. Gilland of the
Packard Motor Car Company,
"there is a well rounded, harmonious,
and efficient
organization. "^^

Employers understood, of course, that
a close foremanworker relationship was also a means
of circumventing the
union.

in 1950,

"'Nth degree'" its

the Lukens Steel Company reaffirmed
to the

commitment to developing better under-

standing and closer ties between supervision
and employees
for it was "the one and only avenue through
which certain

activities of the Union can be offset in

constructive manner."

a

proper and

Firms like Lukens instructed foreman

to compete with the union steward for worker
allegiance by

personally greeting each employee every day and by providing
a

sympathetic ear for on-and-off the job problems.

Some

companies even provided instructions in counseling techniques.

Coring White of the non-union Dan River Mills advised

foreman to learn the names of workers' wives and children
and to engage each employee in
chat" on a regular basis.

a

"three minute, friendly

In 1947,

GE began encouraging

the "establishment and maintenance of a separate man-to-man
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relat.onsh.p between each
supervisor and each
.nd.v.dual
employee," by establishing
15,000 cells of f.ve
to twentyfive people grouped around
a single supervisor.

ge xssued a

124-page manual to supervisors,
which contained elaborate
answers to every objection that
might be raised by
employees
about their jobs or the company.
Moreover, the corporation
urged foreman to find out what
each employee "liKes
and

dislikes about his job, what he
thinks we can do to help him
have a job and a personal association
with us that is more
rewarding materially and spiritual ly. "96
Participation was another fundamental
concept
associated with the human relations
movement.

The Hawthorne

studies had demonstrated that allowing
workers to participate in decisions concerning their
welfare raised morale and
reduced resistance to company directives
thereby ensuring

greater cooperation and higher productivity.

Although,

other social scientists questioned the
link between higher
morale and productivity, some managers embraced

the concept.

Like communications, participation promised
to address

employees higher needs by making work more meaningful,
by
creating a sense of importance and belonging, and
by
restoring workers' creative relationship to the
C.

job.

James

Worthy of Sears warned that workers who were not fully

involved became "restless and discontented" and were "easily
subject to strong leadership which may arise in opposition
to management."

Thus,

like other human relations policies.
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^

participation was

means of ^-Ldwing
drawina th^
tne loyalty of workers
away from the union and closer
to management. 9
a

i

The corporate commitment to
participation, however, dxd
not signify a wrllingness to
restructure work or the lines
of authority within the shop.
Most managers recoxled at
the
Idea of instituting labor-management
committees.
Few had
any sympathy for the widely
discussed Scanlon Plan, a union-

management cooperative scheme that
permitted the union to
negotiate on equal terms with the
employer
on critical

production issues.

Instead,

as Fortune observed in 1951,

employers wanted to give workers the illusion
of participating in the company.98 similarily, sociologist
William
Foote Whyte recalled that companies saw no
need to

change

their styles of management but simply sought
guidance on how
to "make workers feel they are participating. "^^
In reality, participation gave little real
power or

control over jobs to workers.

In some firms, it involved

increased use of conferences during which supervisors
"consulted" with employees on decisions that affected them.

Cessna Aircraft assigned the group leader the job of molding
the "human weakneses of his men and women in the proper

direction." Glenn

L.

Martin Company succeeded in using these

meetings to obtain "full agreement" to
program.

a

methods improvement

The company reported that workers responded: "We

like this way of conducting changes because we feel we are

being considered."

Lewis Corey,

a

professor of political

economy at Antioch College, who observed the Harwood
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Manufacturing Company's syste. of
part.c.pat.on, found tnat
the Objective of the conferences
was "to get the workers
to
accept what management wants them
to accept but to make
them
feel the^ made or helped to make
the decision."100
More commonly, employers relied
on suggestion programs
to secure greater employee
involvement.
Suggestion systems
enabled employers to gain greater
access to workers' knowledge of the work process by giving
employees a direct

monetary reward for ideas on how to cut
waste, eliminate
unnecessary motions or prevent safety
hazards.
Although

they dated back to the

1

880s, it was not until the postwar

era of human relations that suggestion
systems began to
flourish.
Ford Motor Company, for example, established
an

employee suggestion plan in 1947 as part of its
new human
relations effort.
By 1953, four thousand firms
received

more than two million ideas from workers and paid out
over
fifteen million dollars in return. The National Association
of Suggestion Systems, organized in 1942 by four
companies,

compiled statistics on the operation of plans and helped

members promote and administer their programs.

By 1949 the

organization had grown to three hundred and fifty members
and to a over

a

thousand seven years later

.

'^

'-

Companies claimed that the value of these plans lay in

more than monetary savings.

Allen Ruffin of the W.F Hall

Printing Company asserted that they provided

"a

direct line

of communication from the men at the machine to the man a
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the

top...

Moreover, they gave employees

a

sense of part.cx-

pation, making them feel the
company was interested .n
the.r
ideas.
in 1952, Riegel Paper
Corporation executive G.R.
Schenck asserted that upon adoption
of a suggestion the
employee gained satisfaction .'from
personal recognition for
his constructive thinking., and
attained "a sense of pride
when he sees one of his ideas in
actual operation. 1 0 2
-.

The

GE Utica plant assured recognition
by televising suggestion
awards ceremonies on local stations.
Parker Pen Company
used a suggestion system called the
-.Jdea Exchange Plan", in

which workers shared jointly with the
company in the first
year's net savings as the core of a
program to break
workers' traditional attitudes.

The company also eliminated

time clocks to demonstate that it viewed workers
as responsible partners of management.
The firm asserted that
the

program had succeeded in stimulating among workers
"proprietor-mindedness,.. which meant the identification of

employees with company interests. '^^
Companies frequently had to counter worker complaints
that rewards were too meager or that labor-saving suggestions might lead to job loss.

Ceremonies and rituals

offered one way of overcoming such resistance.

Elaborate

campaigns or contests were designed to raise the level of

worker involvement and
or esprit de corp

Company conducted

promote feelings of company identity

In 1949,

.

a

Goodyear Tire and Rubber

five-week campaign devoted to waste

reduction suggestions.

It doubled awards and held weekly
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drawings for merchandise
prizes.

a .Villainous looking

hunchback named Weasel Waste"
roamed through the plants
criticizing good work and praising
any waste he observed
During 1956, "Mr. check" strolled
daxly through the

westinghouse Columbus plant tapping
employees on the
shoulder and giving them five
silver dollars if
they

successfully answered three questions
on xmproving qualxty.
According to a report published in
Factory Manaaement and
M aintenance a distrustful, active
union member admitted
changing "his tune" after receiving
his award, confessing he
had believed the cash only went to
carefully selected nonunionists ^ 0^
,

.

Sylvania's 1952 "Operation sharp" contest
stressed

group spirit to improve worker performance
in the areas of
safety, housekeeping, reduction of scrap,
and product
improvement.

The company publicized the campaign with

streamers, posters, floats,

a

circus parade and the crowning

of "Miss Sharp" before an audience of
12,000.

To ensure

fullest participation, the contest divided workers
into

groups named after college football teams, which were
judged

m

the various categories, with a grand prize of

luxury weekend in New York City.

a

three day

Teams created their own

special costumes and decorations, held parades and pep

rallies,

"come complete with cheers," to build enthusiasm.

The "Stanford Indians" dressed as Indians and built

teepee.

Although the contest cut into working time.
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Sylvania asserted that production
increased, quality
improved, and employee morale and
the level of company
identification jumped.
'-

AS all of these activities
attest, human relations

systems trumpeted the company's sincere
and personal concern
for the individual employee. Name
plates, awards for
long

service,

birthday greetings and merit awards
provided
individual recognition and acknowleged
that the most menial
job, however, minor, was important
to the company.
one

manager whose company began sending birthday
cards in 1946
attested that:

One of my men is going around walking on air,
saying
that for the first time in thirty-five years
with
company he been recognized as an individual rather the
than a cog in the machine.
He says that birthday card
worth more to him than a ten dollar bill.^O^

is

Firms, like the Frigidaire division of General Motors,
Union

Carbide and Carbon, and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing,

provided dinner at

a hotel,

flowers, music, and

entertain-

ment to honor employees "who have proved their worth and
loyalty over

worker

s

a

long period of years."

To enhance the

prestige in the community, many companies broadcast

service award cermonies over local radio stations or

released pictures to local newspapers.

Acknowledging that

some workers might ridicule such efforts, personnel
specialist Joseph

H.

Frost insisted that they were "quite

important to [them] no matter how much [they] may publicly
scoff at the idea."^^^

155

Firms that employed large
numbers of women believed
that these ..nds of activities
were especially important.
Their approach, however, reflected
the gender relations
of
the dominant culture and served
to reinforce its assumptions.
Personnel specialists contended
that the particularities of the female temperament
meant that women required
even greater levels of respect,
appreciation,
and friend-

liness than men.

Hughes Aircraft stressed making
women feel

at home at work, encouraging
supervisors to act as a
"handholder" when necessary.
1957, applying typical
human relations thinking, an employee
counselor concluded
that Hughes women workers were well
satisfied as they liked
getting "a big 'hello'in the morning.
They

m

like the boss to

call them by their first names.
of belonging."

Indeed,

little more that

a

And they like the feeling

many employers believed that it took

"big mirror, perfumed soap, hot water"

and an occasional kind word to "keep the girls happy."

The

GE Schenectady Works' paper featured women's contribution
to
the plant by focusing on the "Woman of the Month." In
other

firms, however, recognition was based more on women's

physical attributes.

Standard Oil held beauty contests

while McDonnell Aircraft Corporation plants annually elected
a

"Sky Queen" to "reign over company activities.

"-'-

VI

Employers asserted that human relations worked.

Communications and participation were contributing to
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a

^

growing company consciousness.
that

m

1958, ERLIC contended

segment of American management
has suceeded xn
building a relationship wxth its
employees that sharply
reduces the influence exercised
by unxon leaders."
Many
managers admitted, however, that
the results were
"a

often

intangible.

They

reUed

on studxes

Uke

one conducted by

the National Industrial Conference
Board in 1952, which
concluded that "communication is a
powerful factor affectxng
the ideas and attitudes of employee."
others pointed to
concrete benefits.
Standard Oil reported greater
worker

participation resulted in
productivity.

c.H.

a

twenty percent increase in

Smith, president of The steel
improve-

ment and Forge Company, attributed fewer
labor dxsturbances
and a more cooperative workforce to a
human
relations

program that included economic education and
foreman
training.

The Ideal Electric and iManuf acturing
Company,

a

small Ohio firm, reported that grievances dropped
dramatically and the union showed a new respect for
management at
the bargaining table.

Finally, General Electric felt its communications

campaign, which exploited the internal factionalism of the

electrical workers union over the issue of communism, had
suceeded in driving
workers.
St.

a

wedge between organized labor and

Even as early as 1947,

United Electrical Workers'

Louis district president William Sentner recognized the

union's growing demoralization and admitted "that poison and
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misinformation and bosses' propaganda
stuck
There is an old saying out in
Missouri,
'if

stuff hard enough,

a

a

little bit.

you hit that

little bit of it sticks."
Some of you

who are farmers know what you take out
of
and know what I am talking about.-m

a

barn every day,

ge believed that the

failure of several locals to join the
International Electrical workers Union's 1952 strike against
the corporation,

and

the refusal of union members to endorse
strike calls in 1953
and 1954 provided proof of the effectiveness
of human
'^
relations
^

'-

.

Despite this litany of endorsements, critics
challenged
almost every aspect of human relations. As early
as 1947,

sociologists and economists began attacking human
relations
in industry,

charging that its goal was to manipulate

workers for management's purposes.

According to sociologist

Daniel Bell the "social science of the factory researchers
is not a science of man, but a cow-sociology," which

suggested that the happy worker like the contented cow is

more productive.

Industrial relations scholar John Dunlop

found that the communications framework, positing

a

"single

unity and corpora teness in the work community" was

"basically incompatible with collective bargaining and

democratic traditions."
In 1950,

Fortune editor William Whyte also questioned

all of the effort spent in economic education.

In a series

of articles entitled "Is Anybody Listening?," his conclusion

was an emphatic no.

The millions spent were "not worth
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a

da.n."

The campaign to sell free
enterpr.se was psychologically unsound/, abstract,
defensive, and negative
Moreover, .'in a great .any of
rts aspects rt
represents a
shoeing lac. of fa.th .n the A.er.can
people, and .n so.e
cases downright contempt."
Americans weren't col lect
ivists
and didn't need indoctrination
rn the American way.
whyte
Charged that the real objective
was a Republican victory
at
the polls.
so long as communications
was so blatantly
partisan, employees would not accept
management's facts or
have confidence in its motives or
sincerity.
Moreover,

participation, as practiced in most firms,
also failed
because the actual goal was manipulation
and avoidance of
real participation. ^ ^

Management consultant Peter Drucker concurred.

Any

money spent on changing the thinking of
employees on "such
queer targets" as a lower tax load on business

was "totally

wasted."

Participation hinged on actually making work

important and possibly restructuring the whole
corporate
organization rather than giving workers
importance. "115

a

"feeling of

Like the social science critics and some

more liberal businessmen, Drucker saw the unwillingness of
human relation advocates to accept the fact that the
workplace involved real and healthy problems of power and
conflicts "which are not conflicts of personalities but

objective conflicts of vision and interests" as evidence of
their 'almost panicky fear" of unions.
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Finally, he

6

condemned the wxdespread use
of hu.an relations
as
of busting organized labor.
The belief

a

„ea„s

that unions would

"wither on the vine" in the facp nf rrr.r.A
tace of good employee
relations
was the "opium of the managerial
proletariat."! 1

criticism touched off

a

period of debate within
the

business community.

Claude Rob.nson of the
Opxnxon Research
corporation provided evidence that
workers were
listening.

His polls demonstrated that
twice as many worKers believed
what they read in company as
opposed to union publications
and that seventy percent of polled
workers said they read
and believed the contents of company
letters.
some
employers, however, admitted that their
economic education
programs met worker resistance. Dupont
surveys,
for

instance, found workers emerging from
HOBSO training with
the comments "just a lot of propaganda
for Big Business" and
"I went up there a Democrat and
'by
i 'm still a
'

Democrat.

They can't change me."

others conceded that the

payoff on foreman training was "not automatic
or inevitable.
Foremen often failed to implement lessons taught
in super-

visory training or workers were suspicious of
newly-trained

foremen who were suddenly solitious about employee
feelings.
But,

an endless series of conferences, meetings, and

seminars on the problem produced the resolve that "if
initial experiments

.

.

.

have only moderate success, the

mature reaction is not to scrap the effort, but to develop
still better techniques for achieving the objective."
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Employers determined that their
programs would beoome more
sophisticated and worked to rmprove
their methods.

They

would avoid preaching or patron.zxng
their workers and would
cast their message in ways that
appealed to the worker's own
self interest.
As a result, human relations
continued
strongly throughout most of the
fifties.
In the end, it is impossible to
estimate the success of

any particular program in reshaping
the ideas of workers.
The cumulative weight of the wide
variety of human relations
mechanisms, however, remained relevant in
the continuing
battle to fashion a postwar pro-ccrporat
e

ideology.

Employers were still committed to the "selling
of sound
economic ideas," which John R. Thompson of the
Missouri
State Chamber of Commerce, admitted, was "a
political

:ob." 12 0

They continued to use communications as a
vehicle

to compete with unions for worker support.

Indeed, an even

more aggressive communications campaign highlighted

a

mana-

gerial offensive against organized labor that began during
the waning years of the Eisenhower administration.

United States Steel Vice President

R.

in 1961,

Heath Larry reiterated

his firm's commitment to this policy, asserting that evi-

dence existed "that over the years

a

[positive] change in

the climate of employee opinion has been taking place. "-^^^

Employers girded themselves for an enduring war of attrition.

It was not enough, however, to preach the virtues of

the free enterprise system; workers expected to see

161

significant improvements in
their quality of life.
To
delxver these expectations,
many employers
complemented
human relations with an astounding
revitalizatron of cor
porate welfare activities. For
workers, then, company
consciousness depended upon tangible
rewards as well as
illusion of belonging.
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Treasure Chest for
Industry," Time, Nov. 26, 1956;
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Wolf, The Manage m ent of Personnel pp. 249-51; "The
Suggestion Box," p. 85; "Suggestion Systems:
Pro and Con,"
M anage ment Record 14 (March 1952):
85-87, 115-19, esp. 117;
H.T. McLaughlin
Westinghouse Electric Corp) "More From Your
Suggestion Plan," Factory M anage m ent and M aintenance 113
(Nov. 1955):
114-17; "Promoting More Suggestions," Factory
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"Presentation of Employee Awards," pamphlet, 1950,
AOF I, Box 56, LMDC; "Service Awards Morale Boosters?" The
Conference Board M anage m ent Record 11 (Nov. 1 949):
4 7 8-"807
"Industry Honors Its Best," M anage m ent Record 14 (June
1952):
225-32; The "Best Employee of the Year" award at the
Coated Abrasives Division of the Carborundum Company of
Niagara Falls was based on loyalty, attitude, responsiblity
for fellow employees, devotion to duty, personal sacrifice
for the welfare of the company, and contribution to the
community, "'Oscar' for Factory Worker," Factory M anage m ent
and M aintenance 115 (March 1957):
115; Carl E. Schneider
warned that workers had to be "given recognition on the job
or you are headed for trouble. "Personnel Relations in Small
Companies and Unorganized Companies," (typescript), address
at the 24th NAM Institute on Industrial Relations, Hollywood, Fla., March 16-20, 1953, Acc. 1412, NAM, Box 12
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Whitmore, The Handbook of Industrial Relations , p. 810.
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"Making a Production of the Service Club Dinner,"
M anagement Record 14 (March 1952):
96; "How to Make Service
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(Dec. 1950):
108; Joseph H. Frost, "Personnel Paradoxes,"
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critiques of human relations in Haw thorne Revisited chap.
3; Also see Baritz, The Servants of Power, chps. 9 and 10.
Baritz concludes that social scientists employed by industry
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payroll; Wren, The Evolution of M anagement Thought
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CHAPTER

5

THE NEW WELFARE CAPITALISM

Managers intent on increasing employee
attachment to
the firm and to the American economic
system reached back

to

personnel strategy that had even deeper
historical roots
tnan human relations.
in the years following World War
II,
a

companies in both the union and non-union sectors
revitalized mechanisms often associated with antiunion
welfare

capitalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.

Industrial recreation boomed, profit sharing

increased, and employers demonstrated

renewed interest in

integrating workers' families into the firm.

More impor-

tantly, an intricate web of benefits including pensions,

vacations, educational assistance, and insurance provided

substantial segment of American workers with

degree of security.

a

a

greater

Indeed, even in the unionized sector,

employers fought hard to claim credit for the benefits won by
organized labor in collective bargaining.

Welfarism meshed closely with human relations.
Together, advocates claimed, they promised to build company

consciousness; they would restore the afffinities between
capital and labor while alleviating the stresses created by
the work process.

But while human relations relied on

social and psychological devices to enhance employee

identification with the firm, welfarism provided tangible
evidence of employer concern for the worker.
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Moreover, if

numan relations created personal ties
and loyalties between
worKer and management on the shop floor,
welfarism sought to
expand that community of interest beyond
the immediate
confines of the factory to encompass the
worker's
leisure

and home life.

Combined, human relations and welfare
capitalism reinforced the notion of the
interdependence
of

workers and their families with their employer.

Employers

tried to convince workers that their security
depended not
on union organization or the state, but on
acceptance
of a

managerially-dominated social and political order.

Welfarism had deep roots in the American economic
system. From the decline of the artisan shop through the

rise of the corporate giants, employer benevolence was

a

constant device, drawing on the moral imperatives of the

American social order.

Its earliest form was a paternalism

based on the personalized relationship between employer and

employee that helped smooth the initial transition to industrial capitalism.

More systematized welfare programs fol-

lowed in the early twentieth century to combat proDlems

caused by the advent of mass production, Taylorism, and
unionism.

Particularly after the labor turmoil at the end

of World War

I,

progressive employers began to address these

problems by developing bureaucratic personnel and labor-

management programs in which welfarism played an important
part.

Through non-wage incentives, employers hoped to
188

.

restore the sense of loyalty and
identification between
worker and employer that had been
weakened by changes
labor process and by the growth in the
size of the
workplace

m

the

Underpinning welfare capitalism was the
concept of
management's obligation to secure the well-being
of

its

employees.

Employers demonstrated their concern for
workers

by improving conditions in their factories
through safety

campaigns,

lunchrooms, and even beautified plants.

They

wished to alleviate many of the hazards of industrial
life
by providing doctors and insurance plans.
Through stock
purchasing, pensions, and

home-ownership plans, managers

sought to bind workers closer to the company and decrease
the costly turnover rates, while work councils and shop

committees encouraged workers to believe that they had

a

voice in determining wages and working conditions or in

settling grievances. ^

Finally,

in recreational activities

like sports teams and hobby clubs, employers linked company

imperatives to the worker's leisure time and offset the

monotony of factory

work.-^

The welfare capitalism of the 1920s achieved mixed
results.

Welfarism played at least some part in the preci-

pitious decline in labor activity and the greater stability
of the workforce during that decade.

But,

passively accepted management's policies;
porate loyalty implied

a

employees never
instead, cor-

negotiated compact between
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manayeir.ent ana worker,

based on the employer's willingness

to compromise on significant issues.

while companies

achieved a degree of consent, they paid for
it through wages
and at times shop floor concessions.^
The Depression, however, shook the notion
of mutual

responsibility between worker and company,

m

the early

thirties, the prolonged economic slump forced most
firms to

drop expensive programs.

Other companies faced competition

for control of welfare programs from newly unionized

workers. 5

Although in disarray, welfarism was not com-

pletely destroyed.

Some companies, like Endicott Johnson,

NCR, Sears, Roebuck and Company, and Goodyear Tire and

Rubber, combined well established programs of welfare capi-

talism with

a

izing drives.

degree of intimidation to combat labor organA few others implemented new benefit schemes

to contain the industrial union upsurge.^
The outbreak of the Secona World War brought changes in

state policy that breathed new life into welfare capitalism.
The drive to promote wartime productivity and industrial

harmony led state agencies to support traditional welfare
programs like corporate-sponsored industrial recreation.
The government also altered corporate tax laws and insti-

tuted wage control policies that encouraged the development
of employee benefit plans in the private sector.

Finally,

some firms struggling with labor militancy, turnover, and

absenteeism looked to welfarism with renewed favor.

190

By tne

war's end,

health insurance coverage tripled and
pension
coverage increased by a third.

Management's desire to build company
consciousness in
an effort to counter the growing power of the
state and
organized labor further invigorated welfarism.
Postwar
prosperity and accompanying high corporate profits
under-

wrote this new venture in employer benevolence.

Obviously,

government-regulated services introduced during the New
Deal and the existence of unions altered postwar welfare

capitalism.

With the development of state-sponsored public

housing, for instance, employers showed little interest in

directly providing housing, which had been

a

common com-

ponent of earlier welfare capitalist initiatives.

Moreover,

benefits like pensions, vacations, and heath insurance came
under the regulation of federal and state law or became

meshed in the collective bargaining system.
however, significant continuities.

There were,

Post-war employers, like

their predecessors, emphasized the common interest between
capital and labor. They, too, were responding to continuing

notions of social responsiblity

.

More concretely, these

employers shared the hopes of earlier welfare capitalists
that provision of an array of benefits and services would

translate into greater productivity, higher morale, and

increased employee loyalty.

They also hoped to prevent or

weaken unionism within their plants.

Non-wage financial incentives,

a

traditional part of

welfare capitalism, expanded rapidly following the war.
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Employers revived profit sharing, for
example, as
which earlier had operated successfully.

m

a

program

the late

nineteenth century, companies distributed
profits, usually
in the form of cash, shares, or
deferred
payments, to

encourage worker loyalty and productivity.

companies practiced profit sharing.

By 1917,
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interest continued

through the twenties, but the depression
ended most plans
and embittered those workers who had lost
money in corporate
stock purchasing schemes.

Concern about heightened tensions

between capital and labor and about union criticism
of high
corporate profits in the post-war years renewed
employer
interest in the plans.

in 1947 the executives of sixteen

companies, mostly smaller firms, founded the Council of

Profit Sharing Industries, which by 1955 boasted over 900
members.

The number of profit snaring plans formally

approved by the

U.S.

Treasury Department grew from 37 in

1940 to over 8,000 in 1955 and 20,000 in 1960.^

Profit sharing promisea to instill within the plant

a

sense of partnership between management and workforce that

would result in improved efficiency and work performance as
well as more harmonious labor relations.
Hough,

In

1

950,

Cass

S.

vice president of a Michigan firm that manufactured

air guns testified that profit sharing so motivated his

employees that they literally fought each other to boost
productivity.

He recalled:

didn't know whether to fire them or give them a
raise.
We have a rule: fighting on the job means
I
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^^^^^
share of
T
Imagine:
workers actually fightinq over
wno s to get the most to do.
Before; those
would have sat down and waited for
be brought to their machines, not the material to
anymore.^

ma?p??^
material.

A 1957 Opinion Research survey corroborated
the motivating

impact of profit sharing, finding that
profit sharing
employees were less inclined to oppose efforts
to

raise

production performance.^*^
Firms resisting unionization were particularly

attracted by

a

policy that promised harmony in the factory.

Like human relations, profit sharing offered to eliminate
the "dividing line" and make workers "feel they belong,

that

they're not just another cog in an impersonal machine."
Not

surprisingly, then, in 1950, only thirty percent of the

members of the Council of Profit Sharing Industries had
contracts with organized labor.
like Sears,

Some large non-union firms

Proctor and Gamble, and Dow Chemical offered

profit sharing or stock ownership.

Most often, however,

smaller companies were behind the programs.

Indeed, for

many small and medium sized firms, profit sharing anchored

a

paternalistic personnel program designed to raise productivity while resisting unions. Such was the case at the 250

member Swartwout Company of Ohio, which began profit sharing
in 1946, and at Motorolla, which set up its plan in 1947 in
a

bid to keep its 7,000 workers "satisfied and happy. "'-

Beyond its immediate practical benefits, profit sharing

generated great excitement among employers because it
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appealed to their broader class interests.

Business

leaders, who feared for the future of
capitalism, believed
that profit sharing 's significance lay
in strengthening the
American social and political system.
Strange J. Porter,
personnel director of a Syracuse machine
company, contended
that plans, when combined with other
evidence of "sincere

appreciation and respect" for the worker, "will
go farther
in estaolisning his inherent identity with
free enterpise
than anything we merely preach about." Advocates
.

often

.

evinced an evangelical fervor.

The W all street Journal

found that the Council for Profit Snaring Industries
annual

meetings were conducted in

a

"missionary mood" as "an

unusually fervent group of businessmen" propounded an

economic gospel that they believed would end labor-capital
conflict and bring the "spirit of capitalism" to the masses.
Defense of the free enterprise system remained
theme.

In 1960,

a

constant

for instance, the chairman of S.C. Johnson

and Son was convinced that profit sharing was

"a

major

barrier to the Communistic inroads which even at this moment

literally threatens our shores. "-'^

While profit-sharing plans attracted new interest,
private benefit programs were far more significant and farreaching.

In part,

offering benefits was an ingredient of

a

broader corporate strategy within primary sector firms to
stabilize tight labor markets through changes in personnel
policy. "'^

But,

they also served as weapons in the battle to

undermine worker allegiance to unions and reliance on the
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^

state.

Benefits provided tangible evidence
of employer

concern for the worKer and served to
reinforce the notion
that the road to security lay in private
as opposed to
public sector welfare initiatives.
After World War II, organized labor seized
the initial
credit for the massive growth in private sector
benefits.

Unions had been pushing for the expansion of the
welfare

state but had met stiff resistance, particularly from

employers.

Without political clout at the state level to

achieve reforms, such as national health insurance, CIO
unions began demanding the expansion of private sector
programs.

Most employers resisted union demands, fearful of

the labor' movement's intrusion upon managerial prerogatives;

some wanted to avoid the expense, pleading inability

to cover the cost.

Others were not opposed, finding

advantages in the tax breaks and the ability to pension off
older employees.

This latter group also envisioned improve-

ments in morale and loyalty from the voluntary provision of
fringe benefits.

benefits as

a

The key here was the maintenance of

voluntary form of compensation under the

complete control of the employer
Business leaders condemned union-negotiated plans,

charging that they tended to "glorify the union as the

expense of the employer," throwing the "obligation entirely
on tne one,

the credit on the other. ""'^

Instead,

employers

wanted the credit and good will generated from voluntarily
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provided benefits and the freedom to
administer such
programs independently of unions. Aware
of labor's power,
business leaders began in early 1946
urged companies to take
the initiative and preempt union
demands by immediately
instituting employee benefit plans.
Moreover, as Fortune
noted, employers feared if business did
not recognize
its

responsibility for providing for workers'
security, the
"government will take over." Accordingly, in
1947,

Ford

offered its workers

a

pension plan and General Motors an

improved healtn insurance plan.^^
The convergence of union militancy and NLRB insistence

that benefits were subject to collective bargaining,
however, forced companies to deal with union demands on

these issues.

Furthermore, union gains often compelled

unorganized firms to match the gains negotiated in the union
sector.

Norton Company of Worchester, Massachusetts, for

example,

deliberately matched the health and pension

benefits of the locally organized American Steel and Wire
workers.

As a result, the number of workers covered by

pension plans in firms surveyed by the National Industrial
Conference Board jumped from twenty-three percent in the mid
forties to almost seventy-five percent ten years later.

Similarily, other benefits, like health insurance, became

standard offering by the majority of American firms. ''^
Forced to concede to union demands, unionized firms

tried to claim credit for the new benefit policies.
1950,

General Motors president
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C.E.

In

Wilson contended that

a

employers nad been attempting to improve
wages, working
conditions, and benefits and complained
about what
he

believed was the false impression that
improvements for
workers "are brought about only by a union beating
an

employer over the nead."

Non-union firms had an equally

large stake in ensuring that they received full
credit.

To

insulate the workforce from organized labor, they needed
to

prove that benefits came willingly and without outside
prodding.

Both union and large non-union firms came to

believe benefits, if properly handled, could "be turned into

investments that bring

a

rich return in the form of

more

a

efficient, more cooperative and more stable work force. "-^^
To assure the best return, the National Association of

Manufacturers advised

"a

continual selling job on how well

the employee is being treated."

Employers developed an

array of communication channels to disclose the "hidden"

cost to the company

of the fringe benefit package and its

monetary value to the worker.

Booklets, movies,

letters,

newspaper articles and personal conferences made it clear to

workers that management picked up the check for their
security.

Each year General Electric gave employees

a

two-

page report entitled "Your Personal Share in General

Electric Employee Benefits."

In 1955,

Esso began sending

management representatives to workers' homes to explain
benefits.

sensed

a

Manager Tom Welsh reported that "the company has
tremendous appreciation " from workers. '-^
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Companies used individual stories to
demonstrate the
ways they took care of workers through
benefits. Dupont and
Sylvania Electric regularly published in
their employee
magazines "graphic, dramatic" cases of the
financial relief

provided by the company program.
1950,

Similarily, in August

Allis Chalmers recounted how the company aided

employee Steve Kalan, whose newly acquired home was

destroyed Dy fire.

The company, which was in the midst of

a

battle with UAW Local 248, was pleased with the lesson

Kalan had absorbed from this experience.

Chalmers management, Kalan observed that

In thanking Allis
"I

found out who my

real friends are at a time like this," and advised "be 100%

with the management and they will be with you." In other
words, the company, not the union, had stood by Kalan in his

time of

need"*-^

Like profit sharing, private welfare plans carried

political message.

a

Business leaders asserted that workers'

security needs could be met within the confines of the free

enterprise system, thus undercutting the need for the
further expansion of the welfare state.

tive Ray Bouchard explained that

"a

In 1955,

GE execu-

well managed benefit

program set up within the framework of the enterprise system
can contribute powerfully to employee security with fewer of
the dangers that are implicit in security programs supplied

by other sources."

Standard Oil executive J.W.

Myers

believed that, like profit sharing, private social systems

provided an important means by which employers could reach
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their workers and "create

a

better understanding of how they

may share in the fruits of private capitalism
by each
becoming a capitalist and having a stake in
our economic
system. "^^

II

Other forms of welfarism complemented employer
efforts
to build company consciousness.

In 1949, a survey of new

plants by the business journal Factory M anage ment and

Maintenance found progressive managers committed to
physical environment.

a

good

Ten years later the journal confi-

dently reported that "comfort for employees today seems at
its zenith

— patios,

gardens, air conditioning, escalators,

x-ray rooms, chapels, reflection pools."

Such employers

believed that these amenities, as well as improved lighting,

elimination of excess noise and vibration, and maintenance
of a decorous plant exterior, not only increased producti-

vity but stimulated feelings of pride toward the plant and
the company.

Management also trumpeted its new wide-spread

practice of granting paid coffee breaks.

Other small

touches demonstrated company concern for worker comfort.

Stanley Home Products, for instance, supplemented

the

breaks with free doughnuts in an effort to win worker

allegiance.

Some benefits demonstrated employer concern for worker

welfare off the job.

Companies,
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like B.F. Goodrich and

Norton,

provided nurses who made home and
hospital visits to
employees and retrrees. Aside from
showing
that the com.pany

cared about workers' troubles, this
service had the added
benefit of reducing absenteeism. 2 3
Programs
for the

increasing number of retired workers
provided yet another
example of corporate good will.
Public Relations News
observed that "it's a moral obligation and
also good
business to help retirees lead happy lives."
Esso, Thompson
Products, and 3M provided financial counseling
to ease
the

transition from full employment to retirement.

Newsletters,

plant visits, special parties, and clubs encouraged
retirees

continued identification with the firm and showed older
workers, still on the job, that the company would remember
them.

In 1956, Ralpn C. Pratt of Charmin Paper Mills repor-

ted on the powerful impact of company recognition of its

retirees.

"I

have seen" he testified "actual tears of

happiness welling in the eyes of old timers as they talk man
to man with the company president" at a pensioners'

dinner

.

^^

Industrial recreation provided another link to earlier

welfare capitalism.

Management's positive experience with

recreation during the war led to

a

tremendous expansion of

corporate-sponsored leisure activities in the 1950s.
1953,
a

In

30,000 firms spent 800 million dollars on recreation,

fifty percent increase over the previous five years.

The

National Industrial Recreation Association, which jumped

from eleven founding members in 1941 to over nine hundred in
200

.

estimated that industry spent more money
on sports
equipment than all the schools in the country
1957,

combined.

m

Mcculloch Motors Corporation of Los Angeles
spent over
million dollars on its recreation building.

1952,
a

Bell and

Howell, Kaiser Aluminum, and General Electric
included

extensive recreational facilities

m

their plans for new

plants
By the mid 1950s,

industrial recreation had become such

an important part of industrial relations programs that
it

was

a

business in itself.

Tne Industrial Recreation Company

of New York planned, coordinated, and packaged programs for

such corporations as General Electric and Lever Brothers,

while companies set out to convince workers that recreation
did not simply mean "getting exhausted on your own time."

Despite the growing competition from commercialized leisure,
large numbers of workers took part in the recreation

program; ninety-four percent of 3M's 5,900

St.

Paul

employees for instance participated in company classes,
picnics, clubs, athletics, carnivals, and musical events.

A

1949 Factory survey found that seventy-five percent of both

union and non-union workers approved of industrial

recreation

'
.

Recreation addressed many of tne same problems as human
relations, and many company executives believed that it,
too,

would give alienated workers the individual recognition

and sense of acnievement lacking on the job.

201

At the same

time, It promoted the teamwork
essential to industrial
success.
in 1952 General Motors personnel
director W.J.

Mahoney repeated

truism of the industrial recreation
movement, when he asserted that "employes
who can play
a

well

together can work well together,

too."

As

m

the case of

other welfare programs, advocates foresaw
recreation paying
off in increased productivity, resulting
from improved
morale, greater efficiency, and reduced fatigue,
absenteeism,

and turnover. 2^

Perhaps more importantly, recreation was

a

crucial

component in the effort to forestall or undermine unionism.
Large non-union firms like Eastman Kodak and Scott Paper

combined recreation with systematic welfare programs that
included pensions, vacations, and insurance to successfully
comJDat organized labor.

Small paternalistic firms openly

boasted that their picnics, parties, and clubs helped create
a

"nice,

friendly attitude" that kept out union

organizers.

In unionized firms,

where organized labor

rather than employers took the credit for the implementation
of benefits, employers hoped recreation would offset

organized labor's influence.

It helped give workers a new

group identity or feeling of status that stemmed from the

enterprise alone.

Thus, after the war, new recreation

programs anchored Ford's,

International Harvester's, and

Allis Chalmers' effort to win back the allegiance of their

workers following more than

a

decade of bitter conflict.

Ford's program grew rapidly with annual participation
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increasing from 286,000 in 1946, the first
year of operation, to 2 156, 00 0 in 1956.
,

Large numbers of business leaders felt that
recreation
was a crucial means for changing worker attitudes
about the

American economic system.

They believed that class atti-

tudes and ideology could be shaped as much at play as
at
work.

iManagers repeatedly emphasized that recreation
broke

down social barriers that were often exploited by unions.
"We believe," declared Bakelite executive L.K.

Merrill,

"that it is good business to have our folks know each other
as human beings with common drives, interests and emotions

as demonstrated on the playing field."

A.H.

Spinner,

direc-

tor of employee activities at Armstrong Cork Company, found

that recreational activities promoted
a

class orientation.

a

company rather than

"Class consciousness,

he contended,

"fades out of the picture when people are engaged in the

pursuit of common interests."^ '
Mostly, employers operated on blind faith that

corporate-sponsored leisure time improved the relationship

between manager and worker.

At least one company believed

it had concrete evidence that its program diminished class

consciousness.

In 1951,

the personnel director of this

unindenti f ied firm reported to Factory that during

a

recent

strike the firm reopened the plant to workers willing to
cross the picket line.

It discovered that while thirty

percent of plant workers regularly participated in the
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recreation program, over sixty percent
of the strikebreakers were active in the company
program.

This rein-

forced the company's view that recreation
was not a waste of
time or money.
"We certainly don't consider
recreation
programs as strikebreaking tools.
and we don't feel
.

.

recreation programs make company 'stooges'
either.
just that those who

its'

are active in recreation programs seem

to be the employees who are most likely to stand
on their
own feet and rely on their own judgement. "^2
Recreation meshed with another corporate welfare goal
of integrating families into the company. Historians
of turn
of the century welfarism have explored the importance of

families in shaping attitudes toward work, but the continuing significance of the relationship between tne family and

the workplace has been ignored.

In 1950,

a

business

newsletter pointed out that "family life is the core of all
human relations.

.

.

the family is the major influence in

determining the course of any member of the group -- including the worker."

It advised that the employer who

"realizes this fact, and works with it, will reap the long
run benefit of a kinder feeling toward the company."

postwar employers followed this advice.
cessors, they, too,

Many

Like their prede-

looked to families in the continuing

effort to build company consciousness."^^

Employers reached out to families in

a

variety of ways.

They sent letters and company publications home, opened

recreation centers to workers' relatives, and designed and
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.

operate, company parks to
encourage fa.Uy partxcxpa
t.on.
They noped to make the company
a socral center
for workers'
famnxes. Particularly tnrough mass
actxvrtres, Uke summer
picnics or Chrxstmas parties,
managers attempted to bring
the entire company together,
including
executives, super-

visors, workers, and families, as
of interdependence.

a

way of creating feelings

Such mass gatherings often
attracted

large percentage of the workforce:

a

60,000 Goodyear

employees and families attended the 1957
picnic; 40,000
workers and family members attended the
Consolidated Vultee
Aircraft Corporation's free circus. Similarily,
a

1949

preview for the General Motors family of the
company's new
auto line brought out 53,000 people.^S Joseph
Losito, a
General Motors worker testified as to the
effectiveness of
such activities:

My family looks forward to the BLC picnics and shows
each year--we haven't missed a performance yet. My
children gain mucn pleasure out of the picnic,
especially the gala occasions specifically for them-the relay races--the prizes which follow— hot dogs,
soda pop, candy corn.
Listen all of you.
This term 'job '--that covers a lot of territory.
It is your life--your environment--your form of
entertainment -- why they are all synonymous.
One can't do without the other.
They all overlap
--each dependent on the other.
.

.

.

Tnis was the kind of message that General Motors and other

firms hoped workers would take away from company-sponsored

programs
After World War II, companies increasingly utilized
open houses, plant tours, and family days to personalize the
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factory and teach more explicit
economic and political
messages to Kith and kin.
this way, welfarism complemented the communication programs of
human relations to
include spouses and children.
1948, the Burroughs Adding
Machine Company's 133 branches held a
series of Family
Nights, which provided information on
the company's products
and included talks by company officials.
Burroughs also
presented a company-made film, showing the
American enterprise system in action and explaining how profits
were good
for business and the public.
other companies used family
factory tours to display their human relations
programs to

m

m

relatives and to encourage identification with the firm
by
providing insight into the plant's work.

In 1952,

those

touring the Foote Brothers Gear and Machine Corporation of

Chicago "saw what dad did at the plant, the machine he

operated and what he made.

They shook hands with his

foreman, his supervisor, union steward, and other fellow
workers."

They also met company officials and "saw the

company's facilities, its excellent working conditions, and

learned about the many benefits received through working at

Foote Bros."^^
Direct contact with workers' families, companies felt,

could enhance the corporate message and ensure employee
involvement.

The Crucible Steel Company of America posted

weekly safety slogans and phoned the homes of employees
during work hours.

Family members who could recite tne

slogan won a five dollar prize.
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The company found that the

"w.ves and children are flattered
wnen the call comes to
tnem. ...
The company, once just a cold,
impersonal name,
is now a neighbor who calls on
the telephone." The entire

family was "avidly interested in "pop's
work ... and the
employee is being goaded at home into
being articulate about
his 30b." Even vacations provided
opportunities to promote
family identification with the company.
During the midfifties, Caterpillar and Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing

employees pasted company stickers to their
cars and luggage
to enable traveling workers to recognize
fellow employees
and to publicly proclaim their attachment to
the company

with slogans like "Building Quality Caterpillar
Products is
my Business. "^^
Firms tried to convince employees that the company took
a

human interest in their families.

During the Korean War,

Victor Adding Machine of Chicago sent corsages on Mothers
Day to the mothers of fifty employees serving in the armed
forces.

The card read "If your son were home, we know he

would personally bring your favorite flowers.
his absence,

please accept this token as

him on Mothers Day."

a

However, in

rememberance of

Other gestures targeted children;

the

General Electric recreation department in Schenactady ran

babysitting service to help harried parents.

Firms often

sent presents and cards to acknowledge new arrivals.

Ferro Corporation of Cleveland gave

a

sterling silver

teething ring engraved with the baby's date, time, and

207

The

a

weight at birth, while Timken Roller
Bearing distributed
thousands of letters of congratulations
from the company
president with banks containing ten
dimes
"to start your

youngster's first savings account.-^O

^^^^ ^^^^.^^

and early fifties. General Electric,
Westinghouse, Allis
Chalmers, and Ford, among other firms,
began providing more
substantial help through the establishment
of college

scnolarship funds for employee children.
Increasingly, employers developed recreational
programs
specifically for workers' children. They hoped
to engender

worker loyalty, while developing
tial employees.

a

relationship with poten-

Until the fifties, most company contact

with children was limited to

a

Christmas party, summer

picnic, or the occasional sponsorship of

baseball team.

a

Little League

Expanding on this base, employers began

offering more extensive
set up children's clubs.
arts, crafts, and sports.

activities.

IBM and Eastman Kodak

Other firms provided classes in
In the early fifties.

Cater-

pillar, the Allen-Bradley Company, and North American

Aviation established baseball schools, while Goodyear
offered bowling instruction in the winter and golf during
the summer.

Summer camps and tours brought children to plants
throughout the country.

In 1948,

the first Ford Rouge day

camp, which included a plant tour, attracted eignt hundred

children ana six years later attendance had increased to
over four thousand.

The Ford Company asserted tnat the camp
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"

won the applause of employee parents
and encouraged identification with the company. Ford found
the program "effective because it reaches into the home."
Thousands of
iMinnesota Mining and Manufacturing and
Timken Roller Bearing

employees also brought their sons and daughters
to work for
day-long programs highlighted by a visit to
the department

where "Dad or Mom" works and the presentation of
with the company emblem.
personnel office sent

a

a

shirt

To ensure attendance, the Timken

list of children's names,

generated

through their records, to foremen, who notified
parents of
the invitation to camp.'^^
In 1954,

the Industrial Sports and Recreation Journal

discussed the long term salutary effect of corporatesponsored children's activities.

It observed that upon

reaching adulthood, these children would surely "look upon
the industry wnicn has given them some of the best sports

and recreational years of their life with

a

warmth and

respect no company can buy."

a

1952 employee

Similarily,

relations handbook urged that because many of "these
children of today will be the men and women who will man the
business tomorrow," the time and effort "spent to tie them
to the company at an early age should prove a good

investment

.

Spouses, particularly wives, remained the principal

focus of company welfarism, however.

In 1946,

Whiting

Williams wrote an article entitled "Who's Got Momma's Ear?,"
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warning that labor leaders were
g.ving

a

lot of attentxon to

"selling" wife on the importance of
union membership. He
contended that unions understood that
wives were "a silent
but important partner in all industrial
relationships." A
1951 survey of industrial workers' wives in
Cleveland showed
just how the "wifely influence was wielded."
it found that

sixty-two percent of wives opposed strikes, that
the more
women knew about the company, the more they thought

along

management lines and that these women were essentially
conservative in their economic thinking.

The survey warned

that where unions filled the gaps in company communication

with the home, women tended to influence husbands along
union rather than company lines.
These observations powerfully influenced employers to

court the "invisible" employee.

In 1950,

Quotes Ending

,

a

newsletter for company editors, found evidence of the
increasing use of features and news stories directed solely
to the home, mainly at women.

Editors believed that special

pages with household hints and recipes attracted female

readers to the company paper.

Similarily, letters addressed

to the spouse explained the firm's position during contract

negotiations and attempted to enlist "Mom" in the drive for
quality,

safety, and productivity."^^

In

1

953,

convinced

that enthusiasm for the company could never be maintained
"unless they are shared and nurtured by the distaff public,"

International Harvester invited the wives or female relatives of 70,000 workers to a plant tour, lunch, and a
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meetxng „.th top eKecutives.

The tour e^phasxzed
interna-

tional Harvester's benefit
proc,ra. and taught that
increased
production meant progress and
security for everyone.
Employers appealed to women by
burlding up the importance
of
their domestic role. The
Sacony-Vacuum Oil Company's
invitation to visit the refinery read
"We hope you girls
will avail yourselves of this
invitation, for it should do
much to settle the age old question
as to whether a man does
as much actual work on the job as
the woman does in

running

the household.

"^"^

Companies gave wives special recognition
for their
"loyalty and devotion" to the firm.
Armco steel Corporation
and Victor Adding Machine presented wives
of long-time

employees with gold broaches.

Westinghouse corporation also gave the employee's

$1,000,

spouse

with suggestion awards over

a

gift.

In 1951,

paternalistic firm,

C.A.

the general manager of the small

Norgren Company of Denver,

explained why his company sent birthday cards and bouquets
to employee wives,

notifed them of changes in hours, and

handed them the profit sharing cnecks at tne company's
annual Christmas party;

"A man's

wife has

a

powerful

influence over her husband's reaction to his job and his

company.

.

.

if you do it properly, you can mold that

influence so it does you and the employee

a

lot of good."'^^

In times of crisis, some employers tried to draw on the

reservoir of good will developed through their attention to
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worKers' wxves.

"You would oe surprxsea,"
contended Ti.ken

Roller Bearing executive

tnat

Frederick "at the pressure

woman can place upon her husband if
he is considering

a

going out on strike for
right

R.L.

half a cent an hour, or vested

a

Mrs. Employee will often make
it clear that she
doesn't care for that."
1949, the Lionel
.

.

.

m

Company claimed

that an appeal to wives was the key to
overcoming
sanctioned slowdown.
It sent home a series

a

non-

of cartoons

called "Talking it Over with the Wife."

The cartoons

implied that if husbands were making less, they
probably
were "fighting the rate," which the company asserted
had

been agreed upon with the union.

According to Forbes

Lionel "did not underestimate the power of

a

woman,

,

in a

few weeks the laggards were back in stride, and production
has hummed ever since. ""^^

III

Profit sharing, benefits, recreation, and the integra-

tion of the family into the firm, these were the building
blocks of welfarism. They provided tangible evidence of

employer concern for the worker. They can, perhaps, be best
understood as components of the corporate attempt to build

company consciousness.

Not surprisingly, these mechanisms

often blended with those associated with human relations in

teaching workers the primacy of the company and the free

enterprise system.

An important core of American industry,

led by firms like IBM, Dupont, Sears and Endicott Johnson,
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relied on human relations and welfarism
to maintain their
non-union status.
But, company consciousness can
not

dismissed as

a

strategy pursued only by the non-union

sector.

Firms openly fighting with their unions,
such as
General Electric and Timken Roller Bearing,
as well as

those

that had supposedly reached an accord,
General Motors, for
one, utilized company consciousness to confine
organized
labor's political and economic horizons.

to this corporate strategy,
turns,

Labor's reaction

to which the next chapter now

provides some evidence of its effectiveness.
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6

THE LIGHTED UNION HALL
In tne decade after World War
li,

organized labor

appeared to lose much of the loyalty
of the rank and file as
well as much of tne vitality connected
to workers' union
consciousness. while some union leaders
reevaluated union
programs or blamed declining labor spirit
on demographic
trends, others, like Textile Workers
Union research director
Solomon Barkin cited business strategies as
the most telling
factor.

In 1950,

Barkin asserted that management's

"humanistic" personnel policies and welfare
practices contrived to encourage "loyalty to the enterprise and
weave the

worker into the employer's social and economic fabric."
Tnese programs were simply

a

bald attempt "to fight

a

rear-

guard action against the union.

Many labor leaders recognized the danger company
consciousness posed to organized labor.

They attempted to

expose the ulterior motives behind the seemingly benign

mechanisms associated with human relations and welfarism.
Moreover, unions to varying degrees sought to actively

contest business for worker loyalty.

Like companies,

organized labor tried to stimulate worker identification by

communicating with their members, particularly on political
issues, by providing welfare assistance and recreational

opportunities, and by reinforcing the notion that worker
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success and security depended on
the collective power of
organized labor.

Most unions, particularly within
the CIO, took company
consciousness seriously, fearing that it
could outweigh a
much newer and more fragile union
consciousness.
The United
Automobile Workers, the United Electrical
Workers,
and the

Steel Workers worried about the growth
of programs designed
to "coax workers into accepting management
policies."
The
UE recognized GE's communications program
as an effort "to

destroy our union so that you will have

a

free hand in

speedup, rate-cutting, and working conditions,"
and vowed
"it is not our intention to let that happen."

Where

employers established successful recreation programs, the
UAW, supported by the Steel workers

,

charged "the company has

had a comparatively easy time dividing the loyalty of our

workers in the shop" and reducing the numbers of dues paying
members.

Moreover, company propaganda frightened union

officials.

In 1961,

Ben Segal of the International Union of

Electrial Workers condemned managerial communications

programs that aimed at "belittling the union and undermining
it and its

leadership. "^

Recognizing the danger company consciousness posed to
the labor movement, unions fought to maintain worker
loyalty.

In part,

they responded defensively, relying on

ridicule and warnings to alert members of management's
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underlying goals.

Henry staffer, president
of a OE Decatur,
Indiana local lampooned the
goals of General Electric's
newly implemented human relations
program.
"We call upon

you to quit worrying about what
might be in our minds and
instead give some consideration
to what's in our pocketbook."3
The UAW, also consistently
scorned human

relations,

calling efforts to communicate
"baloney" and dismissing
supervisory training as ineffective.

m

1949,

the UAW's

journal. Ammunition, noted derisively
that "foremen are
attending schools throughout the country
to receive training
in the art of convincing workers
that they are really deeply
beloved by the boss." These special classes,
if anything,

asserted one auto local, taught supervisors
to forget everything they had learned as workers and to adopt
as their
favorite song "My Company, 'Tis of Thee.'" On
the subject of

company welfare work, the Federated Press,

a labor

news

agency, found laugnable the Container Corporation
of

America's claim that cheerier colors in the shop alone
made

workers happy.
"Sure,

it quoted one old union carpenter who agreed

its all a matter of color.

Labor's black and blue

from the beating it's taking, but every time it fights for
little more of that green stuff,

they call us

red.""^

Communication programs were particularly favorite
targets for ridicule.

In 1952,

the Steelworkers local at

the Fairbanks Morse Company renamed tne company's pamphlet

service the "trash rack" and thanked the firm for providing
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a

^

.ore fodder for the union
paper to refute. The CIO
.ooKed
the early eoonomic education
programs by attaohrng labels
like "Freedom Forum Fascist
Front" or "Operatron Gas
Chamber" and with "exultant
humor" set up a
"Captive

Audience Department. "^
underlying the ridicule, however,
was the fear that
unless workers were forewarned,
human relations and
welfarism might succeed in weakening
their attachment to the
union.
UAW Local 600 leaders at Ford's
River Rouge plant
admonished workers not to be misled
by friendly foremen for
the "trend of thought by management'
is to sugar
and salve-

employees.

Similarily, in 1949,

R.S.

Black of the Rouge

Rolling Mill warned new employees "Don't
Pe fooled by
supposedly friendly arm about your shoulder.
They've

arm around your neck at the same timel"

a

got an

Committeeman Alex

Semion cautioned fellow Rouge workers that
human-relations
oriented supervision was an integral part of a
"new

scientifc method to control and discipline the
masses of
workers "
.

Watch out, advised local union leaders, for programs

promoted by foremen that boosted productivity at the expense
of union solidarity.

in 1955,

UAW Local 842 warned that the

Pangborn's Corporation's newly implemented practice of

publicly comparing production records of worker's on
opposite shifts was an example of the "latest company psychological trick!" to speed up production.

Most worker

participation programs also fell into the catagory of
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senates that .n^ured worKers.'^
In 1948, Macnin.sts'
Pres^aent
«arvey
Brown adv.sea employers
that they could not
gain
worKers "f uU-f ledged cooperation.,
.n efforts to improve
production methods unless a union
representative was
involved ..at every phase of
the plan's development..'
Thus,

in 1956,

SteelworKers Local 2601 warned
workers against
participating in a management-sponsored
safety program.

The

real goal, the union charged,
was to get workers into the
foremen's office to answer personal
questions wxthout union
protection.

UAW Local 600 voted against cooperating
with the Ford
suggestion plan, which it charged
ignored suggestions for
improving working conditions and paid
"peanuts"
for ideas

that ultimately cost other workers
their jobs.
Warnings
were not always effective. The Ford
plan continued to pay
out nundreas of thousands of dollars
in awards each year.
Local leaders engaged in a long campaign
patiently

explaining to the membership "the damage they
are doing to
themselves and other by participating in the mucn
glorified
'Suggestion Plan.'" With less patience,

others labeled the

awards "blood dollars" and snapped "wise up,

it won't work,

you won't get anything but contempt from your fellow

workers" for suggestions that eliminated jobs and intensified the pace of work.^

Unions insisted that all forms of company communication

were propaganda.

The UAW education department regularly
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puoUsned exposes of the
methods ut.Uzed by
e.plovers

-e..

..secret stru^^le-- to
cnan.e

workers' .deas.

.n

xt warned

tnat posters appearing .n
the shop wxth slogans,
U.e .'We ve
Got a Job to DO," or letters,
d.scussxng .'Last Year Th^s
Is
HOW we D.d," sought to tr.c.
workers into identifying
too
Closely wxth the corporation.
Employee magazines also
attempted to confuse workers
w.tn therr nomey, .ntimate
appeal.
General Motors, for instance,
used
xn .ts journal

an "old codger," who "looks
like everyone's grandf
ather

to

mouth glittering generalities
about free enterprise.
According to the UAW, the idea

was "to get the corporation

curse off what the company is telling
you, and to make it
look as if it were just your old man
giving you the benefit
of his years of experience."^

The labor press served as

a

bulwark against the

business community's drive to shape worker
ideology.
UAW,
Machinists, and Steelworkers papers analyzed
the content of
company reading racks and condemned them
for subtly trying
"to weaken workers support of their
union" and for promoting
"reactionary Republican viewpoints." The CIO News,
which was

distributed to millions of workers, tried to counter

employer economic and political education through

a

constant

stream of articles exposing the organizations and
goals
behind the movement.

In the same way.

The Packinghouse

worker, advised that "hiding under the camouflage of

freedom" these courses were simply"

a

wicked,

smear-ridden

attack on every type of progressive legislation enacted or
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proposed since the New Deal."

The Wisconsin CIO News

revealed that Harding College, which
created one of the
economic education programs, was a
front organization for a
nation-wide iDusiness propaganda campaign,
a January 1950
radio broadcast, the UAW commentator
Guy Nunn warned Detroit
area workers of this "highly organized
and systematic

m

attempt to poison the minds of workers
against liberal
government ."10
Union leaders tried to minimize the damage
created by
company welfarism and propaganda by responding
quickly in
kind.

The UAW reacted to the automakers efforts
to take

credit for the growtn of fringe benefits by reminding

workers that benefits came from union solidarity rather
than
business generosity. Similarly, Steelworkers Local 1400
rushed to inform workers of the union's role in the develop-

ment of

a

new insurance plan "before any member of manage-

ment breaks their arm patting themselves on the back taking
full credit. "^^

Unions responded promptly to the employer letters to

their members.

Local 600 advised dumping Henry Ford II

's

letters into specially marked trash cans in each department.
It urged "dont' be fooled" by this

"paternalistic propa-

ganda" which sought "to lull workers into believing that

Henry Ford II is the Great White Father who will lead the
worker--misled by those nasty old union leaders from the
morass of exploitation and despair."
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The union at the John

Deere Plant .n Waterloo, lowa,
.et the general manager's
Christmas message of good wrU wxth
a reminder that
workers
were facing the new year with
a pay cut.
During
1948, UE

locals held meetings to "tear
apart the curtaxn of company
propaganda" issued by General Electric.
More specialized
communication mechanisms, like economic
education, also
brought a sharp response.
Swift Company locals answered
the "phony claims and arguments" of
management with mimeographed leaflets prepared for distribution
immediately after
the classes. The UAW education department
conducted
a

series of discussions to arm Allis Chalmers
stewards with
answers for questions raised by the company
economic education program. -'^
At times union-staged counter actions subverted
company

intentions.

A union organizer,

for example,

asked unauthor-

ized questions at a Thompson Products company dinner,
while

stewards disrupted GE employee meetings by firing half-adozen difficult questions in

a

row.

Although uninvited, UAW

Local 887 helped reshape North American Aviation's 1953

Family Day.

Before reaching the plant gates to view

a

"bunch of Company exhibits" emphasizing management's story,
60,000 workers and family members met clowns,

a

band playing

hill-billy music, and trade unionists distributing balloons
with union slogans and

a

special edition of the local paper.

The company later carefully eliminated the balloons from

their pictures of the Family Day. Finally, some unions

undercut profit sharing or employee stock ownership schemes
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^

by demanding that they be
included in the collective
bar-

gaining agreement
unions also looked to the
industrial relations and the
political systems rn the struggle
agaxnst company consciousness, particularly in the area
of economic education.

Forced to participate or lose pay,
Swift and AlUs Chalmers
workers filed grievances complaining
that "forced listening"
was a violation of their rights.
Allis Chalmers responded
with a declaration that it would
continue to exercise
its

rights of freedom of speecn.

Unable to gain relief through

the grievance system, in 1951, the
Wisconsin state industrial union Council, with the support
of the AFL, advocated
passage of a bill by the state legislature
outlawing captive
audiences.
At a hearing, state Senator William Proxmire,
one of the bill's sponsors,

explained that it "would

guarantee the fundamental freedom not to listen."

A Repub-

lican majority controlling the Assembly Labor
Committee,

however, killed the measure and employers retained

a

free

hand in the area of economic education.-'-^
One of the more effective tactics utilized by unions

involved turning the language and principles of company

consciousness against employers.

Trade unionists compared

the promises of human relations and welfarism witn the

reality of the shop floor to demonstrate the emptiness of
the employer's commitment to the worker.

CIO columnist Max

Ruskin observed that employers spoke often of the
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partnersnxp between managers and
workers bat when the unxon
representative asked, as a partner,
to examine the company
books, the employer snapped
"No" they're
"confidential."

Partnership, then, was

misleading concept that failed
to
include workers in decision making
that affected their work
1

ives

'-

a

^

.

unions asserted that the principle
of freedom, a
central tenet of employer economic
philosophy, also failed
to carry over into the factory. UAW
Local 248 observed that

Allis-Chalmers emphasized freedom during its
economic education program, but when workers sought to
exercise their

"American freedom" to use the grievance system
the General
Foreman resorted to threats of layoff.
1951, William H.
Harvey, a GM industrial relations manager, in
the best human
relations tradition, declared that "The most valuable
asset

m

of Electro-Motive is their employes."

if so,

asked UAW

Local 719, why were grievances over working conditions

ignored?

UAW Local 600 also exposed the limitations of the

Ford Motor Company's commitment to human relations at the

River Rouge.

Union representatives complaining of health

hazards and abusive supervision demanded that Ford "practice

what you preach."

Following layoffs in 1948, workers at the

Gear and Axle department asked "where is this big happy

'human-engineering' teamwork and cooperation stuff that we

are supposed to be or are we just not pals anymore ?"'

^

Labor realized that weaning workers away from company

consciousness required more than rebuttals and ridicule.
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7

however. Organized labor needed
to pose

a

pos.txve alterna-

tive.

Some unions, most notably the
United Automobile
workers, the International Ladies
Garment Workers and to
lesser degree the Steel workers
sought to resist the new
cultural politics of the workplace
through

a

,

labor education.

They comoatted human relations
through education programs
that promoted organized labor's
economic and social agenda
and developed union consciousness among
workers.
These same
unions countered employer welfarism oy
encouraging workers
to rely on union-sponsored or collective
activities to fulfill their material and social needs.

Post-war labor education, in many respects,
merely
served the narrow, utilitarian needs of the
labor movement. 1

its development, however, needs to be examined

within the broader context of the ongoing struggle
between
capital and labor.

emerges as

a

From this perspective, labor education

weapon against the employer campaign to shape

worker ideology.

the Steel worker s

in 1954,

Department observed that to

a

'

Education

"shocking extent" the millions

spent annually on business-sponsored educational activities

were "sheer propaganda efforts to win over the minds and
hearts of worker-employees to follow a narrow and selfish

philosophy centered about the principle of the free enterprise system" and ignoring "the role that Government must
play" in America's economy.

itself as part of

"a

The Education Department viewed

fight for the minds of man" and foresaw
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"

the future success of the unxon
movement depending •upon the
kind Of educational programs whicn
are offered to those who
work and toil, and likewise, exercise
their franchise at the
pol Is
.

Labor education grew rapidly after
World War li.
Through their national and state
organizations, the AFL and
particularly the CIO encouraged affiliates
to devote

resources to education and also directly
promoted educational activities through publications and
conferences.

1946,

in

the Amalagmated Clothing Workers revived
its education

department.

At the same time, the UAW, the ILGWU and the

Steelworkers began expanding their educational activities.
By 1957, the UAW could boast that sixty thousand
students

were involved in local classes, summer school activities
and
weekend institutes.
The Steelworkers' summer programs
began in 1946 with several hundred workers attending two

university-based institutes.

Twelve years later over six

thousand workers attended summer institutes based at thirty-

two universities.-^^
These classes and institutes focused primarily on the

training of stewards and local officers.

In a sense, they

were the counterpart to the rapidly proliferating supervisory and management training programs that were an intregral
part of human relations.

Through labor education aimed at

the secondary leadership, unions hoped to develop

a

core of

local leaders equipped to compete with management in botn

the economic and political marketplaces.
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Most programs

dealt with tne immediate problems
of stewards and committeemen.
They provided training
the tools of trade
unionism, including such subjects as
speaKing, writing,
parliamentary procedure, grievance
settlement, and job
evaluations, or helped officers with
the issues arising from
the increasingly complex contracts.
Classes in economics,
however, cnallenged the underlying
assumptions of corporate
economic education, offering labor's interpretation

m

of the

workings of the American economic system and
emphasizing the
impact of corporate monopoly over prices and wages. 20
In addition,

many of the more progressive unions

integrated labor education with political action, recognizing the dependence of labor on a sympathetic state.

Unlike

the worker education movement of the twenties, however,

postwar labor education placed little or no emphasis on

a

fundamental economic restructing of society or the promotion
of a third party.

Political action classes were sharply

pragamatic, mobolizing local union leaders to mount

campaigns in support of Democratic party candidates or
specific legislative issues.

Nevertheless,

union support

for progressive politics and for an activist government

promoting "the general welfare" stood in sharp contrast to
the employer free enterprise ideology. ^

-'•

Unions hoped that labor education classes would prepare

stewards to infuse the rank and file with the union's

economic and political goals.
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In 1949,

UAW Assistant

Regional Director Frank Sanorske called
upon the steward
body at Allis Chalmers to "talk
unionism and talK Local 248"
to the members.
Eight years later, UAW Education
director
Brendan Sexton contended that informal
plant discussions by
stewards were one of the most significant
means of educating
the rank and file. 22 yet reductions in
the number of union
shop floor leaders, mandated by postwar
contracts, limited
the effectiveness of this approach.
sheer numbers made it
difficult, if not impossible, for stewards or
committeemen
to compete with foremen at a personal level for
workersattention.

In 1948, Ford Rouge

committeemen apologised for

their inability to personally contact each new employee
and
"explain the real meaning of unionism and its progress and
Denefits."

Similarily, officers of

a

New Jersey GM local

expressed frustration that only thirteen committeemen were

available to protect twenty-five hundred members "while
keeping an eye on several hundred foremen at the same time."

While in 1946, the UE discussed building up the steward

organization so that "our stewards have the answers inside
the plant for our people," by 1952,

it conceded that com-

panies reached new workers "immediately and were able in

many instances to influence them before they were even
contacted by a union representative. "2^
Given the structural limitations of the steward system,
unions sought more direct avenues of communication with
workers. Their goal was to raise the level of union con-

sciousness among an often indifferent rank and file.
238

In

UAW Officer E.xl Mazey lamented
that "too .any people
in our plants today don't know
the difference between
unionism and rheumatism." Again
and again, unions like
the
UAW called for mass education to
teach workers facing a
"barrage" of corporate propaganda
the meaning of unionism
and the way in which "the union
constitutes the ma^or safeguard of the individual worker's
dignity."
1952, the CIO
Observed that "one of the most serious
problems facing
1952,

m

union

leadership today is how to reach the rank
and file with the
message and program of the union," and how
to create

loyalty to and participation in unions. ^4
in order to build ties to the rank and
file, the ILGWU

and the Building Service Employes, as well
as some UAW
locals, sponsored new membership classes aimed
at those who

had "no memory of the role the union has played
in building
that sense of security and dignity which they enjoy

to day."

Others tried to create an infrastructure of local union

education committees to inform and encourage rank-and-file

participation in union activities.

Education committees

held lectures and classes, showed movies, and distributed
leaflets at the plant gate that reminded workers of labor's

history and achievements and discussed current union,

community, and national issues.

activity focused on politics.

Much of this educational
Local union education and

political action committees attempted to politically motivate workers by impressing upon them the union's dependence
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on the state.

They arguea that poUtxcal
decisions made by
congress, state legislatures, and
government officials
on

issues,

such as the union shop, taxes,
unemployment
insurance, and wage and hour laws,
health and housing
policy, and civil rights had a critical
impact on workers.
Time and time again, Mike Novak, as
president of Dodge Local
3, explained to members that to solve "our
Union problems we
must participate
Political Action. it is as important as
our homes; tne furniture in our homes, the
food on your
tables." Despite the best intentions of
some union leaders,

m

however, labor education programs reached few
rank-and-file
workers.

Even within the UAW, local officers often had

little interest in educating or activating members.

The

fact that in 1954 only thirty of two hundred international

unions had functioning education departments reflected the

limits of union commitment to education.
Increasingly,

unions relied primarily on their own

newspapers to communicate with workers.

During the fifties,

there were about eight hundred labor papers with

tion of twenty to thirty million.

a

circula-

Local unions also pro-

duced newsletters or small scale shop papers. The union
press consciously competed with both company journals and
the commercial press for the attention of workers.

The shop

paper was "the union's most intimate speech to the union
memper."

it talked in terms of tne people the worker Knew

and worked with and "revealed the meaning of trade unionism
and progressive political action in terms of tne work and
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.

act.v.txes he hi.self is engaged

in."

According to the UAW,

labor :ournaUsm had the
"special job of putting the
f.nger
on sowers of racial natred,
exposing all kinds of antidemocratic words and deeds" and of
providing "antidotes for
the worst poisons of the kept
press." Company journals
usually refrained addressing specific
legislative issues or
endorsing candidates in favor of more
general economic
lessons on the dangers of socialism
and the welfare state or
the importance of profits.
in contrast, the union press
was
openly partisan in drumming up support
for its liberal
political agenda. There were certainly
variations between
unions on their level of commitment to public
affairs and

their political stands, but both AFL and CIO
papers tended
to devote considerable space to legislation
and political

action
Labor also relied on radio and television in their

efforts to keep in touch with the rank and file.

Labor

leaders hoped that workers, who ignored labor education

programs and the union press, might be attracted to

a

program that mixed union building, politics, and popular
culture.

In the late forties,

strategies,

unions pursued two radio

one of FM station ownership and the other paid

programming on com.mercial AM stations.

The Federal Commerce

Commission granted licenses to the UAW and the ILGWU, and in
1949 these unions launched stations in Detroit,

Chattanooga, Los Angeles, and New York City.
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Cleveland,

The UAW's non-

commercial statxon, WDET, mixed
news of the union wxth
"decent mus.c and intelligent
dxscussxons of community and
national problems." The weekly
program,

took listeners into

"Brother Chairman,"

different un.on each week,
introducing
the officers who discussed the
local's nistory and activities.
According to Ammunition, when "some
of the people
start to talk on this program, you can
almost hear the
foreman coming up Dehind you in the shop,
it brings your
shop experiences so close to you."
The UAW worked hard to
promote its stations among workers, even
offering low-cost
FM converters. Despite this, only about
one quarter of auto
workers owned FM sets. Moreover, without
support from
advertisers, labor's non-commercial stations
proved too
a

costly to the CIO, and by 1952 the Detroit,
Cleveland and
New York stations folded. ^"7
But,

as Factory observed,

the air waves,

labor's voice was still "on

plenty," for unions also brought their

message to the membership via commercial AM radio and television.

Following World War

II,

CIO unions organized radio

councils at the city and state levels to provide support for
the development of labor programming.

By 1950,

fifteen CIO radio programs in Michigan alone.

there were
UE locals in

Evansville, Indiana, and Rock Island, Illinois, sponsored

daily newcasts with UE news and the union's interpretation
of current events.

In May 1950, Toledo UAW programs concen-

trated on explaining the newly negotiated pension and health

security provisions to members.
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In Waterloo,

Iowa, UAW

Local 838's daxly program
sandwiched ten minutes of
popular
songs around announcements of
union meetings and news
of the
local.
Utxl.zing a sxmxlar format, by
the mid fifties, more
than forty stations broadcast a
half-hour UAW program, "Eye
opener," directed at day sh.ft
auto workers on their way
to
work and "Shxft Break" for second
snrft workers.
a check of
automobile radios in a parking lot of
a UAW organized plant

one morning showed 87 percent of
them with the dial set on
the Eye Opener station. ^8
Radio also promised access to the
unorganized.
a

Seeking

new way to penetrate "the iron curtain of
reaction that

exists" in the Soutn and Southwest, in
1950 the tail end of
Operation Dixie sponsored a series of radio
programs over
seventy-five stations to present the policies and
purposes
of the CIO to Southern workers.

The program consisted of

folk music played by a well-known singer and

a

short period

of dialogue designed to overcome "the vicious and
distorted

propaganda" of employers.

Television also became an increasingly popular medium
for unions during the fifties.

Evanville,

Indiana attempted to undercut NAM and Chamber of

Commerce programming with
"Mr.

CIO unions in Elkhart and

a

television series directed at

and Mrs. Wage-Earner. Beginning in 1951, the UAW's

weekly "Meet the UAW-CIO" and later the daily "Telescope"
programs carried union and general news and interviews.

The

lUE used television during a 1957 organizing campaign at

a
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Garden Cxty, New York, plant.

Factory observed that
"there
was no denying .ts abUxty to
get attention, not only
from
every worker who tuned xn, but
fro. hxs whole fa.ily
as

well."

Nevertheless, the workers stxU
rejected the union.
Facrng rank-and-file indifference,
as well as a grassroots
insurgency movement, in 1957, the
Steelworkers began a "TV
Meeting of the Month" to bring the
union to its members. 30
II

Undergirding this union campaign to
influence workerseconomic and political ideas was a more
subtle attempt
to

build worker allegiance to the union as
an institution.
Unions, like employers, hoped that by
addressing workerssocial and economic needs beyond the realm
of the factory
they would strengthen their organization,
while improving
workers' lives.
Traditions of union involvement
in the

health and welfare of their members reached back
to the

nineteenth century.

During the postwar period, a core of

unions, that included the UAW, the ACWA, and the ILGWU,

tried to make organized labor
members.

a

way of life for their

At times, they competed directly with employers

seeking to build company consciousness.

After World War II, some unions challenged the indivi-

dualism of employer free enterprise ideology by urging
workers to rely on their own collective institutions in

meeting their material needs.

In this way, organized labor

sought to politicize consumption, while strengthening
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unionism.

The inflationary wave
immediately after war
initially stimulated widespread
union interest in cooperative buying. The UAK sold low-cost
food at local union
halls to prove the effectiveness
of "buying solidarity."
indeed, the QAW built member loyalty
by appealing to workers
as consumers. Autoworkers eagerly
snapped up the outboard
motors, refigerators, and coats the
union sold at wholesale
rates ^ '
.

The UAW and the Rubber Workers were at
the forefront of
a movement to channel worker protest
against
high prices

into a consumer-run democratic system of
distribution.

m

1948, they joined with representatives of AFL and
CIO

unions,

including the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, the

Steelworkers, and the Sleeping Car Porters, to form the
Council for Cooperative Development to promote cooperativism

within the labor movement.

By 1949, Detroit had four large

cooperative food warehouses backed by one hundred union
locals, and union cooperatives were operating in other

cities across the country.

At the same time, Racine, Wis-

consin, South Bend, Indiana, and New York City trade

unionists were building cooperative housing.
years,

Within three

250 UAW locals had formed cooperative credit unions

run by workers "interested in the welfare of their union

brothers and sisters."

The UAW urged mem.bers to support

movement that fought monopoly and worked to create

"a

a

world

organized to serve the needs of the many and not the profits
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Of the few."

When the FUnt, M.chxgan,
co-op opened, Roy
Reutner declared that rt was a
symbol
of labor's

solidarity."

it would make

FUnt

a

"unity and

co-op c.ty "where people

live happily-instead of a GM town."

Cooperatives streng-

thened the union movement by giving
workers a chance to deal
with their own organization instead
of with those "hostile
to the aims of trade unions. "^^

Provision of services that improved or
eased memberslives reinforced the notion of the
centrality
of the union

to workers.

in the early fifties, Toledo auto
workers could

pay their utility bills, borrow money, and
pick up hunting
licenses or driving licenses and plates at Local

12's five-

story union hall.

The local's Flying Squadron visited the

sick and furnished pallbearers and

mourn your passing sincerely."

"a

committee that will

For UAW Local 200 of

Windsor, Canada, visiting ill members provided proof that
"all this business about brothers and sisters really
means

something" and helped create the "deep sense of loyalty the

members feel toward their local. "^^
Union concern for health went beyond visiting the ill.

Most workers received their health care from commerical
insurance secured through collective bargaining.

In some

cases, unions stipulated that claim.s pass through the local

office to ensure proper adjustment and to give workers

a

greater feeling of union involvement in their health care.
A group of unions, however, directly provided medical care

to workers.

After World War II, the ILGWU, the United Mine
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workers, the ACWA, and the
Hotel Workers began
offerxng
health services, while St.
Louis and Philadelphia
labor
organizations established medical
centers open to
local

unions through subscription.^^
Generally,

limited resources prevented
the development
of such elaborate union health
and welfare
programs.

stUl,

the CIO envisioned a labor movement
that reached out to
workers with personal problems having
nothing to do with

collective bargaining issues.

it resolved to serve as
a

liason between the rank and file and
the greater resources
of the community. The CIO's National
Community Services
Committee, which emerged during World War
Ii to help members
cope with wartime dislocations, grew
rapidly thereafter.

Following the merger of the AFL and CIO, it
became an AFLCIO department.

The Community Services program trained

counsellors, who directed fellow workers in need
to appropriate community agencies and then ensured that
workers

received full access to the health and welfare services
supported through taxes and voluntary contributions.

Counsellors dealt with the problems of unemployment,
illness, debt, and housing that often struck workers and

their families with catastrophic consequences.

They aided

workers through the often confusing task of applying for

unemployment benefits or public assistance.
workers, representing

a

By 1954,

wide range of CIO unions, had
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20,000

graduated fro. unxon counsellor
training courses. Three
years later the number of
un.on counsellors had

doubled.35

The CIO used the Community
Services program to
encourage workers to turn first
to thexr unron with
their
problems.
One of the early union
counselling classes, conducted in 1 944, stressed that
counselUng represented the
glue that kept the union strong.
Harry
Block,

of the Phila-

delphia industrial Union Council,
charged that management
had spent large sums of money on
"so-called counselling
services" that often were used to
combat labor.

Unions, he

contended,

needed to perform tnese "services
themselves."
instructor Anne Goula, declared that
labor
"must do

a

far

greater job than collective bargaining"
and advised that if
you "help your members with their domestic
problems it will
help to hold the union together." We now
have,
she con-

tinued,

"a

trememdous influx of workers who are not used
to

unions or to industrial life.

union

a

it is your job to make the

vital thing in their lives. "^^

Community services provided an avenue of access for
organized labor into workers' homes.
Unions had long recognized the importance of family support and participation,

particularly that of wives.

in the early twentieth century,

craft unions had women's auxiliaries which organized unicn
label campaigns; during the thirties, the "emergency

brigades" of women workers and wives provided critical sup-

port to emerging CIO unions. ^"^

After World War II, the AFL

regularly passed resolutions supporting the activities of
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Its auxxlxarxes.

substance.

m

But, AFL interest was
more form than

1948,

the vice-president of
the Amerxcan

Federation of Women's AuxUiarxes
complained of "neglect" on
the part of the labor movement,
and the Massachusetts Federation of Labor substantiated this
cnarge,
finding only one

AFL auxiliary in the state.
Like employers,

many CIO unions sought to court
the

family more seriously.

Taking what Business Week called

a

"cradle to grave" approach to union
organization, auto,
clothing, and New York City retail worker
locals invited
wives and children to meetings, and ran classes
and movies
for "toddling ClOers."
Union papers, like those of

companies, published special women's pages to attract
family
readership.

in 1949,

UAW Local 600's Ford Facts declared

that "today the Union needs 'Union Home' as well as
Union
Shops.

Today the Union needs the support of wives and

families, who will read Union, buy Union, and vote Union!"
It asked "will you carry the message by word and action.

Are you

a

member of

a

Union family?"-^^

CIO auxiliaries, organized in the Congress of Womens'

Auxiliaries, taugnt the principles and ideals of trade
unionism.

Most performed stereotypical women's work within

the local,

organizing social events and refreshments.

But,

like their sisters of the thirties, postwar auxiliary

members bolstered their husbands and brothers during times
of labor conflict.

In 1955,
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autoworker Ben Michel's wife.

'

who was .arcn.ng on

Harvester picketline with
her husband
and son, declared "if my husband
dxdn't get out on
a

the

picket line and help f.gbt for
better wages and conditions
I would lock him out."
The UAW credited the
Windsor
auxiliary for exposing and defeating
a back-to-work movement
during a 1954 strike and in 1956
asserted that Sheboygan,
Wisconsin wives played a key role in
the long running boycott against the Kohler Company.
.

.

.

AS early as 1944, the CIO recognized
the political
potential of auxiliaries.
But, the 1952 election made
clear
tnat organized labor's political message
was not getting
through to most women.
Union wives, in contrast to their
husbands, tended to favor the Republicans.
A steel worKers

survey showed that during the campaign,

87 percent of

members' families failed to receive union political
literature, and political problems were not a topic
of family
discussion.

Beginning in 1954, the CIO's Political Action

Committee began making special appeals to CIO women.

The

CIO issued "A Call for Mom" to attend "family participation

conferences" to activate women voters.

Workshops, like

"Does Politics Affect Our Family Life?" tied current poli-

tical issues with the bread and butter problems facing the

average home-maker.

Effective political action declared the

CIO was a family affair that required "the integration of
husbands, wives and other voting members of the family into
a

working group. "'^'•
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Following the merger, the
afl-CIO set up a Women's
Activity Departments within its
Committee on Political
Education at both the national and
local levels.

Like

auxiliaries, WADs provided support
to local COPE political
initiatives.
Lack of interest
women at the local

m

level,

however,

often undercut the national
organization's effortl.
in 1960, COPE director James L.
McDevitt admitted that too
often unions ignored members' families.
"We are fighting
with one hand behind our back so long
as we don't make this
a family fight with every member
of a trade union family
on

the

team. "'^2

Expanding the union to include the retired
workers
also enhanced organized labor's political
as well

as econo-

mic power.

Union programs for the elderly kept retirees

connected to

m

organized labor.

The UAW launched its program

1953 with three Detroit "drop-in" centers in local
union

halls, a newspaper, monthly information-recreation
meetings,

and two city-wide parties that attracted upwards of
10,000

participants.

By 1959,

the autoworkers operated drop-in

centers in thirty cities open to all elderly workers.

The

Garment Workers, the Textile Workers and the Clothing
Workers ran similar programs for their retirees.

UAW

retirees retained their union membership and the union

encouraged their continued activity as
struggles of the thirties.

Mazy asked

a

a

crucial link to the

UAW Secretary-Treasurer Emil

1953 gathering of retirees to "tell the younger

men and women what conditions were like before the union.
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b.tter struggles to reach the
standards we have now."
mUxtant retirees bolstered the
un.on xn .ts ongoing
struggles.
During the 1958 negotiations,
UAW retrrees fro. across
the
country "slow marched" in considerable
strength around the
General Motors Administration Building
to express
thexr

solrdarrty with the union.

Unions also recognized that

retired workers, like women, represented
an important political force.
During the fifties, retired workers
in
Michigan were mobilized in special
campaigns
for liberal-

izing social Security, housing legislation,
and the development of a state program of services for the
elderly. ^3

After World War II, like their corporate
counterparts,

unions looked to recreation as

a

means of earning the

loyalty of workers and their families.

Recognizing the

danger the growing company-sponsored recreation
movement
posed to unions, segments of the labor movement moved
to

contest business leadership in the realm of leisure.

The

CIO urged its affiliates to promote more systematically

recreational activities in an effort to draw workers from
the company orbit.

CIO recreation councils and sports

leagues emerged in many cities.

City central bodies, like

the Milwaukee Industrial Union Council,

frequently sponsored

tournments in Softball, bowling, or golf that at times
attracted thousands of workers.
lished activities committees.

252

Local unions also estab-

United Electrial Workers

Local 450 forced its connmittee
in 1948, and durxng its
fxrst
year of operation organized a
bowling league, and sponsored
a Christmas party, horseback
riding club, and the local's
first annual picnic.
In 1946, the United Steel
Workers established a recreation program to compete with the
company-

sponsored indus-

trial leagues.

It promised athletes
participation in a

"sports program sponsored exclusively
by our union" and
assured the rest of the membership of
the opportunity to
root for "union made" baseball or basketball.
response
to tne post-war managerial offensive, the
UAW revived its

m

moribund recreation department and developed
the labor movement's most extensive program.
when employers said to
workers "Look at the recreation program we have
for you!,"
the union wanted its members to reply "Thanks
just the same,
we re not interested in your paternalism.
great recreation program,

Our local has a

too."^^

The Autoworkers' recreation department hoped to infuse

members and their families with the spirit of unionism.

It

encouraged the formation of local union recreation committees and regional recreation councils and provided training
for volunteers at workshops and conferences.

By 1953, the

UAW asserted that four hundred golfers and 2,400 bowlers

matched skills in UAW International Championships.

One

fourth of the union locals sponsored interdepartmental
basketball, softball, or bowling leagues, while 900 locals

fielded industrial league teams. Moreover, family "fun
253

nites" and three UAW summer
camps gave children a •union
view of the world. ""^^
The "lighted union hall" was

a

central tenet of UAW

recreation.

Locals reported that open bars
(or
the case
of Lockport, New York, a night
club, complete with floor
snows, movies, dancing and a callroom)
made the union hall
"the social center of activity" for
many workers.

m

AH

the

CIO locals, including steel and rubber
supported UAW Local
644's club in Pottstown, Pennsylvania.
in 1949, Wisconsin

sociologist C.W.M. Hart reported that Windsor
auto workers,
instead of going inside "beautiful plants" to

find the "more

satisfactory and stabilized life," went to the
union hall.
"There, within his union, he is finding his own
ways of

building

a

more satisfying social

life."'*'^

Like other unions, the UAW looked to recreation to

unite the membership.

Aware that one of the wedges dividing

workers was racial prejudice, the UAW recreation department
fought discriminatory practices.

It condemned management

programs that condoned racial discrimination, observing that
"There are no black and white home runs," and in the factory
"there is no black production or white production."

The

recreation department vowed to bring together workers in

a

"situation in which runs scored, or pins knocked down, or

strikes taken, not the color of

a

man's skin nor the altar

at which he kneels will be the criteria for acceptance."

Accordingly, the UAW led the CIO in
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a

five year boycott of

segregated American Bowling
Congress tournaments, it
ended
in 1951 with tne elimination
of the
"whites only" rule.48

At times, union and company
programs directly competed
for worker participation. Such
was the case at the River
Rouge, where UAW Local 600 clashed
repeatedly with the Ford
Motor company.
indeed the struggle over
recreation symbolized the larger conflict between
company and union.
with

sixty thousand members, Local 600 had
one of the UAW's most
fully developed recreation programs,
offering
a

wide variety

of activities ranging from ballroom
dancing classes and

bridge tournaments to an annual water
carnival.

while thou-

sanas participated in the union-sponsored
activities, even
more turned to the company, which boasted a
more elaborate
and better funded program.
in 1950, for example, the union

sponsored one bowling league with twenty teams, while
Ford
had sixty men's leagues and thirteen women's leagues.

officers pleaded with the membership for support.

Union

R.S.

Black of the Rolling Mill asserted "We can call it loyalty
for

a

good union member to confine his sport likes to his

Local Union activities."

In the Plastic Plant,

Bill Jackson

asked why "some workers prefer to participate in the company
sports plan even when they are contacted by their own union

brothers

.

"

^ ^

Department picnics were another arena of contention.
In July 1951,

plastic department foremen were encouraging

worker attendance at an upcoming Family Day Picnic.
officials warned that it was "strictly
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a

Union

company affair" and

ruse to gain employee consent
to intensifying production
by improving relations between
worker and supervisor,
a

unionist James Simmons asked "how can
you go to
day and feel good about the mean

a

picnic one

tricks those very same

fellows play on you and your fellow
workers?" The union
countered with its own picnics. That
summer the Stamping
Plant contended that despite a small
budget,

its picnic,

which excluded supervision and featured
greased pole climbing, chicken catching and a jitter
bug contest,

"was just as

successful and well or better attended as any
put on by the
Company."

if company picnics boosted production
and

enhanced company consciousness, union picnics
enhanced union
solidarity. Following the union-sponsored Rouge
stamping
plant picnic, a Local 600 member observed that
"events of
this nature do more to weld friendship and promote
unionism
than all the speeches our politicians feed us" but lamented
"too bad,

we don't have picnics more often. "^'-'

Unions, however, had difficulty competing with manage-

ment over recreation.

Many had neither tne means nor com-

mitment to contest employers for worker loyalty in this
realm.

In

many local unions, recreation consisted mainly of

occasional picnics or Christmas parties for children or
baseball team fielded in the local industrial league.

a

At

the national level, only the Clothing Workers, the Ladies

Garment Workers and the Textile Workers matched the UAW's

commitment to recreation.

Even the UAW's program suffered

256

fro. underfund.ng.

m

1952, Walter Reuther
admitted that

the "entire recreation program
of the UAW must operate
on
budget so low its total would
appall the average person

connected with industrial recreation."

a

Few unions had the

recreation buildings or facilities
that were
ture of corporate-sponsored recreation.

a

common fea-

Local 600 was

unusual in employing

a

recreation director.

m

contrast, a

staff of fourteen ran the Ford Company
program at the Rouge.
The political and social message of
union recreation also

tempered its ability.

The UAW's stand against discrimina-

tion offended less enlightened workers.

in 1948,

a

UAW

official chided members who didn't participate
in the union
social affairs on the grounds that they couldn't
bring their

families "out in that kind of group.

.

.

with all races,

creeds, and different types of religious training. "^^

These

workers, perhaps, felt more comfortable in company
programs

which often separated black and white workers.
Ill

The overwhelming advantages capital brought in terms of

wealth and power to its campaign to build company consciousness made labor's opposing efforts seem insignificant.
Indeed, the social unionism of the CIO has almost been

forgotten as historians have tended to dismiss the social

consciousness and social vision of the postwar labor movement.

It has been too easy to read the rise of business

unionism and the steady decline of organized labor back
257

into the immediate postwar era.

But,

this was no foregone

conclusion.

Well into the fifties, despite
the efforts of
business, the inhospitable political
climate of the Cold
war, and labor's internal divisions,
a segment of organized
labor embraced social unionism and
defended a liberal, democratic vision, which placed the social
needs of the people
above profits.
Their efforts to make labor's voice
heard
among workers contributed to organized
labor's maintenance
of a significant level of status and
power in post-war
America. That the lighted union hall began
to dim in the
late fifties should not diminish organized
labor's struggle
against the managerial onslaught of the post-war
years.
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CHAPTER

7

MEET YOUR CIO NEIGHBORS
in 1946, more than ever
before, organized labor

understood the importance of publio
support.
ning of the year, unions waged a

At the begin-

long battle for much-needed

pay increases.

By the summer, they were
locked

m

a

losing

struggle to maintain price controls
while launching attacks
against their own members who failed to
toe
the liberal

political line.

A decisive Republican victory in
the Con-

gressional elections in November culminated

a

frustrating

year for unions and prepared the ground for
the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act.
A labor movement that had come to
rely on liberal government awoke to the fact
that its public
support was diminishing rapidly.
The labor press issued repeated calls for union
members
to recapture the good will of their local communities.

Wisconsin CIO vice-president Malcolm Lloyd, UAW leader
Victor Reuther, and International Ladies Garment Workers
Union education director Mark Starr all focused on the need
for better labor-community relations as the first key step
in reversing trade unionism's political and econcmdc for-

tunes.

tically:

Minneapolis mayor Hubert Humphrey put it most empha"Labor must first become a part of its community --

of all the organizations and enterprises that go to make up
the life of a community -- the PTA's, the Community Chest,

the School Boards,

the City Planning groups,
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all the rest.

Labor must show that .t wants

a

good community."

Un.ons

must also rerne.ber, continued
Humphrey, that "they must
sell
themselves to the farmers, the white
collar workers and
businessmen. This requires work
and education
not only in

the union hall,

but in the clubs and farm
meetings. "2

Despite the gloomy events of
1946, organized labor had
a solid community base upon
which to
build,

indeed, the

mixed reaction of many towns and cities
to the postwar
strike wave sent no resounding message
to

either labor or

business.

Unions still had

a

reservoir of good will from

their war-time community activities.

Furthermore, many

local unions and labor councils had plans
to expand the
range of their services and increase the
level of their

participation in their home towns.

Labor's efforts at the

community level, then, complemented its program to
develop
union consciousness among its rank and file.

The support labor received in many communities during
the strike wave of 1945-46 dramatized just how far

unionism's influence had spread since the emergence of the

New Deal.

In many towns and cities, groups that had form-

erly been friendly to industry ignored the inconveniences

caused by work stoppages and took the side of the workers.

Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation reported that in one of
its plant communities, small businessmen aligned themselves

with the strikers.

Up and down almost every business
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a

street, placards placed xn saloons,
stores and shops proclaimed sympathy for the men on
strike.
Similarly, in Three
Rivers, Michigan, over one hundred
businessmen and professionals signed advertisements
supporting workers in their
struggle against the Fairbanks Morse
Company. Fifty pro-

minent Cleveland citizens marked the
one-hundredth day of
the Westinghouse strike by sending
telegrams to the company
urging settlement, and the traditionally
conservative Newark
Evening News held the company alone
responsible for the
continuation of the struggle.^
These strikes revealed the limitations of
corporate

industrial relations policies that relied on the
community
to discipline recalitrant workers.

During the thirties, the

Remington Rand Company's Mohawk Valley Formula had
defeated
strikes with a strategy that combined police intimidation
and court injunctions with propaganda campaigns that turned
the community and local families against workers.

however, the company discovered

a

In 1947,

change in the political

and social climate of its plant cities.

For the first time,

Tonawandas, New York, local leaders failed to support

Remington Rand's policies;

community officials refused to

place the blame for strikes on workers, and police authorities denied assistance to the company's attempts to cross
the picketline.

Aware of labor's increased political clout,

the mayor dramatically reversed the practices of his pre-

decessors and maintained

a

strictly neutral position.
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The

normally anti-union Evening News,
which in past struggl es
had forecast dire predictions
of plant
shutdowns,

was al so

unusually restrained in its editorial
policies/
Elsewhere, local officials moved

beyond neutrality.

The mayors of Pittsburgh and
Cleveland publicly backed
organized labor against the Westinghouse
Corporation.
Cleveland city Councilman Richard
Masterson and mayoral aide

James McSweeney participated in

a

mock funeral burying

a

rejected Westinghouse offer, leading the
United Electrical
Workers Union to express delight at the
"most

unusual dis-

play of public support for
Indiana,

strike.

a

In Anderson,

Mayor CD. Rotruck employed financially strapped

UAW strikers in the city park department, furnished
lighting
for the picket stations, and appointed UAW members
to two
vacancies on the city council.

in many communities, public

and private welfare agencies also provided assistance
to
strikers.

When Racine, Wisconsin, Mayor Francis

interceded on behalf of
president

L.

R.

J. I.

Clausen accused him of "partisanship" and
a

public official in behalf

citizens of Racine."^

Hostility from the community during the
a

Wendt

Case Company workers, company

decried his "failure to act as
of all

H.

"shocking surprise" to General Electric.

1

946 strike was

The company had

felt secure in the belief that it ranked high as a good

employer and good neighbor.

But at many strike sites,

clergymen joined the picket line while local merchants ran
ads criticizing the firm for prolonging the strike.
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Several

stores even removed G.E. products
from their shelves.
some locations, c.ty councils
passed resolutions on behalf
of the united Electrical
Workers Union.
General Electric
believed that these unfriendly acts
resulted from widespread distrust and misunderstanding
not only of General
Electric but of business in general.
a survey conducted
during the strike confirmed the company's
fears.
Community
neignbors charged that "wages are as
low as

m

G.E.

possibly keep them; prices are kept as
high as
them;
G.E. profits are unwarranted or

can

G.E.

excessive;

no concern for the welfare of its
employees;

interest in its plant communities."

Finally,

G.E.

can push
G.E.

has

has no

and most

troubling, the company discovered that its plant
communities

believed that

"G.E.'s

motives are dishonest and contrary to

public interest."^
Labor's war-time patriotic activity as well as a

lingering distrust of business, helps explain support for
strikers.

Participation in war bond drives, scrap salvage

drives, and Red Cross and United War Chest campaigns boosted
the presence of organized labor in communities across the

country.

Philadelphia unions, for instance, dedicated them-

selves to the war effort.

Union leaders, as well as thou-

sands of members of the rank and file, gave generously of
their time and money on behalf of war-time charitable
agencies.

Built and operated by trade unionists, the USO-

Labor Plaza,

one of the city's most popular recreation
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centers for service personnel,
served as
of labor's commxt.ent to
victory.

a

vrsible example

These efforts won the

local labor movement numerous
accolades from community
leaders and the press.8 similarily,
in Tonawandas, New
York, the Site of the Remington
Rand strxke, the AFL and
the
CIO formed a new organization,
the United Labor Council,
to
facilitate trade union voluntary
activity.
This organization helped give labor an increased
voice in the town's
civic affairs.
In early 1946, after evaluating
labor's

behavior during the war, Charles Cooper,
a UE Local 308
officer, declared that "labor in
Tonawandas

has earned a

right to community support."^
During the war, the development of
closer cooperation
between labor and social welfare agencies
enhanced
the

effectiveness of union patriotic activity while
strengthening organized labor's prestige within the
community.
Previously, organized labor often had little
relationship

with these agencies.

In most communities, business and

professional people controlled the policy making boards of

governmental and voluntary organizations.

In 1940,

for

instance, only 90 CIO representatives served on the boards
of the many thousands of local, state, and national health

and welfare bodies in America.

Business leaders also pro-

vided most of the funds for voluntary agencies,

like Com-

munity Chest and the Red Cross, through either private
donations or corporate fund raising campaigns.

Workers,

however, resented both the solicitation process, which in
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many companies was largely
a "shake-down" affair
w.th a
foreman ordering employees to
"fork over," and management
s
claims of full credit for their
gifts
an<- =
gitcs.
Antagonism
typically
Characterized the relationship between
workers
and the

social service agency staffs, who
often identified with the
business and professional classes
and assumed an attitude of
paternalistic benevolence towards those
in need, barely
hiding their suspicion and distaste
for unions. 1°

Mobilization for war began to break down
old suspicions
and barriers.
Just before the United States' entry
into

the

conflict,

the CIO and the AFL developed war
relief commit-

tees to aid workers in countries fighting
Fascism,

to pro-

vide special services for America's armed
forces, and to
meet the needs of America's defense workers.
in 1942,

the

government's War Relief Control Board encouraged
combining
all war-related appeals into one cordinated
drive adminis-

tered by a single newly created agency, the National
War
Fund.

With the assistance of the National War Fund, the Red

Cross, tne Community Chests and Councils of America, as well
as numerous smaller agencies began pooling fund raising and

relief efforts. '^

Labor committees reached a national

agreement to cooperate with the Community Chests and Red
Cross.

This agreement provided substantial funds to the AFL

and CIO committees to facilitate their work and facilitated
labor representation on all governing boards, campaigns, and

allocation committees.

The agencies promised to publicly
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2

credxt un.ons for worker
contributions and to encourage
solicitation by joint employer-union
committees. 1
The war, then, provided the
labor movement with the
opportunity and resources to begin
integrating itself into
community service networks. At the
national level, the AFL
and the CIO built a cooperative
relationship with
the top

leadership of important health and
welfare agencies, in
particular the Community Chests and
Councils, inc.

At the

local level, AFL and CIO committees,
working closely with

their community counterparts in fund
raising campaigns,
gained representation on community and war
chest boards of
directors.
By 1945, for instance, Ohio unions
led the

country in board participation with 109 CIO
representa^
tives
-'•

.

National War Fund agencies provided the CIO's War

Relief Committee with an annual operating budget of
almost
$600,000,

enabling the Committee to move beyond fund

raising and to

establish an outreach organization, the

Division of Community Services.

This division set up

regional offices throughout the country and organized fifty
state and city industrial union council comm.unity services

committes which were responsible for working with community
agencies on programs of service to industrial workers on

out-plant problems.

These committees initiated the union

counselling programs, discussed in an earlier chapter, which

were developed further after the war.
strike wave,

During the 1945-46

unions drew on the relationships established
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with both pubUc and private
agencies to secure health
and
welfare services for strikers.
At the

request of the United

Steel workers, for example, the
Buffalo and Erie County
council of social Agencies provided
a counselling and
infor-

mation service in union halls during
the steel strike.14
The war-time rapprochement of
labor and community
agencies augured well for the CIO's
postwar plans.

in late

the national Community Chest's
Committee on Future
Relations with Organized Labor proposed
that local chests
1945,

support labor community services committees
in the same way
they funded organizations like the YMCA.
The report argued
that health and welfare agencies could not
afford to ignore
labor for unions were "a basic sociological
necessity in a
free society such as ours, not merely a colossal
grab
bag.'"

Moreover,

their "permanency may well prove to be a

very vital feature of the continuing health and stability
of
our industrial progress. "^^

CIO proposed

a

Encouraged,

budget of $240,000

CIO Community Services Committee.

a

in early

1

946,

the

year for its National
The Chest's National

Budget Committee approved the CIO's request, which was then

considered by local community chests, which would actually
raise and allocate the funds.

-"-^

The commitment of local community agencies to the CIO,

however, was more fragile than an alarmed business community
realized.

Despite strong support from the National Chest's

board, president and staff, the majority of local chest
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leaders refused to endorse the
national organization's plan.
Leo PerUs, national director of
the CIO's Committee, disappointedly acknowledged that although
community chests and
organized labor had come to know each
other better during
the war, "some very real fears
and some deeply ingrained
prejudices still remain." He also
suspected that lurking
behind the local chests' refusal to
fund the CIO Community
services Committee was the business
community. The professional staffs of social workers who
comprised local chests
reported to boards of laymen often controlled
by business
leaders.
Perlis charged that some "financially
powerful lay
leaders/' disturbed by recent industrial
unrest and by the

assistance given strikers by some social service
agencies,
had brought "great influence ... to bear upon
the insecure
shoulders of some community chest leaders."

As a result,

Perlis bitterly concluded, "doubts, fears and prejudices
won
out -- at least for the present. "^"^
Out of this impasse between the national and local

bodies of the Community Chest over the form and level of

institutional relationship with labor came

a

compromise.

They agreed that rather than providing direct financial

support to the CIO's Community Relations Committee, the
national chest would set up a small Labor-Employee Partici-

pation Department.

It would serve as a liasion with between

the National Chest and organized labor and would promote the

active participation of unions in the health and welfare
activities of local communities.
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In addition, the National

Chest encouraged local
chests or councils
^-ounciis nf
of social agencies
to hire special labor
staff to
Lo set up
no advisory
labor
participation committees to
facilitate cooperation
between
the agencies and organized
labor.
Furthermore, the Department gave unions the power
to choose labor staff
persons to
represent the interests of the
afl and the
.

ciO,

community Chest would pay their
salary.

but tne

The Community

Chests and Councils Inc. launched
the Labor-Employee Participation Department in January
1947, but
as late as 1955

local coordinating councils for
private social agencies
employed only 52 full-time labor
representatives. ^ 8

During 1946, without the financial
support of the
community Chests and Councils, inc.,
the CIO had to practically dismantle its National Community
Services Committee.
The Committee's Pudget dropped from
its wartime peak of over
half a million dollars a year to
$12,500.
Consequently, it
was forced to liquidate all its regional
offices.
Leo

Perlis later recalled,
sense,

"We had to start,

in a very large

from scratch. "^^

II

Starting from scratch meant defining the broad goals

which would characterize the CIO's community service program
for the next decade.

First,

the CIO wanted to ensure that

all workers gained access to health, welfare, and recrea-

tional services.

Second,

the CIO hoped to establish a
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positive i.age of labor .n the
co..un.ty.
Extending trade
un.on.s. beyond the plant gates
and ,ob-centered
ob.ect.ves
would help establish unions as
important .axnstrea. c.vxc
organizations.
Moreover, by integrating
.tself xnto the

co..un.ty, the CIO hoped to
demonstrate that unions were
not
like selfish special interest
groups, but instead were
concerned "about the welfare of the
coinmunxty" as
a

whole,

a

strengthened, more politically
powerful labor movement would
be the byproduct of
union's improved xmage.
Joseph A.
Beirne of the Communications Workers
contended, "looked at
most crassly, community service is one
way of convincing
one's fellow citizens that a union's
economic program,
legislative program, political action
program or organizing

program is deserving at least of thoughtful
consideration if
not outright support." Community service,
he
continued,

might "make our political action and legislative
work

a

little easier, and thereby make our collective
bargaining
and grievance work a little easier. "^^

Without its large wartime budget, the national CIO

Community Services Committee acted primarily as
making and facilitating body.

a

policy-

it served as a liaison

between the CIO and the national organizations in the health
and welfare field such as the chests and the Red Cross.

The

committee emphasized mobilizing local trade unionists for
civic activism and acted as a clearing house for information
and guidance on programs and policies.
the gains made during the war,
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Initially, despite

it was difficult to interest

so^e labor officials

social welfare services.

They

Viewed the CSC as be.n, removed
fro™ the ^ainstrea™
of union
actxvrty.
But, gradually, durxng
the late forties,
under
the leadership of the National
ciO Co.^un.ty Services
Committee, city level industrial
union
councils and local

unions across the country began
to set up community
services
committees ^^
.

community service committees
pursued
programs that promoted unions in
the

a

variety of

community.

Illinois

labor activities can serve as
an example of the growing

presence of

organized labor,

m

1947,

inghouse workers Local 28 organized

operated out of the union hall.

Chicago United Pack-

a Boy's

Club that was

At the same time, in the

Clearing section of Chicago, UAW CSC
members formed
munity Council that succeeded in improving

a

Com-

street lighting,

reducing traffic hazards and industrial
smoke nuisances.
Locals across the state established blood
banks and held
blood procurement drives. During times of

crisis, the local

committees stepped in to aid their fellow citizens; in
the
spring and summer of 1952, when major floods hit
East Moline
and Rockford,

Illinois,

local CSCs aided in evacuation and

housing and made collections of food, money, clothing, and
furnishings.

The Rockford social service agencies publicly

commended the trade unionists for their actions.
in the country,

Elsewhere

unions participated in similar activities,

sponsoring little league teams, operating dancehalls for
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teenagers, and giving Christmas
parties
h
tor needy
^ ^^^^ for
community
children. ^2
Fund raising for voluntary
health and welfare
agencxes
helped organized labor demonstrate
good citizenship.
Pr.or
to world war li, wealthy
.nd.v.duals provided the
majority
of support for volunteer
agenc.es, but during and
after the
after the war the burden shifted
to corporations and
employees. At the national level,
leaders of ma^or trade
unions, like David J. McDonald
of the Steel workers served
on national fund raising committees.
At the city level,
local industrial union councils
set up labor participation
committees which cooperated with
business committees and
agency personnel to decide on labor's
fair share of the fund
raising campaign goal and to work out
campaign procedures.
If good labor-management relations
reigned within the
plant, union counsellors worked with
supervisory staff in
soliciting funds or pledges.
in all cases, unions were
,

committed to giving without coercion but, in turn,
demanded
full credit for labor's role in raising
money.23

With organized labor's assistance the level of workers'
contributions to charity increased significantly.

in 1950,

Detroit UAW Local 600 alone raised ten percent of the city's
eight million dollar Torch Fund Campaign.

That same year,

Akron workers' gifts totaled thirty-six percent of all money
collected.

The 1953 National CIO Community Services Commit-

tee annual report proudly announced that CIO members had
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over the past twelve years
contributed .ore than
four
hundred mUUon dollars to
voluntary agencies.24
TO ensure that workers
had access to the
health and
welfare services that they
supported, local community
services committees sought
labor representation
on the

boards and committees that
governed social agencies.
These
ranged from the tax-supported
public welfare and health
departments to the community
chest-supported family and
cnildren's agencies, settlement
houses. Red Cross and Salvation Army chapters. Boy and
Girl Scouts, and the YW
and
YMCA.
The CIO argued that since
workers supported these
agencies with their tax dollars
and their voluntary contributions, labor had a right to
participate directly
in the

policy making and budget decisions
of these organizations.
Essentially, union members would
represent the consumer of
welfare services. Their participation
would help "democratize" social agencies, making them
more representative of
the community and more responsive to
popular needs. 25

Unionists believed that labor's participation
would
help reduce the influence of business over
social

agencies.

On the one hand, unions could protect
sympathetic social

workers from undue pressure applied by the large
donors from
the business community.

in

1

950 the Ohio CIO's CSC observed

that "sometimes social workers who are liberal in
their view
or friendly to Labor, are subjected to coercive
treatment by

reactionary givers and the presence of Labor representation
can assure them a greater measure of security."
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On the

other hand, union community
activism could help develop
an
appreciation of the labor movement
among indifferent or even
hostile social workers.
In 1953, for example,
Treva Berger,
the Chairman of the IlUnois
Lake County Community
Services
Committe, recalled that her
commrttee had worked closely
with a director of the Public Axd
Commission.
impressed
with the CIO CSC program, this
director had helped change
"entirely the minds of the members
of the Council of Social
Agencies "about people in unions and
in [the] CIO in particular "26
.

Unions succeeded in increasing labor
representation on
social and welfare agencies boards and
committees.
Whereas
only 90 CIO members sat on agency boards
at the beginning of
World War II, by 1 95 3 1 5 000 CIO members
served in
,

various

,

capacities with national, state and local welfare
organizations.

To a lesser degree, AFL unions also provided
repre-

sentatives to the agencies.

representation was only

a

Still,

even this level of

beginning.

in 1953,

in Chicago

alone, five thousand citizens made up the agency boards,

making the 140

CIO volunteers seem almost insignificant.

The CIO hoped that increased participation in the

administration and funding of community agencies would pay
off during labor conflict.

Even financially strong unions

were unable to fully support strikers.

A cooperative social

service sector, however, could strengthen immeasurably
labor's ability to sustain a long-term work stoppage by
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prov...n, .eUef for workers.

The CIO National

Cc.un.ty

services Committee's sought
to ensure that
assistance was
given on the basxs of need,
regardless
of the cause,

as "a

community responsibl ity to .ts
cxt .zens...28
nized, however, that the
extent to wh.ch community
welfare
agencres within their legal and
financxal means

wrlUngly

gave assistance to strikers was

a

measure of the communxty's

acceptance of the prrncxple of the
strike as
in the collective bargaining
process.

a

lawful step

Here the changing

image of labor and the degree to which
unions had established prior relationships
play.

withm

the community came into

The CIO increasingly found that
social agencies were

more "responsive to

a

union which is

a

vital and integral

part of the fabric of daily community
life. "29
As strikes approached,

the CIO Community Services

strike assistance program swung into action.
level,

a

At the plant

strike steering committee appointed and
arranged

for the training of strike counsellors who
referred workers
in need to appropriate social agencies.

work of strike counsellors meshed

in some plants the

with the established

union counselling program, another important CSC activity.

Union representatives then met with local public and private

agencies to set up procedures for relief and to make certain
that social workers understood their responsibility to

workers on strike.

In 1952,

the Labor Participation

Department of the Community Chest asserted that "to the
credit of many social agencies
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...

in large measure" the

pr.nciple of need as the
basxc eligiMUty for
assistance
had been accepted. Unions,
U.e the Amalgamated Clothing
workers, the UA„, and the
Steelworkers credxted the
csc's
strike programs for sustaining
often
prolonged labor

struggles.

The United Steelworkers,
for instance, noted
that the strike relief program
contrrbuted to the successful
conclusion of its 1 952 strike,
until then, the longest
in
the union's history.

Although the CIO did not intend
for its CSC to be a
political force, the quest to
improve community welfare and
to gain access to services at
times pushed local committees
into the political arena.
while supporting voluntary
agencies, the CIO contended that
security for all could be

achieved only through an activist
government.
considered government agencies responsible

Moreover, it

for the major

burden of financial assistance during
unemployment and
strikes. 32

Again,

the example of unions in Illinios

suggests the range of CSC political activity.

During 1952,

in the face of inflation set off by the
Korean war, com-

munity service committees across Illinois, in towns
like
Alton, Moline, and Galesburg, led the political
struggle to

maintain rent control.

in Chicago,

the CSC fought for

increases in workmen's compensation, for funds to build

tuberculous sanitarium, for

a

a

liberalization of residency

requirements for public assistance, and for state aid for
slum clearance and public housing.
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The

CIO CSC in East

Moline helped guarantee access
to pubUe relief
for the
unemployed by electing six CIO
people to the Town Board
responsible for approving relief
expenditures.

Politrcal

power also

caBne into

play during strrkes.

During 1953

strikes involving clothing,
electrial and auto workers,
committees in Kenawee, Aurora and
Freeport placed considerable pressure on township
supervisors who initially
refused to provide assistance to
needy strikers and their
families.
Chester winski of ACWA Local
651 of Kewanee
reported a change in policy "after
the Township Supervisor
had been properly educated. "^^

III

Community services was the core of labor's
slowly
growing local-level public relations
campaign. Political
failure in the 1946, 1950, and 1952 national
campaigns had
convinced many trade unionists that they were
laboring "in

a

climate that is completely hostile to our point
of view."
By the early fifties, both the AFL and the
CIO believed that

unions needed to change the climate of opinion in
America.
Consequently, both houses of organized labor launched

national-level public relations programs to promote labor
and liberalism.

The CIO, in particular, complemented

national efforts by targetting more localized public relations activities.

It believed that business penetration

into the community helped shape the political atmosphere.
The CIO urged local unions to compete with business by
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trumpeting labor's contributions
and po.nt of v.ew
w.thin
the community.

community services served

a

public relations function

by transmitting a subtle
message to the community,
one that
attempted to establish unions
as useful, responsible,
and
Civic-minded organizations. For
the ciO, the beauty
of this
program was that it allowed
unions to demonstrate
through
their actions the "mutuality
of interest" between
labor and
the public.
Henry Fleisher, National
CIO Director of Publicity, consistently urged local
unionists to take advantage
of all the potential goodwill
that could be generated by
publicizing their community service
work.
He advised CSC
representatives at a 1953 institute to
"cultivate newpaper
(sic) and radio contacts" and
furnish them with "good human
interest stories." Union insistence
on receiving credit for
its fund raising activities and
contributions was another

manifestation of labor's drive to gain community
goodwill
and acceptance.
As part of its efforts to alter the local
community's

perception of unionism, organized labor realized
the potential benefits

of communicating directly with the public.

The UAW encouraged its districts to organize
speakers-

bureaus and offered the services of the national union's

Education Department in providing resource materials and
training.
Park,

International Harvester UAW Local

6

of Melrose

Illinois, energetically attacked the task of changing
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pubUc

op.n.on; .ts officers spoke
regularly oefore Mgh
school soc.al sc.ences
classes, college groups,
and gatherings Of .xnrsters.
June 1 950, as part of

m

its

pubUc

relations program, the Mrchrgan
CIO Councxl began maiUng
CIO literature on economic
and political
xssues to key

people, including ministers
and educators, throughout
the
state.
Reverend Walfred Erickson of
the First Baptist
Church in Lawton, Michigan,
admitted that his sympathies
were not "one hundred per cent
pro-union" but appreciated
receiving material which represented
"fairly and fully the
union viewpoint on the issues
which confront us
as

citizens."

Another Baptist minister. Reverend
Robert
Retelling of Midland, Michigan, found
it "healthy

D.

to hear of

different viewpoint than that consistently
maintained by
the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce. "^^
a

The CIO council in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, worried

about the "many misrepresentations about
the CIO," introduced itself to the community through a widely
distributed
pamphlet entitled "Meet Your CIO Neighbors." The
pamphlet

pointed out that the "CIO isn't just
It isn't something far away.

a

bunch of initials.

CIO is your neignbor,

fellow who lives down the block.

or the

The family next to you at

church, your friend in the club, your fellow straphanger
on

the bus." 3 7

Similarly, beginning in 1949, CIO unions across

the midwest began reaching out to neighboring farmers by

sponsoring exhibits at highly popular state and county
fairs.

Relief from the hot sun or rain, free cold drinking
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.

water, .ovies,

"gi..ic.s", .nclud.ng gux.
shows and raffles
and giveaways like shopping
bags or ballons wxth
a unxon
imprxnt, promoted attendance
at the CIO fa.r tents.
one
tent, Michigan CIO CouncU
representatives strategically
placed near the drrnKrng fountarn
a large display
chart
illustrating the comparative incomes
of farmers, big businessmen and the "middle men."
The unronxsts reported that
"this chart caused considerable
comment." Farmers left the
CIO exhi^ts with literature
pointing out the close relationship between farm income and high
wages for workers. One
CIO Education Committee Chairman
summed up his comments on
his union's fair booth this way:
"We don't feel that we can
expect to convert people to CIO thinking
in the few minutes
we can hold them in the tent. For that
reason, we feel that
the entertainment we provided was important
as a means of

m

breaking down prejudice and preparing the way
for

more sympathetic feeling toward [the] CIO" and
for
receptive audience to

a

little

a
a

"more

year-round program of public

relations "^^
In most cases, however, unions equated public relations

principally with the mass media.
provided

a

Radio and later television

point of contact not only with the union member-

ship but with the broader public as well.

Increasingly, as

the post-war corporate anti-labor assault intensified, AFL

and CIO locals and city councils began sponsoring programs
"geared at showing the ordinary citizen just what unions are
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ana now they .enef.t
the co.„™ity...

Lansing, Michigan, u.w
locals began

,,,,,
a

rad.o prog.a™ ".abo.

speaks,.,

initially to support the
autowor.ers strike against
General Motors. Maintained
as a regular offering
after the
Struggle, it brought labor's
point ot
yuj.nx.
of view
vi^^w on
^
economic and
political issues to union
members and the public.
1950,
the Michigan CIO Council
contended that the sixteen
labor
programs broadcast throughout the
state were beginning to
have an effect ..upon the
political picture in Michigan...
According to the Council, letters
from listeners indicated
that for the first time many
people were hearing

m

'

labor's

point of view.^^
A television program served as
the core of a public

relations campaign in Cincinnati.

m

early 1952, as the

Ohio labor movement geared up for the
forthcoming election,
the Cincinnati CIO Council broadcast
a thirteen week television program, "What's Your Answer?",
in which labor representatives debated opponents on subjects including
price
controls, civil rights, academic freedom,
and farm supports.
At the same time, Cincinnat ians saw advertisements
in the
local press depicting the role of the CIO in the
community

and listened to spot radio announcements explaining
how the
CIO helps workers and their families.

Local papers also

featured the CIO contributions to the polio fund, while the

public library ran an exhibit demonstrating the influence of
30,000 unionists on the city's life.^°
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Even .ore ambitious in
ter.s of pubUc relations
were
tne lanor-operated fm
radio stations. As
noted earUer
during the late forties,
unions launched stations
xn
Detroit, Cleveland, Chattanooga,
Los Angeles, and New
Yor.
Cxty.
Labor stations guaranteed
un.ons, which at t..es
had
experienced drffrculty .n purchasing
air time, access
to a

mass audience.

The UAW, which vigorously
promoted labor
radio, envisioned that these
stations would "enhance the
cause of our political, economic
and social

democracy

through affording to all groups
and classes such freedom of
speech and opportunities for
discussion as to be unparalleled in the history of the radio
broadcast
industry."

Walter Reuther believed that the UAW
could make its Detroit
station, WDET, "a powerful instrument
for propaganda free
news." The UAW president asserted that
impartial coverage
"cannot be overestimated," especially
"in a city like

Detroit where the daily newspapers consistently
distort the
news."

In the same vein,

the ILGWU's station in New York

City, which symbolically took the call
letters, WFDR, pro-

mised upon its debut in
liberalism.

Thus,

1

94

9

to be

a

voice for labor and

labor's FM stations presented five

liberal news commentators, several of whom had been fired

from commercial stations.

They also typically carried the

AFL and CIO's national news commentary programs as well as
local union programming.'^-'In their appeal for public support, unions promised to

devote their stations to community service.
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This stood in

Sharp contrast to
trad.t.onaUy-run com.erc.al
AM stations
that emphasized profits over
public interest programming.
The ILGWU intended to ma.e
WFDR "the most articulate
townfeting hall, the outstanding mus.c
hall, the most attractive cultural center in the
community." Simxlarxly
WDET was
to be the "people's station,
where all the problems,
social,

political, economic-which affect
labor and the community
generally can be talked about
openly and honestly."42
indeed, labor FM stations
provided a significant amount
of
educational and cultural programming
while serving
as an

outlet for communication with
union members.
1950,
WDET's schedule, for instance,
included "Community clinic"
and "Let Freedom Ring," both designed
to combat discrimation
and bigotry; the "WDET Roundtable,"
a panel discussion of
national and local legislative and
economic issues; several

m

children's educational programs;

a

show produced in coopera-

tion with the city's health department;
and

a

daily musical

series featuring the Detroit Public Library
Symphony. ^3
IV

All of this suggests that labor appeared to pose

threat to business' domination of local communities.

a

real

But

often labor's influence was more shadow than substance.
Labor's widely heralded FM radio stations folded after only
a

few years, the victim both of the manufacturers' and

broadcasters' unwillingness to embrace FM and of wariness
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fro. advertisers that the
stations would .e union
propaganda
outlets.
Moreover, in the late forties
and fifties, the
cold war atmosphere of suspicion
and intolerance towards
liberal causes impeded union
access to outlets of mass
communication.
Particularly
politically conservative
communities, local television and
radio stations at times
refused to sell air time to unions,
stiff resistance from
advertising agencies and television
stations almost kept the
Cincinnati CIO television series off
the air.^^

m

Even in the realm of community
services, there existed
many barriers to labor's attainment
of community recognition
and power.
Until the merger of the AFL and the
CIO in 1955,

division within the labor movement impeded
the growth of the
community services program. Although some AFL
members
served on the labor staff of the national and
local community chests, they did not officially represent
the Federation.

It wasn't until 1953 that the AFL even
enunciated a

policy on community activities.

Continuing hostility and

competition between the AFL and the CIO also hindered the

development of unified labor program.
Following the merger, the AFL-CIO committed itself to
an expanded community relations program.

By 1957, the

number of labor representatives on voluntary boards and

committees had increased to 75,000 and the number of fulltime labor staff on community agencies to
labor educator Alice Cook observed in 1959,

variety of standards.

.

.

135.'^'^

But as

"judged by a

this representation is small-295

small .n proportion to the
number of workers in
these
communities and of the contributions
they make
support of
these agencies." she continued
that "while labor
representatives had been readily accepted
in a few communities,

m

generally they have won only
grudging acceptance." Leo
Perlis admitted at the AFL-CIO's
inaugural convention that
agencies viewed labor as a "junior
partner."48 contemporary
studies of community agencies
revealed that trade unionists
were often letterhead or token
representatives with little

impact on policy making.

present

a

On the whole, they failed to

new set of interests,

ideology.49

p^^^,

a

new program or

a

new

this reflected resistance from social

workers and the business leaders who
often dominated board
membership. in 1959, the Indiana state
AFL-CIO observed
that although labor contributed millions
to agency

coffers,

the "leaders always look at us as something
aside from the
community." Furthermore, agency boards and
committees made

participation difficult for workers by scheduling board

meetings during the day or by creating an atmosphere at
the
meetings that made the labor representatives "so uncomfortable that they no longer wished to attend. "^^
Labor's ambivalence about its role in the community

also helps explain its failure to gain
of influence.

a

significant level

Lack of interest was one factor.

Joseph

Beirne of the Communication Workers Union, who became chair-

man of the CIO's Community Services Committee in 1953,
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complained repeatedly of the
refusal
retusal nf
of unions to "exploit
part of the opportunities
that exist inn ^-k
^
the Community
services field."50 p,.,,,,^,,,,^
n

^^^^^^^

^^^^^^

created contradictions for
organized labor.
Unions
presented their representatives
as advocates of the
community's broader interests.
indeed, labor's manifesto
was
"The union member is first
and foremost a citizen
of his
community." To prove their
non-partisanship, labor representatives frequently yielded to
other groups and failed to
consistently promote the needs
organized
labor.

By

emphasizing the common interests
of labor, business, and the
middle class, unions tended to lose
their class identity.

Those few employers who recognized
this contradiction

welcomed labor's involvement

m

that participation brought

cloak of repectabi li ty and

a

community affairs, believing

responsibility to union leaders which might
have a moderating influence on their behavior
during times of industrial

conflict.^-'-

For all these reasons, then,

labor's community services

failed to tap the potential public support
that prevailed in
the strike wave of 1945-46.
Facing a generally conservative
social atmosphere in the 1950s, contemporary commentators
like sociologist

C.

Wright Mills even denied that local

communities still had important influence.

A bureaucrati zed

mass society had rendered citizens voiceless and small towns
powerless, according to Mills;
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labor could compete as a less

'

potent large-scale institution,
.ut .t was unU.ely
to en.oy
much success through a
community-based
strategy.52

There rs,

of course,

another explanation for
labor s
inabUrty to atta.n power and
political fro. its community
activities. Business leaders
were neither dismissive
of
community relations nor sanguine
about labor's inability
to
compete.
indeed, the National
Association of Manufacturers
chairman of the board. Cola G.
Parker, asserted
that it "is

in the local communities that
the work must be done, and
the
union leaders know it.
This kind of community
.

.

.

activity pays off in politics too.

it makes the union

leader an important and influential
figure, and it helps the
union machine do the job at the
polls. "S^
j^^^j^^^

^^^^^

dismiss local community efforts, employers
and corporate
managers in the post-war era embarked
on
an aggressive

campaign to shape

a

pro-business environment in the nation's

cities and small towns.
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1

CIO community Services Committee,
iq^^'^Q^r'T^1° Perils to Irving
Abramson, March 19,
n
councils of America, inc., L^bor
plrl'irTn^r^^^^
Department, "Principles Underlying the Work of
IhI T
Participation Department," (mimeographed report),
T.n
fo?f
^
McDonald Papers, HCLA; Community
Qo^'
Services
New sletter (Community Chests and Council~of
America, inc.. Labor Participation Department),
July 1947,
Box 7, Greater Buffalo Industrial Union Council
Records; Leo
Perils to Beirne, CIO-CSC Today:
A Report With Recommendations, April 21, 1955.

Seot
^tAl

'

'

.

•

1 9

Perils to Beirne, CIO-CSC Today, A Report With
Recommendations, April 21, 1955; Nat Klein to Industrial
Union Councils, Oct. 15, 1946, Box 3, Greater Buffalo
Industrial Union Council Records, LMDC; Leo Perlis to David
J. McDonald, Aug. 30, 1946, Box
36, McDonald Papers;
National New sletter Labor-Employee Participation Dept.,
Community Chests and Councils, Inc. Dec. 1 947.
,
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37, David J. McDonald Papers
^^^O, Box
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Trade anions
^^entice-Hal
"
1
19691
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L
n
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ciO Executive
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o c
B
Carey (CIO Secretary-Treasurer)
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"Thl n^^'
Labor in Social Welfare
Opportunity
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addr^Jc ^ Jl^
of social work, Atlantic
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?Q^f
c'ty
Washington Office Records ALUaTav 12
CIO
J.-H'
^'^^^
C. Miller, industry.
Delbert
Labor' and'^Vo"
'

hct^tu
,
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i

&

.

Brothers,nr96^pp^i^8f^85Tll^

"^^P^^

US^D:partmtnt'of'E&•o'^^^

Box
P^^lis
to
CIO-CSC Today, A Report Wit^T
Beiren,
1955; Proceedings? ?welftfLnL'rcTn"r'''°"'' ^^''^ ^1,
institute, JuliL'RothL'n\rj\^:L'M?ner\\^^^^^
,
7, Greater Buffalo Industrial
Union JoGncll fMDc.
10,

Tl^lf
'

Industrial
nion'coun'crif; ^ZtrlZn^lT.l^^'l
^---^-P^ed
pamphlet), Maich
48rBSx'5 ^'^l'mo'^
:
.^^^C;
Illinois State
Industrial Union Counri rrn >
Committee,
Annual Acti vit^esTpSt (mime~ph)'
,

1

-corL,\\°u\7'^;unftl'on °Ap 1 ^948^^
William J. Ryan to James
Wnfifm^r/''"?^^
Miller, De~30 fgZfi rov S
Greater Buffalo Industrial Union
CouncH; LMDC- "?acts RarpH
(--eogrWhfd'Veport) T^'
?953 ''Box"5r?io"wn''^'^'^^'''
CIO Washington Office Records, AULA;
Milton
Derb4r ?.hn;
Berber,
La^ in Illinois:. The Affluent
Years,

'"^'^'^^^

PP

3

38-3

9^

1945-80

University-^FTmn^I?^re^lTnf89),

23
Proceedings, Twelfth Annual CIO Community
Services
Tn.^.'^
Institute;
Fred Koppers

(President,

Koppers Company, inc
McDonald, Nov. 27, 1956, Box 149, Mc'l.onald
"^^^^^ Steelworkers of America Meeting,
Ana^^^
^tt'l^^'"
Aug.
23, 1956, Pittsburgh, Philip Murray to Charles
Cox
°^ .^^^"^^^^"^^^^^^^ Steel corp., (telegram) Oct.
/^it
A""^
1 4,
1 94 7, David J. McDonald to C.F. Hood
(President, U.S.
Steel Corp.), (telegram), June 6 1 956 all
in Box 40,
doward Hague Papers, HCLA
to

David

)

J.

,

2^Bell,

,

"The Worker and His Civic Functions," p. 68The National CIO Community Services Committee,
A Report to
the National CIO Executive Board (mimeograph),
June 4, 1953,
Box 46, Series 1, Michigan AFL-CIO Papers, ALUA
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'"^"^^"ent Morris
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agencies to
"""^
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Department of Employment had "frnr;,.
a strikebreaking agenov"
°
*° ^^"^
"=ed as
and a,
°' blacklisting
union workers. Moreover fith%h»
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r^^^^
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''^^"'^
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Address before'N^ti^nal'c^n e
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^
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LMDC; "Lake County CIO esc kpo"
° "^the Stafe'. n I
CIO convention" (mimeograph),
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Hillman Papers, Amalgamated Clothingl%53 Bofu
Workers of ftmerica
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Records (hereafter ACWA), LMDC

VI

,
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"''Mi""tes," Health and Welfare Advisory
Council to the
"
committee,
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Dec. 15, 1 953
Box
lib,
U6 Bessie
BlssieTn
Hillman Papers, ACWA, LMDC

M,*--

28

National New s letter-CIO Edition Labor
Particioation
Department, Communit7Thi7ti-and-C^cils,
Inc.? Fall^l949
Box 7, Greater Buffalo Industrial Union
Council, LMDC;
Carey,
The Opportunity of Labor in Social Welfare-"
CIO
Executive Board Minutes, Oct. 5, 1954, alua
,

29

"Report of tne CIO Field Staff for the Fifth
Anniversary^ Meeting Labor Particiaption
Department Advisory Committee, Jan. 15, 1952, Box 10, USA Department
of Education
Records, HCLA; National CIO Community Services Committee,
Case Histories of the Strike Assistance Program,
1952 Steel
Strike," (mimeograph) Box 36, AUF, LMDC.
^^J.C. Pierce to Leo Perlis, Oct. 6 1 949 Andy Brown
to Leo Perlis, Oct. 7 1 949 Robert L. Kinney to Leo
Perlis,
Dec. 6 1 949 all in Box 37, David J. McDonald Papers,
HCLA:
East St. Louis CIO CSC Report to the State CIO Convention,"
Dec. 1953, Box 116, Bessie Hillman Papers, ACWA,
LMDC
,

,

,

,

,
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Report of the CIO Field qtsff f
sary Meeting Labor Participation
^'"'^ ^"^^^ Annivern»..=
tee, Jan. 15, 1952, Box
Advisory CommitrofSsA
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Records HCLA; The YKCA tl's
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strike loomed in 1 950 ,thf disrri^^^^
^ telephone
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^""Pl^ meeting of human needs for a
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group of citizens who feel they
can exnerf ,nnh
services from agencies which they
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c^u:sS^.o^ts,"A^mm^\^=lorx"^';.^pr
"-'^^
o^f ^e^k'i^ke'^rsrst^nc^.^"'^"-"^National CIO Community Services Committee
A
National CIO Executive Board, June
4? 1953Citizen CIO, National CIO Community Services
Committee
"''^ OPP°^tunity of Labor
^J-Ihe

Tn^llT.T'.eriri'j','''''

^^Labor^Welfare In Our Comm unity Chicago Industrial
union Council CSC and The Community Fund and
Council of
Social Agencies of Chicago newsletter, May-June
1947, July
1947, Aug.-Sept 1949,
Box 59, AUF, LMDC; Illinois State
Industrial Union Council CIO Community Services
Committee,
Annual Activities Report (mimeograph), 1952; Robert
E
Jordan (President), "Report to the Delegates, Milwaukee
Industrial Union Council, CIO," 1951 (mimeograph). Box
Greater Buffalo Industrial Union Council Records, LMDC- 1,
The
Broadcaster UAW Springfield, 111., Local 1027, March 19^
Four County Council CIO CSC Report to the State CIO Convention, East Moline Illinois," Dec. 1953, Statewide CIO
CSC
Report to the (Illinois) State CIO Convention," Dec. 1953,
both in Box 116, Bessie Hillman Papers, ACWA, LMDC;
Milwaukee County Industrial Union Council CIO Community
Services Committee, "Annual Report," 1952-1953, Box 55, CIO
Washington Office Records, ALUA.
,
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38

^^^iahbors in grand Rapids, pamphlet,

f

^^^"^^^ ^^^^ Program,"

Marvin Meltzer,
"ReDort'nn^rr
l^^^ Project, Marvin
Report on county Fair
Meltzer to Don
1^^' Dingwell to Gus and
Box 51, Michigan AFL-CIO Records,
Anfr^;Brendan Sexton to Education
AULA;
Committee, UAW-CIO Executive Board, Oct. 9, 1951, Box 3, Edward
Coffey Files, UAW
Department of Education Records, ALUA; Education
at
CIO Department of Education and Research newsletteT; Work,
I949
Box 4, Buffalo Industrial Union Council,
LMDC.

llrZT' undated
T.^I' memo,

39

Ammunition, Feb. 1947; William S. Hilger (President
New York, CIO Council to the CIO Radio
Department, Sept. 27, 1949, William S. Hilger to Jack
Conway, Feb. 4, 1950, Box 1, UAW Local 686 Records, LMDC;
Bill Kemsley to All County CIO Councils in Michigan, Sept.
6, 1951, Box 7, Mildred Jeffrey Papers, ALUA; Report of
Education Department (mimeograph), c. 1950, Box 180,
Michigan AFL-CIO Records, ALUA.
of Lockport,
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M.S. Novik, "Radio Must
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iS/'Policy
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papers, ALDA; United

'^'„rie' ^Wo^"^^^^^^^^^

44

Mildred Jeffrey to Bob Miller, Nov.
23, 1949
box a
Broadcasting CorporatioA of
Michigan f95o'"B"' iT"''°
''^^^^ Advertising Accounts of WDET
Durina ?QRn 2'

March 1959 'Rn°^.^^';"''?'^^^^ ^^^^^^ t° ^.J. Slowie, c.
Members of the Board
of Directors and ^''^^^^
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^^"^^^^ °^
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March 10, 1952, "Minutes of Annual
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"^^^^^
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li^^^^V
Papers, ALUA; "Looking Ahead in Labor,"
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"The Cincinnati CIO Tries Television,"; On
the dif f
obtaining air time in Rochester where the UAW hoped
rnat television programming might "neutralize
some
community s anti-union feeling," see the following of this
correspondence:
Frank Wallick to Mildred Jeffrey, Oct. 26, Nov
19, 1951, Frank Wallick to Joe Rauh, Nov. 19, Dec 29
1 9 51
Mildred Jeffrey to Frank Wallick, Jan. 4, 1952, Box
18,
Mildred Jeffery Papers, ALUA.
i
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^^L-CIO,
HistoT' Enci^clo^edia
and
Refi^ce-^^^kTT^l
P^""^ ^ (Washington, D.C.,
439-4"4~.
196oT7pp.
31,

'

1

X
'

^^^^^ American Federationist"'oct'"?959' p^Tr'
Com^^^JHITA^tiVIt^,
Reedy T ^ls Par ley "^iFL-rin 1^^

—

cKTiitlan sgxence M^ng^ir s^pt 21,' 1957^
Local "a
Refiorter (DAW), De3r67n:957;
Proceedinqs' Bl^T?r^,Q.7
pp. 287-89; Proceedings
AFL-C IO, 1959? p p. !54-56'.

'

.

48

"Education of Workers for Public
^i""?^
Responsibility
in Community and Public Affairs
"naDer
presented to the conference on Labor's
Public ResponslMcDonald
9^
capers,
Paper^ H^k
HCLA; ' I'pf
'r to' Proceeding
AFL-CIO
s. 1 955, p
47- PrnrP^H nrra
•

'

TTssTT.'

^~^r..ces
2TTLibrary, Smith
rn"r.^.ff

s

Co'nf eVencTrffPHH^:

College; Memorandum
ti Advi'sorv
to
Advisory Committee on Labor Participation,
nd Box n
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Vaughn Davis Bornet, Welfare in America (NormanUniversity of Oklahoma Press, 1960),
pp. 126-27, 144-45James B. McKee, "Status and Power in the
Industrial Community:
A Comment on Drucker's Thesis," The American
^Q^^^^l of Sociology 58 (Jan. 1953):
368-70 ;~Wil liam H.
Form, "Organized Labor's Place in the Community Power
StrucIndustrial and Labor Relations Review 12 (July 1959):
526-39; Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, induspr^al Society and Social Welfare (New York: Free Press,
1965), pp. 276-81; James Hudson, "Power With Low Prestige:
A Study of Labor Unions in a Dependent Community," Ph.D.
University of Michigan, 1965; Proceedings Second Meeting of
the Industrial Communication Council at the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, July 30-Aug. 3,
1956; Derk C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American
Comm unity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 434-36.
,
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Hudson, "Power with Low Prestige,"
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1952, Box 10, series 3, Inter-University Labor
Education
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nn"""A
45-46; Fortune also discussed the implicitions of
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£|£manent Revolution (New York: Prentice^Hal
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pp.
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Louis Horowitz, ed. Power, Politics and
Tiie Collected Essays of
g^gP^^W right M ilTT (L^don:
Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 353-73.

^^Industrial Relations Division, National Association
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1

95 8),

1
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CHAPTER

8

A BEACHHEAD IN THE
COMMUNITY

Dur.ng 1950 top International
Harvester executives
traveled across the South and
Midwest to participate
in town
-etin.s. The purpose of these
co.pany-sponsored ,atherin,s
was to introduce International
Harvester management to
community leaders and to encourage
the excnange of
information
and attitudes between company
and community. Typically,
the
company invited about two hundred
local people to a luncheon
meeting.
Guests included public officials,
county agents,
local business and professional
people,
teachers,

clergy,

members of women's clubs and civic
groups, labor leaders,
and representatives of the press
and radio.
Local and

divisional management officials sat
scattered among the
guests, serving as hosts at eacn
luncheon table.
international Harvester President John L.
McCaffrey or Chairman of
the Board Fowler McCormick began the
meetings with
a

snort

talk outlining the company's place in
the community and the
current state of business.
what followed was an opportunity
for community leaders, in a "no-holds
barred" atmosphere, to
ask questions of the "highest authority in
the company"

about issues ranging from Harvester's attitude
on social

security to soil conservation.

According to the company, these forums helped "create
an impression of neighbor liness" that went far in
correcting

misunderstandings "commonly held about corporations."
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After

one sue. co...„.,,

.as .aae

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
a

te„.Me

.ista.e ove. t.e yea.s

..3

.aUu.e

interest .tsel. „ore .n
t.e co..unity
we want to teU the people
.n the twent,-^our
co^.unit.es
whe.e we have plants that
the., prohle.s

to

a.e ou. p.ohle.s."

industry, he declared "can
no longer continue
to rgnore the
community in which it operates."!

international Harvester's
interest rn its plant
communrtres arose from a widely
shared fear among postwar
employers that they had lost
authority not only on the shop
floor but also beyond thexr
factory gates. Community

sympathy for workers xn the
1945-1946 strike wave as well
as
the growing union presence
xn communxty agencxes
appeared to
business alarming signals of
public support for
liberal

values and organized labor.
Community, then, took on a new
importance for business leaders
worried about the decline of
corporate power. At the 1948 Congress
of American Industries, National Cash Register
Company President S.C. Allyn
rallied fellow business executives
to the
struggle,

declaring that the community had become

"a

beach-head for

the recapture of American ideals;
for the acceptance of

industry in its true and ordained role as
leading citizen. "2
Business strategy in the community followed two
intertwined paths. One path was an aggressive public
relations
effort threatening the decline of American values,
morals,
and freedoms due to government's and labor's
attacks on the
free enterprise system.

This effort was especially vigorous
310

.

-

the period fro. 1945
to 1952. and was
the product of
national organisations, in
particular the .at.onal
Association Of Manufacturers.
However, other .usrness
.roups and
individual frr„s also joined
the crusade against
collectrvrs™ and state rntervention.
. second path
e.phas.zed
business- effort to shape
co.^unity relations in a
.ore
positive fash.on.
^.ploying in the co.^unity
at large programs ai^in to the welfarism
and human relations
used
in the

plant,

individual companies constructed

image of the importance of
business as
Together, these two facets of
community

a

more favorable

a good neighbor.

relations axmed to

create the proper climate for
the domination of corporate
America

Business took labor's community
activities much more
seriously than subsequent historians
have.
the years
immediately after World War II, business
felt besieged by

m

labor's political and economic power.

The community

response to the strike wave confirmed
employers' fears,
epitomizing the crisis facing the continuation
of the

"American way of life/' as they perceived

it.

The growing

presence of labor in the community, even if at times only

a

form of tokenism, served notice to the business
community

that unions had become
own backyards.

a

force to be reckoned with in their

Employers feared that greater union prestige
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would mean greater union
power in the
L.ne plant.
plant
relations handbook warned of
the

n
.
One industrial
•

danger posed by labor's

public relations which sought,
it charged, "to
keep the
community class-conscious...
Unions, it contended,
wanted to
make the public believe that
.'employers as a class are
out
to skin the shirts off the
backs of workmgmen
and
that

,

business was "as cold-blooded as

a

m

fish

a

cake of

ice..'3

Faced with this challenge, the
public opinion of the local
community became immensely important
to business
leaders.

The community,

they believed, was crucial
in shaping atti-

m

tudes and

determining the economic and political
environment. Government, which played an
increasingly intrusive
role in the operation of the economy,
started at the grass
roots in towns and cities.
early

m

1946

,

C.C.

Carr of

Alcoa warned that "public opinion of
industry takes root
where industry lives, and from this root
will stem the

freedoms granted to industry

imposed upon
James

W.

it."

...

or the restrictions

Similarily public relations consultant

Irwin reminded employers that "in our industrial

communities we may be made or broken.
our neighbors, who regard industry as

can win many battles.

we stand to win

with the support of
a

good neighbor, we

Without the support of our neighbors,

none."'^

Employers matched their efforts to influence the ideas
of their workforce with

confidence in business.

a

pledge to restore community
As in the shop,

this required

teaching the public about the centrality of the company and
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'

the free enterprise
system to cc.un.ty
wellberng.
indeed
these two efforts were
closely interrelated;
employers saw
.ndustrxal relations and
co..unity relations as
o.erlapprn,
spheres.
WorKer attitudes toward
employers served
as the

base from whicn communities
formed their opinions
of
business.
Advocates of human relations
argued that an
employer's reputation and
influence beyond the plant
gates
could oe built on the goodwxU
generated by a contented and
loyal workforce,
turn, they believed that a
community

m

favorable to the company could
set the boundaries for
acceptable worker activism within
the plant,

they saw corporate community
relations as

a

m

a sense,

form of company

consciousness writ large.
Not surprisingly, in the years after
World War II, many
of the same businessmen who promoted
human relations and

welfarism stood behind the dramatic growth
in corporate
community relations. Most active were the

umbrella business

organizations like the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, the American
Petroleum

Institute and the American Iron and Steel Institute.

The

nam's community relations program, designed to
"merchandise"

the business story to the public, was the most
ambitious and
far reaching.

it overlapped with community relations

campaigns devised by city and regional business associations,

like the Associated Industries of Cleveland, which

urged its members to "sell the principles of free enterprise
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as a real and living
force...6

Both national and local

.us.ness organizations provided
guidance and support to
the
many f.r.s who established
their own community
relations
activities in the ensuing decade.

The dr.ve to sell the free
enterprise system at the
local level meshed w.th and xn
turn gamed momentum
from a
campaign to arouse communit.es rn
defense of Americanism,
in the late forties and fifties,
the ma, or threat was
communism. After the war, business
had
latched upon anti-

communism as

way of strengthening its own
appeal and
legitimating its attack on liberals
and organized
a

labor who

it tarred as col 1 ecti vi st s.

Business groups,

like the

Chamber of Commerce, joined with veterans
organizations,
patriotic societies, civic clubs, and

religious bodies to

battle communism at home.

The American Legion the General

Federation of Women's Clubs, the American Bar
Association
and others formed Americanism departments,
charged with
exposing and rooting out subversion in communities
across

the country. In 1948 the Chamber contributed to
the struggle

by publishing a Progra m for Comm unity anti-Com m
unist Action,

which included directions on how to compile

a

filing system

on local suspects.^
If one part of defending Americanism involved exposing

its detractors,

the other part encompassed promoting the

values associated with the American way of life.
the concepts of individual freedom and liberty.

Key were

Community

organizations mobilized to reaffirm the public's commitment
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to these values.

,,31,

the Klm^.a

tee,

born in the El.ira
Assoo.atron of Commerce
but
.nclud.ng c.vrc, religious,
veteran, farm,

fraternal, youth

,

and patr.ot.c associations,
organized a mass.ve
demonstration Of community solidarity
in "opposition to
forces that
would destroy freedom
America.- 25,000 people
a
community of 49,000 joined in a
mass "Pledge of Allegiance
to the Constituton."
The pledge read:

m

m

"Before God and in the sight of mv f^i r..
reaffirm my devotion and loyalty^L
the riaht. . .
obligations of freedom under law
granted bv^h/
Constitution of the United States^of
reassume my personal responsibility America and
to cSeri^h^he
blessings of liberty and to
preserve them
undiminished for posterity." 8
i

According to defenders of Americanism,
communist
ideology was just the most obvious
threat
to freedom.

Ranking second was economic illiteracy.

The often

unthinking, apathetic, and misguided
citizens that populated

America's cities and town were unable to
fend off the
attacks on industry by labor and government.

These attacks

undermined the whole economic order and ultimately
the
American way of life, business asserted, because
the

loss of

economic freedom and individualism inexorably led
to the
loss of political and social freedom.

Thus protecting

American freedom became intertwined with protecting American
business.
a

The General Federation of Women's Clubs called for

defense of industry through education, particulary in

communities.

"There," according to GFWC President Mrs.
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Hiram Houghton, was •where
the danger must be
met."
Federation and others looked

The

to companies and
business

organisations like the NAM to
"save the Freedoms"
and "keep
our American way of life."^
The NAM certainly intended
to fulfill the GFWC's
mandate.
its xnterest rn community
relations preceded the
postwar social crxs.s, but
previously consisted mainly of

mailings and

few regional meetings. At the
end of the war,
however, the NAM began paying
increased attention
a

to organ-

izing local communities in support
of the private enterprise
system.
1947, it formed a national Committee
on Cooperation With Community Leaders.
Goodyear president E.J.
Thomas, a member of the NAM's Public
Relations Advisory
committee, stressed the significance of
this change in NAM
policy.
"No amount of activity at the national
level," he

m

contended,

"radio talKs,

appearances' by

a

advertising, or even

personal

national figure— can take the place of

hard work in the home town by local talent;"
that "applies
to selling a political ticket or selling

industry's point of

a

product--or

view."-'-^

The nam's local efforts had two closely linked goals.

One stressed bolstering business leadership within the com-

munity;

the other aimed at aiding these

r einvigorated

business leaders shape the local climate of opinion.

in

niid-1947, the Association launched an Industry Leaders

Program, designed to mobilize business leaders as shapers of

public opinion in their local communities.
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The program gave

1

local employers the
"factual a..un.t.on and
platfor. techniques to beco.e better
cha.p.ons of the A.er.can
way."
To
acco.pUsh th.s, the HAM for.ed
tea.s consisting of
two
experts, one in the field
of economics and
labor relations
and one in the field of
public spea.ing. opon
invitation
fro. local employer associations,
the NAM representatives

Offered two-day rnvitation-only
seminars to key industrial
leaders.
Advance men preceded the team
to aid in making
local arrangements for the
conference. 1

NAM experts began each conference
by distributing an
industry Leaders Manual which
was to serve as the local

business spokesman's "bible."
was essentially

This

loose-leaf "sales kit,"

treatise on the NAM's economic and
political philosophy and a guide to
the organization's position
on legislation.
it explained the nature and
philosophy of
the "American Individual Enterprise
System" and, through a
series of discussion outlines, provided
explanations of
issues like prices and profits, the
relationship between
wages and productivity, employment stabilization,
monopoly
a

in collective bargaining, taxation, and
the growing pressure

towards centralization and government controls.

This infor-

mation provided employers with sources for speeches and
panel discussions aimed at local audiences.

To keep bus-

inessmen current on the changing political scene, the NAM
sent all conference participants updated material with which
to amend their guidebooks. 1^
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Tne manual also included
xnstructions on how to
sell
the free enterprise philosophy.
it suggested that
appeals
Should be .ade to the heart
so strongly "that
it xs not

inconsistent with intelUgence
to act upon
according to the Industry
Leaders

it."

indeed,

guide, thinking was

difficult for the average person.

To see clearly the rela-

tive value Of contending
pnilosophxes, the guide advrsed
People n,ust be lead through a
thinking process." The
industry leaders program provided
businessmen with the means
to lead the public.^^

Wnile the manual provided the
"factual" ammunition, the
meetings themselves served to wrtip up
employer enthusiasm
and provide practical lessons.
NAM experts pointed
to

opinion polls revealing a crisis.

One team member then

dramatized "with some wild soap box forensics
Voice of the Opposition/" while the
other

.

.

.

'The

exposed the

fallacies of collectivist philosophies.

After discussing

issues raised in the manual, the participants
used it to

compose and deliver short speeches.

NAM experts and fellow

conference members provided businessmen with "coaching
in
the art of meeting the forensic tirades of the
left-wingers

with the truth about what has made this nation great. "^'^
Testifying to the impact of the Industry Leaders

program was the participation by over 9,000 businessmen in
260 cities during the first two years.

Some employer asso-

ciations even requested repeat performances.

Martin

P.

Murphy, secretary of the Janesville, Wisconsin, Chamber of
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,

commerce, reported that the
program was "a dxstxnct
success...
He observed that
participants are enthusiastic
.feeung that at last they
•
have been grven the
weapons
With Which to do an effective
Job in the co.^unity.^.
The
group, he continued, was
now anxious to
follow up as

Missionaries of the free enterprise
syste™.
have an encore.'^ si™ilarily,

i

hope we can

reports fro™ the f.eld con-

vinced NAM Official T.M. Brennan
that participants were
instilled with an inspired fervor
to spread the message of
private enterprise."-'-^
in many communities, the
program's graduates followed

up the seminar by forming speakers'
bureaus.
The appearance
of manufacturing executives at
grass roots gatherings of

organizations like the YMCA and YWCA,
Rotary and Exchange
clubs, Parent-Teacher associations
and church groups
not

only facilitated the spreading of the
free enterprise
message but also served to strengtnen the
influence of the
local business community. The Tristate
Industrial Association of Pittsburgh, for example, formed a
bureau of twentyeight business representatives who had offered
their services to combat false propaganda with facts."

Similarily,

within days of their Industry Leaders conferences, employers
in Davenport,

Iowa, Bridgeport, Connecticut, and San Diego

established speakers' bureaus and reached out aggressively
into their local communities.

By the end of 1949,

195 local

employer associations had developed speakers bureaus.
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secon., elose.y .elatea

1-7, .elped local e^plo.e.s'
assoc.aUons esta.Usn
comprehensive cc^unity P..UC
relations
pro,„„s.

N.M representatives .appe.
out

Upon .e.uest

a plan of act.on
ana a.aea

local employers .n such
communities as Ouincy,
niinois, san
D.ego, California, Tacoma,
Washington, ana .ynchburg,
Virginia.
To learn where industry
stood in each locale,
the
program began by recruiting
local college students
to
conduct an opinion survey
of the local population.!'
in Reading, Pennsylvania,
the public relations
drive
co.batted popular support for
unions and for a Socialist

city administration.

Drawing on the information
generated
by the survey, the Manufacturers
Association of Berks county
organized a "frontal attack" on
business critics.

Employers worked to convince Reading
residents why wages
were at their current level and
why unions were inevitably
linked to racketeering. To promote
the image
of local

industry, the Manufacturers Association
created an Industrial Sports League and encouraged
members to respond to

complaints about factory noise, dirt, and
unsafe working
conditions.

To show that employers were more
interested

than union officials in the community,

a

Community Social

Progress Committee publicized the extent of
management

involvement in civic and charitable organizations
and
encouraged employers to extend their efforts.
Within six
months of its implementation, Frederick H. Klein,

president

of the Manufacturers Association,
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claimed that the program

.ade our association a
.rivin, ,orce .n our
co^^unity."
Kle.n noted the association's
influence; local
newspapers
long partial to labor "now
see
"i^as

that all
rnat
all stories about
enterprise that are in any way
I controversial
i-iuversiai non4contain management's
side of the case."^^
•

•

The NAM encouraged businessmen
to direct their message
at those groups considered
by public relations
experts as
key to molding public opinion.
These "thought leaders"
included educators, clergy,
professionals, local officials,
and women's leaders.
The NAM even published
periodicals
directed at opinion molders: Trends
(aimed at educators),
and Program Notes (women's club
leaders), each had a circulation of 46,000; understanding
(clergymen) had a circulation of 26,000.
Recognizing that women's clubs were an

audience of "inestimable potential," the
NAM also began
providing package programs to club directors
designed to
stimulate discussion on issues like federal
spending and
taxation or the Taft-Hartley Act. The packages
included
speeches, such as one asserting that the
Taft-Hartley

Act

wasn't a slave labor law, hints on speaking
effectively,

sample invitations, and publicity releases.
One of the more ambitious programs of NAM's Committee
on Cooperation With Community Leaders attempted to
build

consensus among large numbers of local opinion leaders

through a nationwide series of town meetings.
1948,

Begun in June

the meetings combined the initiative of local business
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groups w.th the national
organization.

The the.e of the

up worth saving?"

seven hundred clergymen,
educators
women's leaders, students,
youth leaders and
businessmen
from Reading, Lancaster, York,
Harrisburg and Lebanon
attended the first town meeting
in Hershey, Pennsylvania.
A
panel of local businessmen
discussed the challenges facing
American society and afterwards
fielded questions from the
audience.
Over nine hundred of the
"most influential
leaders of community life and
opinion" of Providence, Rhode
island attended the next meeting,
which was broadcast over
the radio.
Audiences at these meetings raised
questions
about why industry opposed the
guaranteed annual wage, how
taxes could be cut when necessary
government expenses were
so great, and why businessmen denied
that organized labor

promoted

a

better standard of living for workers,

which

indicated work still facing the business community.

Never-

theless, the NAM concluded that "these local
leaders of

thought" left the town meetings having rededicated
"them-

selves to the traditional concepts of American liberty. "^0
On the eve of tne

1

948 election, the NAM was convinced

that its community relations program was reshaping America's

political landscape.
NAM,

But Truman's reelection stunned the

leading it to question its public relations strategy.

Reflecting the members despondancy. Association director

Thomas

J.

Bannan asked NAM President Wallace

F.

Bennett

"whether we were so far down the road to Socialism that
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.

tnere was no return or
whether freeao. stUl
existed^-^l
So.e pubUc relations
experts argued, however,
that Tru.an 's
campaign provided proof of
the significant-^
yniricanoe „f
of communication
efforts armed at the individual
at the local
level

The

Democrat's victory,

they asserted, could
be attributed to
organised labor's effectiveness
in influencing
individual
members and more symbolically
to Truman's whirlwind
"whistle-stop" train tour.
That trip enabled Truman
to go
to the grassroots, face-to-face
with the people, to sell his
vision.
According to Public Relations
News, his success
proved that public relations
campaigns could change
attitudes

After

period of study and reevaluation,
the NAM's
Board of Directors and staff vowed
to cast aside "defeatistattitudes. Particularly at the community
level, which they
believed was the only place where
"genuine confidence in
industry [can] be engendered," they
planned to redouble
their efforts at convincing "the American
people that only
through the operation of a competitive
capitalistic economy
can lasting national prosperity and the
basic freedoms of
a

the individual citizen be assured."

America,

declared one

local NAM leader, was not yet really ready to
"adopt the

Fair Deal motto,

'The state is

my shepherd;

I

shall not

want. '"23
An invigorated and enlarged Committee on Cooperation

With Community Leaders reflected the NAM 's commitment to
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co.„un.ty-level action. The
..M boosted the sx.e
of the
co^^ittee fro„ 250 to 2,000
leading
industrialists xn

hundreds of c.ties and towns.

These business leaders
.or.ed
local tas. forces devoted
to reshaping public
opinion.
The
NAM'S expanded co^.unity
program featured „ore town
meetings
places like Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, Houston, Texas
Colu.bus, Georgia, and Lakewood,
Ohxo, and an rntensified
industry leaders program, with
four instead of two tea.s
of
experts in the field.

Begrnnrng in 1949, Tru.an's
legislative proposals in the
fields of agriculture, housing,
and health brought a special
urgency to NAM's warnings about
state interference in
economy.
The Davenport, Iowa, speakers
bureau presented a
panel discussion on "What Price
Security?" before the YMCA
Men's Club of that city.
As a direct result, the club went
on record with a resolution "opposed
to any legislation
which subsidizes government in business
or which is designed
to reapportion the wealth of the nation
for the benefit of
special interest groups." The national
YMCA then sent this

resolution to over 300 YMCA's Men's Clubs throughout
the
United States. in Lakewood, Ohio, the NAM town
meeting
kicked off a "Free Enterprise Week," during which
citizens
"were given many evidences of the blessings of the
system to

community and nation. "^^
In early

1

95 0, the

NAM launched one of its most suc-

cessful community relations efforts in the Southern states,

partially in response to the CIO's Operation Dixie, the last
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-:o.

ef.o.t to o.,an..e.
Sout.e.n wc.e.s
..e p.o,.a.
wh.c. ca.e to .e calle.
the "HoanoKe Plan"
afte. the c.ty
^ts or.g.ns, was a
sustained year-long
integrated pubUc
relations ca.pa.gn that brought
together tested co..un.ty
relations techniques with the
goal of reaching every
segment
Of society.
early January I950,
several business organizations, aided by NAM staff,
for.ed the Roanaxe American
Way
Of Life Co^.ittee which
plunged into a February
through
November schedule of weekly
activities to create economic
understanding throughout the area.
An industry Leaders
workshop opened the schedule and
was followed closely by the
organization of a Speakers Bureau,
which heavily promoted
its offerings among civic clubs.
Next, came a five week
radio round-table of business and
economic problems. April
and May were Economic Education
Months featuring a Town Hall
Meeting, the distribution of NAM
pamphlets and posters to
schools, and the showing of NAM films
to schools and
colleges.
During May the close relationship between
community relations and company consciousness
became clear as
the Roanake Plan moved into factories,
offering NAM-run

-

L

.

m

Employer-Employee Communications Clinics.
The Roanoke Plan gathered momentum through the
summer.

June was Church Month with

a

luncheon for the city's clergy-

men, plant tours and film showings in the churches and an
introduction of the NAM 's journal Trends

.

July and August

brought an industrial exhibit and more radio programs.
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The

A.e..can Way of .,,e
Co...ttee also p.ov..e.
,U.s to ,out.
summer camps including the
boy

gin

scouts.

W.nd.ng up .n the fall, the
Committee targeted schools
in early September, the
Committee sponsored a
Bus.ness-

Industry-Bducation Day,

new program developed
by the ...
and the Chamber of Commerce.
On BIE day
a

schools closed

whUe

teachers toured local plants
and learned at luncheons
or
dinners about the part that
business played xn the
welfare
Of their community.
October was School and
College Month,
dur.ng whxch local businessmen
participated xn vocational
guidance forums and spoke to
local Roanoke college
students
about national economic and
social
trends.

The year's

program climaxed in November, the
"Thanks for Freedommonth, with community-wide meetings,
newspaper, radio,

church activities and special
school assemblies with
business speakers. The program ended
with

"Thanks for

Freedom Sunday" in all Roanake churches
on November 26.27
Throughout the campaign, the Commitee

reported on the

campaign's impact.

in May,

for example, it asserted:

"Roanoke people are talking to their fellow
Americans about
the values of freedom and the American way
of life. They
are taking to them direct— where they work,
where they
play,

where they worship and where they are educated."

People were "talking to them in such terms that they
can
understand what free enterprise means to them personally,
to
their families and to the future of America." The Rcanoke
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Plan was such

a

success the NAM used i-h.
the campaign in
sixteen

other Southern cities. ^8

Few groups could match
the NAM's efforts
to bolster
bus.ness leadership and
shape public op.n.on
at the local
level, but other business
groups came to understand
the
..portance of community relations.
The Chamber of Commerce,
Which after the retirement
of Erxc .ohnston from
the presidency in 1946, drifted bac.
towards economic and social
policies Closer to the NAM's,
also strongly advocated
the
expansion of localized business
public relations,
1949,
the Chamber began its
"American Opportunity Program,"
and
later followed it with "Explaining
Your Business." These
programs provided training, resources,
and plans

m

to local

chambers for community relations
campaigns.
its affiliates
also often cooperated in the
programs developed by the NAM.
Then, in 1954, the Chamber of
Commerce began promoting

Economic Discussion Groups.

These groups,

like the NAM's

earlier Industry Leaders Conferences
aimed at developing
"articulate, persuasive spokesmen" for
business.
Between
1955 and 1960, fifteen hundred groups of
businessmen,

organized by individual companies like Caterpillar,
Eastman
Kodak, or Alcoa or by local chambers, met weekly
for eighteen weeks to discuss economic problems using
materials
supplied by the Chamber of Commerce.

After executives from

his company participated in one such group,

E.R.

Lehmann,

vice president for industrial relations for West Point Manu-

facturing Company of Georgia, concluded that the program was
327

•-re tnan

an

unseUisn patriotic .esture."

.,3

..a

weU-

Planned approach to the
solution of a very real
prohl em
facing business and industry."
Lehman felt that it
was to
the advantage of every
businessman "to .now and
to let'rrbe
known that our system is
the best for

all-and why."29

Other employer groups
believed they could
promote their
free enterprise vision
more effectively xf
organized independently of established business
organizations.

m

the

immediate post-war years, many
of these groups were
particularly effective in pushing
anti-communism and linking it
to any ideas that business
could define as subversive.
1947, for instance, the New Jersey
Manufacturers Association
quietly formed "The Work and Unity
Group," then denied any
connection with it. Believing that
Communist cells were

m

burrowing throughout the country
spreading "poisonous misinformation," the Group vowed to "fight
fire with fire."
Consequently, local businessmen formed
"cells" at private

luncheons to provide an antidote to
left-wing ideas.
Manufacturers Association director Robert W.
Watt explained
that his organization was working underground
"to set off a

chain reaction of public opinion."

The group sponsored

meetings before church, consumer, and veterans
groups, provided speaker kits, and passed out 50,000 copies
of a

pamphlet called Free Men or Slaves

,

which denounced

government planning and excess profit taxes.
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Similarly,

1347 Syracuse, .e„ .or.,
businessmen
.,e Cit..en-s Poun.at.on
.o avo.. .e.n,
.a.elea „i.,
any name the public
was familiar with.
with " Financial
p,
support
came from such businessmen
as Cloud Wampier
of carrier
corporation, but the Foundation
asserted that it
represented
•public spirited citizens,.,
rather than employers.
These
citizens were appalled by
the ..apathy, of the
general public
about What they believed
were fundamental American
economic,
social, and spiritual values.
The Citizen's

-™ea

Foundation

devoted itself to defending
the country's freedom-economic,
political, and moral-which
was slipping away in
..return for
promises of a life of less
personal responsibility...
its
active enemies were ..fhe
communists, their allies and
their

dupes;., its

passive enemies were '.ignorance
and indifference...31
working behind the scenes, the
Foundation's AntiSubversive Committee defended its
definition of political

freedom by orchestrating attacks
on Syracuse labor and
liberalism.
During 1948, it stopped the proposed
broadcast
of ..communist-front., programs on
a local radio station and

exposed the .'misuse and abuse.' of the
names of
prominent Syracuse citizens in connection
with
Wallace campaign meeting.
it distributed

'.The

a score of
a Henry

Red Package,.,

folder explaining the evils of Communism
to 50,000
workers. Finally, in a campaign tarring the
International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers as
subversive, the
a

Foundation convinced Precision Casting Company workers
to
reject unionism altogether. ^2
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In the wake of
Truman's

1

948 victorv
k
victory, business
leaders
•

forced ot.e. non-part.san..
cc.unity o.ganxzat.ons
with
even ™ore expUct political
goals,
within
a yea.,

bus-

inessmen organized "Forward
Hamilton" in Hsmi,.
Hamilton, Ohio, and
the American Guard
Anderson, indiania, to
promote public
understanding of the economic
system and bolster their

m

poli-

tical effectiveness.

Both also tapped increasing
community
anxiety over communism.
Forward Hamilton, quietly
financed
by General Motors, Ford, the
Lima Hamilton Company and
Champion Coated Paper Company,
took credit for defeating
mayor Eddie Beckett, a UAW member,
and restoring business
dominance to the city council.
it poured 20,000 dollars
into the city election, trumpeting
its free enterprise
message with car cards, radio time
and an intricate network
of small meetings.
The Indianapolis News reported
that the
American Guard, organized about the
same time as Forward
Hamilton, operated with a budget of
590,000, much of which
was supplied by General Motors. The
initial impetus behind
this "educational movement" was organizing
community opposition to a proposed liberal state unemployment
compensation
bill. 3 3

The Guard claimed to be a "non-partisan
patriotic

group" formed to "obtain good government and
worthy office

holders by education of the voter."

According to Charles

Harbaugh, who resigned as manager of the Anderson
Chamber of

Commerce to take charge of the Guard at
a year,

a

organizers initially met secretly.
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salary of $15,000
They feared that

•as businesss^en
they woul. ,ust .e
-s.tt.n, .uc.s' ,or

those ,a.or people who
f.,„e that any businessman
or capitalist is against us..
By late »4S, the
^„er.can Cuar. „as
on the ai. with two raaio
programs a wee., .hey
also too.
their message, which
mxxed attacks on socialism
with a
defense of business, to
churches, school children
and civic
betterment groups.
individual firms shared the
concern about their relations with local communities.
1946 and 1947 surveys of
its readers Public Relations
gews found evidence of
growing
interest in the "grassroots
approach to PR." companies
pulled back from million-dollar
industry-wide programs
designed to "play tunes on the
minds of 141,000,000 people"
in favor of going directly
to the community.

m

indeed,

77

percent were committed to
Lo inore^oin^
increasing their community relations budgets for 1948.-'5
For many of these firms, the
immediate impetus for
action was "the continuing threat
to Free Enterprise in our
country, the growth of ideas leading
to the Welfare State,

creeping Collectivism and

a

continuation of high taxes."

Shortly after witnessing community
leaders support their
workers during the 1946 strike wave, Allegheny
Ludlum Steel
Company and General Electric woke up to the
importance of

community opinion.

Allegheny Ludlum Steel Company attempted

immediate repairs to its reputation by conducting
an intensive two-week campaign which included meetings
between the
entire executive staff of the company and the local
"opinion
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-eat.n, people"
.ents toutin, the

m

all

.3 well as a se.ies

ccpan^s

pa,e adve^.^se-

cont.i.utions to the
co....ity

the local papers.

Labor's growing stature
xn the communxty
and xn the
Plant, combined with the
Democratxc Party's
194B vxctory

encouraged companies to devote
ever greater resources
to
economxc and polxtxcal education.

..erxca's entrance xnto

the Korean War xn 1950 only
added to their efforts.

attendant economic dislocatxon,
including
tion, meshed wxth surging
anxxety

a

The

return of infla-

over the "communist

menace" to make busxness leaders
even "more fully aware of
the importance of telling the
free enterprxse story."37
Eisenhower's election in 1952 removed
some of the
urgency from the business community's
campaign to sell the
free enterprise system to its
neighbors. Alarmists nevertheless remained; in early 1953,
for instance, Public Relations Journal reminded employers
that the "long, hard battle
against socialism was all but lost by
business' neglect of
its public relations opportunities
and obligations for many
years prior to the depression and for a long
time after
that."

It warned that if business slackened
"in its well-

organized efforts to keep the public informed,
nothing

better can be expected than

a

swing again to the left--for

the forces of bureaucracy and socialism are
forever at

and they are masters of propaganda. "^^

it—

But in general,

business message in the community was less hysterical by
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the

mid-decade.

However, business interest
-Liicerest

.n
m

community rela-

tions, albeit in a
slightlyy different
uxrrerent form, continued
to
g.ow.
one 1955 survey revealed
that seventy percent
of
companies
designated an executive
in charge of plant
community relations. ^9

II

The

fUp

side of the aggressive
selUng of the free
enterprise system was a community
relations strategy emphasizing rn a more positive way
the need to create a more

sympathetic polrtrcal and economic
environment for business.
Obviously, company involvement
in communities was not
new to
the mid-twentieth century;
from the
earliest mill villages

business had been intimately linked
to the communities that
produced its goods and services.
what ai st inguished the
post-war corporate community relation
programs was the
"degree of conscious commitment,
initiative, organization
and sophistication which companies
were now prepared to pour
into them.""^*^
Industry's program to become

a

good neighbor looked

very much like the campaigns to build
company consciousness
within the plant among workers. One part, the
equivalent of
welfare capitalism, consisted of philanthropic
and welfare

activities that provided tangible evidence of company

concern for the community.

A second part, akin to human

relations, emphasized the importance of direct communication

with the public.

"We must" declared Frank W. Abrams,
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Of t.e

^

Board Of ..ustees,

touch With our

feuow

.en.

..reestaMish the oo..on

we ™ust reappear
in the role of

war™-hearted hu.an bein.s-wh.ch
rs what we are."
couia .raw upon the reservoir
of
,00.

wUl

companies

ana un.erstanain,

generated by effective co^.unity
relations to reestablish,
xn Abra.s words, '.genuine
public acceptance" of
the business
community's economic leadership. ^ 1
A wide range of companies
participated in this drive to
improve community relations.
There rs no simple formula
to
predict which firms would develop
community programs. Union
as well as non-union, large
and small, single and multiplant companies practiced community
relations.
shortly
after the war, for instance,
Bigelow-Sanf ord Carpet Company,
Keystone steel and Wire, Ford Motor
Company, International
Harvester, General Foods, and General
Electric, to name but
a few, organized community
relations departments or embarked
upon their first planned community
relations program. ^2

Commitment to human relations within the plant
was
certainly one factor. Companies developing

human relations

programs saw community relations as an extension
of their
inplant communications and welfare activities,
in 1948,

International Harvester chairman John

L.

McCaffery advised

one works manager that "our community relations are
important not only from the standpoint of good public
relations

but also from the standpoint of good industrial relations
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within the plant.

The general attitude
cicLXTiuae of the
community
colors ana helps to shape
the attitude of
e.plo.es themselves towards us...
Employers U.e MoCaffery
sought to
recapture the sense of
identification and common
interest
that they believed business
used to share with
its employees
and Its neighbors.

company size and plant location
were faotors determining level of commitment to
community
relations.

Large

multi-plant firms created programs
hoping to alleviate
hostility Which they feared
existed towards "foreign
owned"
branch plants.
General Foods
found that the "bugbear" of

absentee ownership was the attitude
of local people who felt
that "outfits like ours are big,
remote, impersonal moneymaking machines that take all they
can from the community,
care little about the individual
worker's wellbeing,
and

less about the community welfare.'

A 1953 Bureau of

National Affairs survey also found that
the level of company
community activity varied with the size of
the community.
While both large and small firms (large
defined
as over

1,000 employees) were likely to develop full-scale
programs
in mid-size or small cities, generally
only large companies

with greater resources operated community relations
programs
in metropolitan areas.

Small firms doubted their ability to

have an impact in large cities like New York or
Chicago. '^^
The new concern with human and public relations contri-

buted to

a

growing interest in the decentralization of

production away from major industrial cities like Detroit.
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Many employers believed that
dispersing plants among
smaller
communit.es would increase their
ability to
influence what

both workers and the public
thought about American
business,
in 1946, Factory pointed
out that factory
decentralization

promised to solve not only
production and distribution
problems but also industry's social
problems.

People xn

smaller centers were "closer to
realities and understand
that they cannot have what they
do not produce."
But many
companies further hedged their bets
by locating in

southern

and western states where unions had
yet to make any
headway
so fundamental was the concept
of integrating company

into community to some firms that it
affected the appearance
of the factory itself.
Believing that unsightly plants
might irritate neighbors, firms like Bethlehem
Steel and the
Borden Company began extensive programs of
landscaping and
beautif ication.
The Bournville Works of Cadbury Brothers
Ltd claimed to have created a "suburban landscape"
around
Its factory

with "masses of crocuses, daffodils and

flowering trees" that not only lent color to the immediate
surrounding of the plant but also made "the grounds one of
the beauty spots of the community."

Many companies, parti-

cularly when building near residential areas, designed new
plants so that they blended into the surrounding landscape
and architectural patterns.

The streamlined look of the

factories of the fifties was part of this effort to create
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Within the co™™unity

a

industry.

„o.e visuaUy pi.as..,
..a,e of

companies often attempted
to cu„y p,,Uc
favor by
providing services ana
g.fts directly to the
co^.unity
Ansu: Che.ical Company's
co^.un.ty

program, .e,un shortly

after World War IX, for
instance, featured
emergency rescue squad, trained,

a

volunteer

equipped and operated at

company expense,

yale and Towne Manufacturing
Company .ade
Its auditorium available
to Stamford civic
groups for
meetings, similarly Caterpillar
Tractor Company of Peor.a,
Illinois, loaned xts trucks
to the city for clean-up
drives
and to the Post Office to
assist in the department's

Christmas

rush."^"^

Business routinely won friends
by supporting local
recreation programs.
Many companies gave or leased
at

nominal charge park land to local
communities.
Peerless Woolen Mills of Rossville,

m

a

1949, the

Georgia, the town's

leading industry, began

a

project to build an eight thousand

seat stadium, Softball and baseball
fields,
a

a

running track,

field house and other sports facilities
for use by the

community as well as company employees.

Dow Chemical

Company also generated goodwill by opening
its facilities
and programs for use by the community.
The West
Point

Manufacturing Company of Alabama made "itself
responsible
for the reacreational activities and general
welfare of the

25,000 inhabitant of the area,

known as 'The Valley.'"

it

provided lighted playing fields, swimming pools, gymnasiums.
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tenn.s courts, and croquet
laws, in addition
to other
located

Programs for children built
good will with the
local
communities of the present and
of the future.

actors advised management
"Kids,- it contended,

m

1946,

to learn more about
chrldrel.

the biggest common
denominator of
community Ufe." Nearly everything
revolves around the
community's kids." Local industry
would do well to get
into the orbit if for no other
reason than "today's kids are
.'are

tomorrow's workers
ijvtixb. "^^

Hp
n
u
uesiring
to become
more closely
=; i

t-

-<

rr

allied with the community's life,
companies initiated
recreation programs for local children.
The Wyandotte
Chemicals Corporation conducted a sports
program
that

offered basketball, volleyball, wrestling,
boxxng, tumbling,
weight lifting and gymnastics in its
gymnasium at Wyandotte,
Michigan.
Companies like General Electric, Olin Industries,
Motorola, and North American Aviation, among
many others,
became closely associated with the developing
youth sports

movement in the areas of baseball, basketball, football,
and
soccer.

in 1947,

United States Rubber Company stepped into

the Little League baseball picture, promoting
the activity

nationwide and picking up the cost of the annual World
Series in Wi 1 1 iamsport

,

Pennsy 1 vania.

Social programs also encouraged children and their

families to identify with companies.
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in 1950, a Bloomfield,

—

Westin,hou.e plant, .ou,.t
..,i.,e. acceptance of
tne company as one of
the co^.unxty's
good neighbors" by
running a Teen Canteen
with dancing, ga„es
and free
refresh.ents.51
^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^
and the Al Us-chal.ers
Manufacturing Company,

-

located in

miwau.ee, Wisconsin, each began
sponsoring post-pro.
parties for area high school
students, treating the.
to a
midnight supper, professional
entertaxn.ent and dancing 52
Raybestos-Manhattan, inc. "carved a
solid niche in the town
Of Stratford," Connecticut,
when in 1947 it for.ed the
Knot

Hole Gang, a club for all
children in the neighborhood
of
its plant. The club .et three
ti.es a week under the supervision of volunteer workers from
Raybestos.
The company
also sponsored a Sea Scouts
program and eight Little League
teams, complete with special
field, uniforms, and a banquet
at the end of the season featuring
a major league ball
player as the principal speaker. 5^

Participation in a broad range of community
affairs was
another important avenue to community
acceptance of business
and its values. Companies encouraged
their employees, both
rank and file and managerial, to become
involved in the

community's civic, service, fraternal, professional,
and
social organizations.
General Electric maintained
a

file of

employees active in civic projects which enabled supervisors
to personally congratulate workers on their
accomplishments.
In some firms, leadership of community organizations
was

seen as a prerequisite for professional advancement.
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Key-

stone steel and Wire of
Peor.a, ilUnois,
expeoted its
Dunior executives to ta.e
an active role with
local
groups.54
^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
..nportance of Keystone's
actrvrty.
i„
,,,,,

zatxons, company representative
became better acquainted
with the communrty-s "thought
leaders," doctors, clergy
merchants, educators and others.
The Institute claimed
'that
through the resulting friendships
"much of the mystery about
What goes on within the walls
of the company plant will
gradually be dispelled. More
importantly, these people will
become missionaries for the company
in the community."55

Companies expected their senior
executives to sit on
the governing boards of community
agencies.

Business repre-

sentation on these boards was hardly
unique to the period
after World War II. Local business
leaders as individual
philanthropists always had been the major
force in private
welfare activities. During the twenties,
however, participation shifted from individuals to corporate
representatives
acting as officials of the company.
in the post-war decade,
this practice increased in the face of labor's
challenge.

Represention on policy making boards ensured decision
making
congenial to business interests and served as a device
for
changing attitudes in the community towards business. ^6
Fund raising provided corporations with a means to

acquire greater influence over voluntary agencies while
increasing their community prestige.
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During and after World

war II, corporate giv.ng
expanded dra.atroally.
Crvxng rose
fro. .35% Of profits .n
1941 to 1.08. .n 1960.
ooUar.
thxs represented a ^u.p fro.
5239 ..llion to 5555
million .n
the decade after 1948. in
part this was a result
of warborn profits and tax incentives,
but aesxre for an
improved
public image was also an important
factor.57
corporations,
like unions, had played a ma,
or part xn the National

m

War

Fund and were drawn into the fund
raising drives of the
community Chest and other voluntary

social welfare agencies.

Facing multiple appeals, in the
late forties, com.panies Irke
Ford and U.S. Steel began promoting
United
Fund drives.

Despite some labor participation,
businessmen felt these
drives consolidated the giving process
and provided even
greater opportunity for business control.
As these

federated fund raising drives grew larger,
executives representing the largest companies assumed
leadership by

providing both the largest donations and most
of the staffing.

In 1956, Humble Cil Company lent a full-time
staff of

one hundred people to organize the United Fund
drive in

Houston, Texas. 58

Corporations exacted

high levels of support.

a

In most cities, business leaders

overwhelmed labor participation and gained
the allocation process.
"a

price for their

a

larger voice in

Central financing, then, provided

channel for the expression of business interests in the

spending of welfare funds. "^^
Through corporate philanthropy and other welfare activities, companies tried to create the image of themselves as
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benevolent, car.n,, trustworthy
organisations.
They hoped
that tnis positxve ..age
would enhanoe the
seoond part of
their co..unity relations
strategy, that xs
oo..unioating
with the pubUc on economic
and political xssues.
These
cc.un.catron efforts overlapped wrth
those emanating fro.
the national business
organizations like the NAM
and the
Chamber of Commerce. with the
encouragement of these
organizations, companies attempted
to teach the public about
the economic principles of the
free enterprise system, its
superiority, and the necessity for
its preservation.
They
also sought sell the company itself
to the public.

Employers tried to familiarize the
public with the products,
policies, and objectives of the firm,
while also emphasizing
the company's economic support of
the community through
payrolls, taxes, and contributions.

Companies believed that

the payoff from greater public understanding
of business

would result in increased product sales,
improved workforce
recruitment, and favorable treatment from local
governments
on issues like taxes or zoning.
Finally, companies
hoped

they could rely on community support in times of
labor
struggle.

Companies relied on all sorts of media to send
variety of messages into the community.

a

wide

Institutional

advertising surged in the years immediately after World War
II as companies made a concerted effort to sell themselves

and their values to their neighbors.
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In the late 1940s,

.any ads dealt w.th the
specter of spreading
cc.un.s. and
the threats Tru.an's
pcUc.es

posed tc .nd.v.dual
freedom.
General Electr.c advertisements,
for instance,
explained
"the facts about Mdden taxes"
and how "the profit
.otive is
the driving power of our
free socxety." They
also .ade
clear that their opposition to
"compulsory unxonxsm" was
related to what GE decried as
the way "Communxsts seek
to
get and keep control of labor
unions."
During 1950, Locke
inc. of Baltimore sponsored a
series of ads warning readers
that the "cradle-to-grave security"
and the "free medical
service" promised by the government
meant

"socialism-the

end of your individual freedom."^!

The International Nickel

company's Huntington, West Virginia,
campaign avoided
broader political issues in favor of ads
reminding the

public that "your Inco friends and neighbors
help in many
ways to make Huntington a good place to live
in."
Companies
tended to step up advertising just before
elections and

prior to or during strikes as they went to the public
with
their side of the issues.
Other advertisements targeted special audiences.

Pittsburgh steel companies, for example, wooed friends from
the black community with ads in the black press.
1954,

U.S.

During

Steel bought space in the Pittsburgh Courier

,

for

the picture of a black supervisor consulting with an assis-

tant superintendent. Below was the statement:
On the production line, in our mills, or in offices,
or in transportation, quality people, for a quality
product, are our first consideration. Numbered amcnc
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^

great tea. dedicated to
'
the TeVvTcVo'f
T:e'n"ti°on
Earlier that year. Republic
steel pra.sed "Negro
Progress"
.n an ad stating ..Greater
Safety and better working
conditions ..ean increased security
for Republics
68,000

employees, thousands of whom
are Negroes...
The company
then pledged its "continued
suDoort
h^i
support in helping
you continue
to progress. "^^

m

•

increasingly, radio and later
television carried the
business message to the community.
Local business associations used radio to showcase
industry,
Wisconsin during
the late forties, "The Cavalcade
of Racine Industry" radio
program dramatized "the history and
romantic growth" of
local industry, while the Oshkosh
Associated Industries'
"Wings of Industry" brought "industry
right into the home."
Eacn program focused on a member firm,
beginning with a
description of the company, the investment
required for each
employee, and details of plant growth and
sales volume. An
interview with workers taped "right on the job"
created a

m

first hand view of the part played by industry
in community
life.

According to one employer, the show demonstrated that

"what is good for business is good for everybody. "^

Individual firms found radio an effective community

relations tool.

Some,

like The Ger ity-Michigan Corporation,

simply used radio spot commercials to sell free enterprise.
Others associated the company with popular community activities.

Armco Steel and The Gardner Board and Carton Company
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broadcast high school football and
basketball games, using
the commercial time to explain what
the problems, accomplishments, and contributions of industry
meant to community
welfare.65 ^^^ms also inagurated weekly
or even daily
radio

programs in

a

variety of formats to help integrate
the

company into the community.
pany's,

Keystone Steel

&

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Com-

wire Company's, and the Mooresville

Mills' programs intersperced the sounds, voices,
and news of
the plant with public announcements of forthcoming
community
activities. In 1948, Armstrong Cork launched

a

program which

soon reached three of every four listeners in the Lancaster,

Pennsylvania, region.

It mixed company reports with musical

entertainment, featuring company employees as well as professionals.

In the mid fifties. Caterpillar company moved

into television with a weekly half-hour Sunday night news,

weather and sports program that carried messages about the
firm instead of product commercials.

Timken-Roller Bearing

was probably the most ambitious company in the media field,

blanketing Ohio with five radio programs.

Some forms of company communication were similar to

mechanisms used in the in-plant human relations programs.
Two Nebraska firms, the Kelly Ryan Equipment Company and the
Formfit Company, used stunts, like paying employees in
smaller cities and towns with silver dollars.

These dollars

then circulated am.ong local businesses dramatizing the

economic impact of company payrolls.
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Companies also used

plant tours and open houses to
educate the community and
humanize the factory. Even before
World War li, some companies had a tradition of opening
their doors and displaying
their products to the public. After
the war the number of
firms offering tours skyrocketed.
Opinion Research Corporation reported that among the companies
it surveyed the

number sponsoring tours increased from
twenty-six percent to
seventy percent between 1948 and 1950.
Companies widely
advertised their open houses and attracted the
public with
promises of child care, refreshments, and souvenirs.
Attendance at some of these events testifies to their
popularity.
In a single day, the Youngstown, Ohio, plants of the

Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation and the Lynn General

Electric plant each attracted 30,000 visitors.
open house conducted by the

S.D.

A three day

Warren Company, employing

2,800 workers manufacturing paper, brought 14,000 visitors
to Westbrook,

Maine, a town of 12,000.^^

Unlike prewar tours that concentrated primarily cn
technology, post war open houses stressed ideas.

A.

D.

LeMonte, of the Mullins Manufacturing Corporation, advised

a

1949 conference of public relations executives that "the

modern open house

.

.

.

actively, not passively, attempts to

create opinions or develop action that eventually, will

profit the company that's paying the bill."

S.C.

Allyn of

National Cash Register was more blunt about corporate objectives.

The goal was to "indoctrinate citizens with the

capitalist story."

He asserted that "experience shows that
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people are eager to go through factories;
that when they are
taken through and given an indoctrination
in the sociology
of the industrial system, they are able to
play
back the

story with remarkable fidelity. "^^

Tnese new "interpretive-

public tours overlapped with those targeted at
employee
audiences, teaching the same kinds of lessons.

The goal was

to show plants as working models of capitalism and to
point

out benefits flowing to people from the free market system.

Exhibits, signs, films, and handouts addressed "misconcep-

tions" about profits and wages or the relationship of

machinery to jobs and prcducti vity ."^^
Following the business associations, individual
companies appreciated the role of community leaders or
"opinion molders" played in shaping ideas.

They sent copies

of plant papers or special newsletters to business, educa-

tion,

club and church leaders.

included over 6000 names.

Caterpillar's mailing list

Noting that "barber shops were

the idea crossroads of America," in 1950 Caterpillar began

inviting Peoria barbers to special plant tours, lunches, and

discussions to ensure that they could "talk factually about
the company and its policies."

Other firms sponsored

special open houses for teachers, clergy,

and doctors. 7

General Electric, Johnson and Johnson, and Republic Steel

established speakers bureaus that addressed the gatherings
of these professionals as well as other groups.

Over a

three year period Republic Steel representatives made 3,000
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talks to an audience of more that
one-quarter of
people

a

million

•

The occasions that brought together
all aspects of

corporate community relations were the
ceremonies attendant
to the opening of new plants or company
anniversaries.
These events symbolized the mutuality of
factory and community.
In 1950, Wichita, Kansas, designated
a "Coleman
week" with activities honoring Coleman Company's
fifth anniversary and the founder's eightieth birthday.
Bigelow-

Sanford Carpet Company's 125th anniversay began with
special

a

"Influence Group" dinner for 140 leading citizens.

An open nouse attended

by 12,000 visitors capped off the

celebration which, according to the company, demonstrated
"the hign degree of friendship between the company and the

town" and "emphasized the interdependence of the two for

maintaining prosperity in the community.""^
Typical of

a

community wide celebration of

a

new plant

was the dedication in 1952 of the Parker Pen Company plant
in Janesville,

Wisconin.

A Citizens' Planning Committee,

representing business, labor, youth, and women's groups
sponsored the event, while school children participated in

contest naming the factory.

On opening day "factory

whistles tooted" and "church bells

rang."

Finally,

Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation's 1949 celebration
brought together the entire community in the towns of
Dunkirk, New York and West Leechburg, Pennsylvania: schools

declared holidays; mercnants, who had installed street
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a

decoration and window exhibits, closed
shop to permit
employees to attend the event; volunteer
firemen and members
of local civic clubs served as special
traffic police;

women's clubs set up free baby sitting in
churches to care
for children; high school students and other
organizations
presented the company with flowers, and newspapers
printed
special editions in which merchants placed congratulatory

advertising. ^4

Events such as these epitomized the intri-

cate connections between business and the community, parti-

cularly in smaller cities and towns.
The business campaign to emesh itself into local com-

munities attracted the attention of liberals and labor
activists.

As early as 1946,

sociologist Robert

S.

Lynd

cautioned trade unionists about business infiltration at the
grass-roots level.

Lynd observed that the NAM had "suddenly

become vastly solicitous about local people."
that its concern was part of

a

He contended

long-range strategy to syste-

matically capture grass-roots public opinion.

Sympathetic

local comm.unities, Lynd believed, could be manipulated to

provide political support for the people and issue business
favored.

Business leaders sought to establish in every-

body's mind "that 'freedom of initiative' is what America is
all about," and to put labor in the doghouse in public

disesteem up and down the Main Streets of the United
States--and to keep it there."

Of the entire spectrum of

the business community's attempt to reshape political
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culture, Lynd believed that most
dangerous of all was this
movement "to capture-body and breeohes,
mind and

sould-the

local

community."'^^

Trade unionists responded strongly
to the NAM's early
community relations campaign.
1946, Irvine Kerrison

m

the Detroit Teachers' union,

of

charged that "high-powered NAM

speakers" were appearing in the high
schools "expounding
subtle but effective anti-labor and pro-NAM
propaganda."

Particularly after 1946, when the NAM took the
advice of
public relations experts and played down its
sponsorship

of

the local campaign, labor found business propaganda
even

more insidious.

Labor worried that pro-business ideology

might be more persuasive if local people thought
orginated in the community.

it

Thus, the CIO charged that ads

carrying the names of local business firms actually were

prepared by the NAM.

The Guild Reporter published an

expose, which was reprinted by
papers,

a

number of other labor

of the NAM's attempt to "hoodwink" club women with

propaganda.

Through program kits distributed to over 36,000

women's club program directors, the NAM planted anti-labor
speeches,

"ostensibly prepared by women who have standing in

the community as the studied opinion of the speakers."

The

kits. The Gui Id Reporter derisively noted, even suggested

planting people in the audience to ask specific questions
for which the kit provided the answers.

The Harrisburg Central Labor Union issues broader

warnings about NAM underground work.
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It cautioned:

"So

watch out for the new look on big business
propaganda.
out also for phony committees which will

Look

rise in the com-

munity.
a

Pretend to be interested in public welfare
and get

lot of publicity in the daily press.

fooled by the new line.

.

We must not be

.

it must not happen here."^'^

Throughout the fifties, trade unionists worried about
industry's "unending efforts to get people to accept
its

ideas as their own."

Unions warned members about the "pro-

paganda" that poured forth from newspapers in the form of

institutional advertising and editorials.
CIO Vanguard,

for instance,

attacked

a

The Connecticut

series of ads

sponsored by an organization of manufacturers called, Industries of Naugatuck Valley, which charged that the stock-

holder got too little because workers got too much.

The UAW

reacted as strongly to company community economic education
as it did to the inplant education efforts.

In 1955,

it

warned autoworkers of the ways companies used the mass
media.

They used radio and television, often "to sell the

corporation's ideas more than its products."

The UAW

charged that many huge corporations, which sold only to
other companies and not to the public, "now sponsor lengthy,

expensive programs as well as those featuring news analyses
or commentaries."

It was not surprising,

corporation's economic,

then,

that "the

labor and political ideas turned up

on these broadcasts in the form of "comments" or com-

mercial s

7 fi
°
.
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Ill

Industry's community relations clearly
irritiated
labor, but what tangible benefits did business
attain

through its increased attent i veness to community?
the campaign to reshape workers attitudes witliin

As with

shop

tlio

through building company consciousness, ompioyors oLton

difficulty pointing to specific achievements.

h>id

Eaiiy on,

however, some saw an impact in both the political and

economic realms.

In 1950,

the Associated Industries of

Alabama reported to the NAM convention on the aftermath of
its free enterprise communications program.

claimed

Tt

th.it

since the inception oL the campaign, which stressed the

"tremendous federal tax burden corporations are carryin^i,"
there had been no additional taxes levied on industry by the

state legislature.

Ohio business leaders could also link

campaigns like Forward Hamilton to the suprising reelection
of Robert Taft in 1950,

despite heavy labor opposition.

The

business community was also convinced that its efforts

within the community were critical to the election
Eisenhower

7Q
^
.

Especially

m

the area of labor relations, business

expressed satisfaction with its community relations
programs.

Within

a

few years after developing

I

he most

ambitious and wide ranging corporate community relations
programs. General Electric believed that it created

a

much

better understanding among its neighbors of the company's
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aims, policies and objectives.

Proof, according to GE

spokespersons, was the community response
to union strife
1950, 1951 and 1952.
It asserted that community
leaders
urged workers to refrain from striking
and, in the few
places where plants struck. General Electric
claimed "we
found public sentiment in our favor." Unlike

m

1946 "there

were no clergymen in the picket lines.
against

Newspapers did not run stories and editorials

us.

against us.

Most of them knew about our offer and urged the

union to accept it."
"the

real

Merchants did not go

This,

General Electric proclaimed,

pay-off. "^^
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CHAPTER

9

A MATTER OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
By 1956, despite a decade of campaigns designed
to

capture the hearts and minds of workers and their communities, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars on

"economic education" and other public relations, despite

a

veritable flood of words and images extolling the benefits
of American capitalism, business leaders remained uncertain
of the loyalty of ther workers.

To be sure a Republican was

in the White House and the nation's political atmosphere

seemed more conservative.

Moreover, the passage of Taft-

Hartley and the defeat of Operation Dixie had helped stem
the labor movement's growth.

But,

union membership remained

high and the public had yet to view industry as "the symbol
of progress and hope for the majority of people.

Most

importantly, many business conservatives saw in the merger
of the AFL-CIO the specter of

a

labor juggernaut that would

challenge the leadership of business both on the shop floor
and in the halls of Congress.

In January 1956,

Kenneth

R.

Miller of the NAM proclaimed that "one of the gravest
threats to management's right to manage is the vastly

increased size and power of organized labor, now that the
AFL and CIO have merged into one giant organization."
unions, he continued,

Labor

"possess a private power of

unprecedented scope and influence.

The potentials of this

power are in themselves crucial and confront industry as
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well as the country, with problems
of far reaching
signxfrcance."2 it was against this
background that conser
vative business leaders launched yet
another major campaign
to capture public opinion and redraw
the laws governing
labor relations at both the state and
federal
levels.

This

campaign, and labor's response marked
the decade's final
effort by both sides to shape the nation's
understanding of
postwar labor relations. As such it reveals
both the

character and limits of America's postwar
consensus.

There were opposing interpretations of the AFL and
CIO
merger's long term implications.

in December

1

955 as the

two organizations officially united, The iron Age observed
that "labor unity opens

chapter in the American labor

a

movement which will frighten some industrialists and
encourage others."

More moderate business leaders, who

believed that unions had

a

legitimate and important role in

society, predicted the merger would result in more respon-

sible unionism, in

a

decline in jurisdictional strikes, and

in better informed and more creative collective bargaining.

They felt that George Meany, the new head of the AFL-CIO,

was much more conservative than the CIO's Walter Reuther.
Meany, they hoped, would use methods "other than strike and

bombast to make gains for labor."

All this would promote

the moderates' primary industrial relations goal -- stabili-

zing labor-management affairs.
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Political liberals tended to

reinforce this interpretation, emphasizing
that the AFL-CIO
was actually moving away from militancy and
that its

political and economic objectives were quite
limited.

They

dismissed the idea that Reuther's more militant
social
policies would become incorporated into the new
organization-^

While business moderates applauded the merger of the

AFL-CIO as

a

step toward "responsible unionism," business

conservatives, which is to say the majority of American

business leaders, viewed the merger as

a

dangerous threat

which required renewed mobilization by the business community.

To them it was clear that labor unity meant increased

union strength and militancy.

No longer could employers

play the AFL against the CIO.

Conservative employers fore-

saw a major organizing drive, the emergence of labor as the

most powerful political force in the country, and more
effective collective bargaining resulting in increasingly
favorable contracts for labor.

Employers' ever present fear

of union power over the economy and politics was seemingly

on the verge of becoming reality.

In December 1955, NAM

Chairman of the Board Charles Sligh wondered it the AFL-CIO

might not "become

a

ghost government, in which

a

handful of

people not elected, not authorized by the American people

would pull strings behind the scenes to direct the destinies
of

the nation."^
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Much of the popular press reinforced
this interpretation, emphasizing the danger to
the public posed by "big
labor."
News & World Report, for instance,
predicted
that the repercussions of a more
powerful and richer labor
movement would reverberate in a negative
way throughout
society.
Housewives would feel the effects in
increased
living costs.
Taxpayers would "get the impact as the

increasing political power of organized labor
is translated
into Government policies and tax rates."
Finally,

the

nation's youth, would experience greater economic
uncer-

tainty as their work "more and more" conformed to restrictive "union rules and practices."^
As the nation debated the implications of the merger,

the conservative wing of the business community decided to

take action.

The NAM embarked upon a public relations

campaign to expose "the abuses and evils of organized labor"
with the ultimate goal of arousing the public to demand
legislation to curb labor.

Employers wanted passage of

state "right to work" laws designed to weaken labor by

destroying the union shop and

a

national labor act that

toughened Taft Hartley and dealt with the issue of union
monopoly.

The NAM's program focused on publicizing five

areas of "abusive" labor practices.

These included compul-

sory union membership, coercion of employees and employers

through violence, racketeering and other "illegal,
unethical,

and undemocratic activities," "monopolistic

dictation" of labor relations through industry or pattern
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bargaining, work limitations and other
restrictive
practices, and the "misuse" of union
organizations and funds
for political purposes.
In outlining its new program,
the
NAM observed that only an aroused public
opinion could
assure protection against the continuation
and expansion of
these "evils." A public sympathetic to management
would
help strengthen politicians' resistance to labor
coercion,

assist management in dealing with "giant unions,"
and
"oppose illegal and immoral political action of any labor

group or leader."^
"Semantics" were an important part of the business

community's new public relations campaign.

Despite the

publicity associated with the merger, the NAM believed that
the public still tended to view labor as "the underdog."

Employers thus needed to tread carefully for fear of
inadvertently arousing sympathy for their opponents.

To

address this difficulty, the NAM clothed its assault on

unions in

a

disclaimer that it was not anti-union and did

not seek to destroy or undermine organized labor.

Instead,

the NAM claimed that employers simply sought to protect the

values associated with the "American Way of Life."
Indeed,

-J

the business community's attack on labor

consciously drew upon traditional themes embedded in

American political culture such as the danger of monopoly
and the concept of individual rights.

sized that unions had become
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a

First,

the NAM empha-

"labor monopoly" that evinced

no concern for the public's interest.

it charged that the

vast "uncontrolled" economic and political
power of labor,
which made unions capable of "paralyzing
a single plant, an
entire industry, or the country as a whole,"
was evidence of
this monopoly.8
"Today," declared NAM President Ernest
G.
Swigert in 1957, "the greatest concentrations of
political
and economic power in the United States of
America are found
not in the over-regulated, over-criticized, overinvestigated,

and over-taxed business corporation."

Nor were they

present in "their hag-ridden, brow-beaten, publicity-fearful
managers." Instead, monopoly power was to be "found in the

under-regulated, under-criticized, under-investigated, tax-

exempt and specially privileged labor organizations," and in
"their beligerent, aggressive, and

f ar-too-of ten

lawless and

corrupt managers."^
Secondly, employers characterized their drive against

labor as

a

crusade to protect the freedom and the rights of

the individual, which they characterized as the "bulwark and

foundation of the whole American system."

According to

business leaders, unions invariably ignored individuals.

Experience had shown, claimed the NAM, "that as

a

labor

organization and its officials increase in size and power,
the freedom of individuals is correspondingly diminished."

Employers thus argued that their main concern was protecting
the rank and file against exploitation by union leaders, an

emphasis which flowed naturally from employers' use of
-^^
personalized human relations in the factory.
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In Its campaign to create an
atmosphere intolerant of

unions and to win support for new anti-labor
legislation,
business leaders sought to reach the state
and
local

community leaders whom it had been targeting for
almost a
decade.
NAM departments drafted new literature
including
booklets and flyers on "the existing evils and
potential
threat of Big Labor."

They sent them to employers for

distribution to workers and for publication in company

magazines and newspapers, to leaders of women's organizations, to farmers and farm groups, to educators, to politicians,

and to opinion leaders.

One such flyer entitled

"Monopoly is Always Wrong!" showed two tiny workers and an
even smaller employer facing

a

giant AFL-CIO.

It

observed

that laws prevented business monopoly but exempted unions.
This double-standard, it continued, was "directly contrary
to the concept of equal justice under the law."

enabled

a

company or union to impose its will on the public

and the flyer concluded:
tent.

Monopolies

"V\?e,

as a nation, must be consis-

Every instance of monopoly, whatever its source

be stopped in its undemocratic tracks!"

,

must

The NAM also

provided pattern speeches for employers to use at meetings
and on raaio or television, and supplied material to news
and broadcast journalists to ensure that the general public

was "properly informed, alerted and active against the real
and potential threat to the national welf are."-"-
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The NAM believed that one of tne
best ways to signal
the public about the "abuses of monopoly
power by labor
unions" was to throw the "cold light"
of publicity on actual
cases.

It began searching the labor
and general press for

material and also called upon employers
to help provide
steaay flow of reliable "human interest
stories."

a

By 1955

the Employers' Association of Chicago was
already collecting
"documented" case histories and publishing them
in a series
of folders headed "MR AND MRS CITIZEN: IS
THIS AMERICA?" for

distribution to employees and opinion leaders.

"The Heroic

Story of Mrs. Esther Quigley" told of one family's experi-

ence in

a

strike called by

"a

handful of union biggies" to

force "the company to knuckle."

not to let

"a

Quigley,

determined

handful of local union bosses lead 450 people

around by the nose," organized
movement.

Mrs.

a

successful back-to-work

She reported that the experience taught her that

"we working people have a job to do in ridding ourselves of
bad union bosses" and getting "real responsible leaders."
If "our men can't or won't do it" resolved Mrs. Quigley, "I

think it is time we housewives took
and with the help of public opinion,

a

hand.

With more guts

we can do

this."-'-^

In 1955 and 1956, the NAM believed that despite the

publicity about the merger there was not yet enough public

understanding of the implications of union "monopolistic
abuses" to successfully implement

legislation. '^

a

drive for national

But the business community was ready to

proceed at the state level on the issue of "compulsory
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unionism/' feeling that targeted drives
might have success
in particular states.
Hence, the mid-1950s witnessed
a
major business campaign to spread "right-to-work"

legislation in heretofore union states.
II

Right-to-work laws prohibited contract provisions

compelling union membership.

Although the first two right-

to-work laws were passed in 1944, it was really Section 14b
of the Taft-Hartley Act which ceded to states jurisdiction

over union security restrictions.

Thus,

as anti-union

sentiment was on the upswing, states could prohibit the
closed shop, the union shop, and maintenance of membership
agreements.

By 1947,

fourteen states, mostly in the South

and West, possed right-to work laws.

Between 1948 and 1954,

six more states followed, but state labor movements helped

repeal several of these statutes, including ones passed in
the northern states of Delaware and New Hampshire.

Unions

opposed right-to-work because they believed that these laws

were designed simply to weaken the labor movement and drive
down wages.

Trade unionists argued that union security

provisions provided

a

"sound basis for a collective-

bargaining relationship that benefits both workers and
employers."

Moreover,

they asserted, non-closed shop

relations bred suspicion and created constant conflict

between the union and the employer and union members and
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non-unionists.

Such conditions made it difficult
for

organized labor to grow and prosper.
Prior to 1954, most of the activity
surrounding rightto-work took place at the local level in states
with weak
laDor movements; there was little national
debate over the
issue.

However, interest increased in 1954 as local
employer

organizations helped enact legislation in three states.

In

1955, impressed with their success but fearing a labor counter

attack, the NAM, the Chamber of Commerce, and the newly

formed National Right to Work Committee began coordinated
national educational campaigns to assist local employers

promote or defend right-to-work.

When Louisiana and

Washington unionists succeeded in "repealing and repelling
union security provisions" in 1956, these national organizations

redoubled their

efforts.-'-^

Conservative national business organizations sought to
shape the debate over right-to-work.

Business leaders

asserted that they had little personal interest in the issue
but were concerned with protecting the public interest and
the moral right of the individual to choose.

The question

was simply one of personal freedom versus force and compulsion.

It was "an American tradition" asserted a Chamber of

Commerce spokesman, "that no person should be forced to
support opinions and policies with which he disagrees."
1957, NAM Board Chair Cola

bluntly:

G.

Parker put it even more

"compulsory unionism is

American justice;

a

a

blight on the spirit of

skeleton in freedom's closet. "^^
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In

Not

only did union security clauses attack
individual rights;
they directly contributed to the concentration
of power in
the hands of union officials.
Here employers played on the

popular fear of labor's "bigness." Employers argued
that
"compulsory unionism" increased the chance of corruption
since the membership was

captive audience and worker

a

allegiance did not have to be earned.

The NAM believed that

by emphasizing corruption and the union boss's

"domination

over the individual member," union security would "not be

tolerated by many of the American public. "'
While the The National Association of Manufacturers,
the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Right to Work

Committee did not directly participate in internal state
legislative battles, they provided financial support,
advice,

and educational materials to the companies and state

affiliates involved in campaigns.

As a way of providing

more generalized assistance, the NAM tried to publicize the
issue.

It encouraged national organizations like the Bar

Association, the American Legion, and the Daughters of the

American Revolution to take

a

stand on right-to-work and

attempted to interest national magazines and newspaper
chains in exploring the impact of the issue.

Regional

offices of the NAM encouraged company communications to

employees and the association sent right-to-work kits to
1 8
schools throughout the country.
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seeking support for their attacks on union
security,
employers focused especially on the religious
community.
The clergy had assumed a particularly
prominent
role

debate over right-to- work.
touched off

a

m

the

The 1954 struggles on the issue

discussion that continued for some years

thereafter in the religious press.

Numerous religious

leaders from all three major faiths came out against the
statutes, fewer in support.

Stung by the their stand, the

NAM cited the "recent interest taken by the clergy" as an

important reason for national business organizations to give
"full-scale attention" to the right-to-work drive.
Of the three major faiths. Catholic clergymen were

loudest and most persistent in their opposition to laws

banning union security.

The Church itself did not adopt an

official position with regard to right-to-work legislation.
But,

since the 1920s, the Catholic Church had forged strong

ties to the labor movement.

Citing Catholic social

doctrine, the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC),
the coordinating agency of the bishops on secular problems,

had spoken out on labor's side in most controversial
issues. ^'^

Monsignor George

C.

Higgins and Father John

'

F.

Cronin, directors of the Social Action Department of the

NCWC made clear their personal opposition to right-to- work
on the grounds that such laws were contrary to the Christian

principle of social justice.

The "net effect of these laws

would be very bad for the cause of peaceful and orderly
21
industrial relations in the United States," they argued.
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A host of other priests joined in denoucing
right-to-

work.

Archbishop Henry

J.

O'Brien of Hartford,

flatly rejected the claim "that

a

Connecticut,

fundamental right of the

individual is invaded if he must join

a

union."

He argued

that "it is neither immoral nor unethical to require union

membership for the greater common good of the group."
our modern and complex society, O'Brien continued,

in

"everyone

is subject to prohibitions and rstraints, as well as to

mandatory rules of conduct based on the common good of the
An editorial in the Catholic paper,

group."

Register

,

St^ Louis

stated plainly that it was the "constant and clear

teaching" of the Catholic church that workers had
right to organize.

According to Father William

natural

a

J.

Smith in

his La Crosse Register column, those advocating right-to-

work only pretended to be concerned with protecting individual workers;

their real aim was "to destroy unions, or

at least to weaken them to a point tantamount to destruction."

He and other Catholic writers saw right-to-work as

introducing chaos into "what should be an ordered economy"
by creating strife and suspicion among workers and between

labor and management. 2 2

Unions were greatly encouraged by the support of many

Catholic clergy as well as other religious leaders.

In

their attacks on right-to-work, they regularly turned for

justification to the higher authority of the Church.
1955,

In

when Maryland was considering open-shop legislation,
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the International Association of Machinsts
sent each legis-

lator a booklet containing moral studies of
right-to- work

laws by Father William

J.

Kelley, Rabbi Israel Goldstein,

and the Reverend Dr. Walter

G.

Muelder.

Federation of Labor also sponsored

William

J.

a

The Baltimore

rally at which Father

Kelley was the principal speaker, and distributed

recordings of his speech throughout the state.

Unions paid

close attention to the discussion in the religious press and
sought to quietly bolster their supporters.

The Steel-

workers, for instance, provided Father Jerome Toner, author
of an anti-right-to-work study. The Closed Shop

information for his study.

In another case,

,

with

Steelworker

officials, concerned that the strongest argument for the

union shop be crafted for

a

debate to be published in

a

1957

issue of The Homi letic and Pastoral Revie w, interceded witn

Monsignor Higgins to ensure the engagement of the most
"competent theologian with

thorough social and economic

a

background ."2 3
The National Association of Manufacturers also sought
to influence the clergy on the question of right-to-work.
It widely distributed a pamphlet entitled "Ethics,

Economics, and the Church."

The pamphlet, which quoted an

1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, brought a sharp rebuke

from some it was supposed to influence.
J.

Lally,

editor of the Pilot,

a

Monsignor Francis

Boston Catholic weekly

paper, called it "a totally absurd piece of propaganda."

went on to say, "it is almost unbel ieveable that serious
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entitled The Case for Right-to- Work Laws

^

a Defense of

Voluntary Unionism which sought "to correct
the impression
that American Catholics are unanimously
opposed"
to such

legislation on moral grounds.

Prior to publication, NAM

manager Noel Sargent had met with Keller at Notre Dame
for
the "purpose of reviewing various economic questions in

which industry is interested, especially Guaranteed Annual

Wage and Right to Work."^^
Protestants tended to be somewhat more tentative than

Catholics on riyht-to-work.

Indeed,

journal. The Christian Century

,

the liberal Protestant

repeatedly chided the

National Council of Churches for failing to take
In the mid-fifties,

a

stand.

conservative business leaders seemed to

carry more weight with Protestant clerics than with Catholics.

Ironically,

the Federal Council of Churches, the

organizational predecessor of the National Council,
since its formation in

1

liad,

908, been a voice of support for

labor and social reform.^'''

In 1950,

however, as the FCC

merged with other ecumenical organizations to become the
NCC,

part,

it began moving in a more conservative direction.

this reflected the influence of

a

group of conserva-

tive business leaders who had been invited to join
Committee.

in

a

Lay

In the Council's eyes the primary function of

the Lay Committee was to raise funds, but businessmen like
J.

Howard Pew of Sun Oil, Charles Hook of Armco, and Henning

W.

Prentis of Armstrong Cork viewed the Lay Committee as an

opportunity to reshape the NCC.
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Liberals and moderate

business leaders, liKe lawyer Charles
and,

after

P.

Taft, opposed Pew

five year struggle, the Council
disbanded tne
Lay Committee. However, some of its
members, who nad been
appointed to the General Board of the NCC,
remained active
and influential in that decision making
body. 28
a

Still, conservative business leaders had
little in-

fluence over the activities of the Department
of Church and
Economic Life, which was part of the NCC's Division
of

Christian Life and Work.

The Department had been one of the

strongest proponents of liberalism within Protestanism.
the late

1

In

940s, the Department had conducted a study of the

ethical issues of labor-management relations, resulting in

a

statement titled "The Church Looks at Industrial Relations,"
adopted by the Federal Council in May 1949.

Among its

conclusions was the statement "we believe that compulsory
union membership should be neither required nor forbidden by
law."

But,

Federal Council pronoucement s were not binding

on the National Council.

Aware of the intense interest in

right-to-work, the Department, which included professional
staff and representatives of the clergy, business, and
labor,

undertook

a

restudy of the issue in 1956.

Oil's Board Chairman Robert

E.

Wilson and the

Standard

NAiM 's

Noel

Sargent tried to block a statement opposing right-to- work in
language similar to that of the earlier FCC statement.

Wilson asserted that "instead of reaffirming the church's
traditional position of protecting the rights of the
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individual against coercion whether by
employer or union,
and backing the state in affording
such protection, the
proposed statement says such protective

laws are not in the

£ubUc interest !"

Nelson Cruikshank of the AFL-CIO
and the
other labor representatives protested the
delay of a statement that affected "so directly the basic
welfare of
the

whole labor movement."
taking

a

"missing

Cruickshank believed that in not

stand for the union shop Protestant Churches
were
a

very important and crucial opportunity to demon-

strate their understanding of the real heart and soul of
the
labor movement. "^^

Sympathetic to labor, the Department of Church and

Economic Life eventually voted to forward the draft statement on "Union Membership as

a

Condition of Employment" to

the General Board of the NCC for adoption as official
policy.

Conservatives and liberals confronted each other at

the June

5,

1956 meeting of the General Board.

An

impassioned five-hour debate ensued, the longest ever conducted on any single subject.

B.E.

Hutchinson,

a

retired

Detroit industrialist led the fight against the statement

wnile Tilford Dudley of the AFL-CIO gave

a

"fiery speech"

denying that the object of right to work was to protect the
"little man."

Moderate business men, however, like Irwin

Miller and Charles Taft, spoke on behalf of the statement.
The debate ended inconclusively when the General Board

refused either to adopt or reject the statement disapproving
the right-to-work laws of eighteen states.
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By a close vote

of 40 to 32,

the Board voted to refer the report
back to the
Division of Christian- Life and Work. The
Division, however,
was authorized to distribute the statement
to churches for

discussion.

While disappointed that the statement was not
entirely
squashed, conservative business leaders were
generally

pleased with the Board's decision.

They worked hard to

ensure that distribution of the Division's right-to-work

statement was limited and that the Council promptly
corrected "misleading" articles, such as one published in
the AFL-CIO News, implying that the NCC had taken an

official stand against right-to-work.
to

J.

Noel Sargent reported

Howard Pew that the "Labor Union people who are on the

General Board were very bitter about the failure to approve
the report." To Sargent,

it was clear that the "strong

actions" taken by Pew and the National Lay Committee prior
to its disbanding were responsible for the "substantial

improvement" in the General Board's decisions in economic
and social matters.

The business community's efforts at

shaping the attitudes of the the leaders of the National
Council on economic and political issues paid off when
"forty people at the last meeting of the General Board"

voted "for recommittal of the report denouncing 'right-towork'

laws.""^"*"

One of the most dramatic expressions of the changing

attitudes towards unions was the results of the 1957
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legislative campaigns for right-to- work.

While right-to-

worKers lost in Louisiana and failed by just

small margin

a

in Idaho, they won a referendum ballot in
Kansas for the
1958 elections and passed a statute in Indiana.

The victory

in Indiana was of special significance for it
was the first

highly industrialized, strong union state to enact
legislation restricting union security.

m

1956,

a

coalition of

employer organizations that included the Indiana Chamber of
Commerce, the Associated Employers of Indiana, and the
Indiana Manufacturers Association formed the Indiana Right
to

V\Jork

Committee,

(IRWC) a state level counterpart to the

National Right to Work Committee.

The IRWC asserted that it

was not an employers' organization but

a

non-partisan

independent citizens committee.
Several factors contributed to the IRWC success. The

IRWC

stimulated local business activity by holding legisla-

tive clinics in 21 Indiana communities, attended cy 2,500

employers.

Throughout 1956

,

right-to-work prcpcr.er.-s

created the proper political atmosphere by conducting
meetings, publishing pamphlets, purchasing newcaper

s^^ace

and radio time, meeting witn workers on the job, and

speaking before civic groups.

Lobbyists cul-iv=-ed legis-

lators with a series of breakfast meetings

public support of the Lieutenant Governor

ar.f

ar.d

r=ir.ei

-.-.e

Er,^=<er zz

House.

Right-to-work advocates also played upcn

Stephen

C.

-r.~

wr.a-

Noland, president of the NRTVr clair^i V2= "= vave

of revulsion" against union-inspired vicler.ce assii-i-ea
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with the long 1955 Perfect Circle strike over the closed
Trade unionists worked to offset the employer

shop.

barrage, but unlike the employers, labor was divided.

state bodies of the AFL and CIO had yet to merge.

The

Disunity

from personal animosities and differing political perspectives hobbled the union defense. While immediate public

concern with labor violence in
servative,

a

"traditionally

.

.

.

con-

independent state" contributed to the employer

victory, William Book, executive vice president of the

Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce and

a

leader of the IRWC,

pointed to the long corporate effort to resnape tne political atmosphere.

He observed that "business organizations

here have worked long and hard to spread the gospel of
conservatism.

become

a

Our new right-to-work law could not have

reality without such seed-planting."^^
Ill

One of the reasons the IRWC's seeds fell onto such

fertile ground was the growing public concern over corruption in organized labor.

Unions had come under increasing

scrutiny during the early fifties.

In 1951,

the New York

State Crime Commission began hearings on the New York waterfront, uncovering evidence of money stolen from union
locals, unsolved murders, bribes, kickbacks, shakedowns and

job selling.

Other investigations and hearings followed.

Eisennower's Attorney General Herbert Brownell made

385

racketeering

primary focus of nis department,
beginning
1,500 investigations in his first two
years
a

in office.

m

1953 and 1954 House and Senate committees
held public

hearings on corruption on the waterfronts
and in the
building trades. Also
1954, a Senate subcommittee began
a two-year investigation of union
mismangement of welfare
and pension funds.

m

All this contributed to a growing public
consciousness
of union corruption,

piqued by the 1954 release of the

highly popular motion picture,

"On the Waterfront," and the

acid-throwing assault in 1956 on

a

syndicated labor colum-

nist shortly after he had broadcast details of shady

dealings in

a

construction union.

But,

it was the sensa-

tional televised hearings of the Senate's Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Fields,

popularly known as the McClellan Committee, that splattered
the labor movement's dirty laundry across the front pages of
the country's newspapers.

The committee held hearings for

two-and-one-hal f years, examining primarily the activities
of the leaders of the Bakers, the Textile Workers, and the

Teamsters.

It discovered some unions were shot through with

theft, embezzlement and misuse of funds, infiltration of

gangsters and racketeers, undemocratic procedures, violence
and threats against employers and recalcitrant union

members, and labor management-collusion.

With the

encouragement of business, it also peered into union
political practices, secondary boycotts and organizing
386

tactics.

Its brief look at employer anti-union devices,

however, received considerably less attention from tne press
than the labor abuses.
The business community exploited the revelations of the

McClellan Committee in their campaign against labor.

Here,

at last, was proof of the impact of union "monopoly power"
In April

1957,

referring to the committee's early findings,

NAM Chairman Cola

Parker charged that "monopoly power and

G.

compulsion are being used to maintain crooks, racketeers,
gangsters and hoodlums
unions."

...

in the top positions in many

With one hand, he continued,

"they keep a tight

grip on the working man's throat, so that he can neither

move nor cry out in protest; with the other they reach into
his pay envelope and into his welfare fund in order to

enrich themselves."

NAM official Sybyl

S.

Patterson cheered

on the Committee, observing that the Senate investigation

had "awakened the public to

a

realization that unions enjoy

extra-legal privileges which they are utilizing without

regard to the public interest or, indeed, to the rights of
individual members."

The NAM, however, took care not to

become closely associated with the Senate investigation.

It

quietly encouraged employers to provide evidence to the

Committee, but adroitly decided to "stay on the side-lines"
so as "to avoid the danger" of tainting the McClellan

hearings with the charge of being in the control of the
36
bus iness community.
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Thn nr^arinys, however, provided the
NAM with the ammunition to promote the second part of its
legislative

campaign, the drive for

a

national labor reform act.

In

October 1957, NAM officials concluded that the
time was
right "to crystallize" the "public reaction against

labor

abuses into specific reform legislation."^^

To do this,

employers had to
reach the individual in the community, stimulate his
identification of labor problems with his own economic
wel ling-being, promote his idea to action individually
in an attempt to correct these abuses by writing to his
own congressman and senator, and through that procedure
spark determination in Congress for corrective legislation at the national level. ^°
This self-consciously political effort meshed with the NAM

more generalized anti-labor public relations program.

's

The

employers' association marshalled its supporters, publicizing, among other items, the National Council of

Churches's resolution calling for legislation to correct the

abuses revealed by the McClellan committee.
To arouse women, "who would have

a

lot to do with the

kind of legislation that is passed," the NAM designed
women's club program entitled "Are You the Victim?"

a

new

With

the shape of a frightened woman splattered on the cover,
kit evoked the powerful image of rape.

the

During 1958, five

thousand clubs across the country used the kit which exposed
the "uncontrolled power, wealth and political influence of

unions and union bosses" and explained how the activities of
unions directly impinged on each individual.

For instance,

the NAM charged that union monopoly power, used "to restrain
388

.

trade, to restrict production and to fix
prices" were behind
the resurgence of inflation in the late
fifties.
The

pattern speech provided in the package demanded
"Why should
the working man and woman, the consumer, -- the
general

public be the victim of this restrained power?" when
the
"American credo has always been that central power must be

controlled and restrained for the good of all."

The club-

woman delivering this speech then called upon her audience
to take action,

to "make our club's strength felt in the

fight for clean, democractic unions," by writing to Washington as individuals and as

group and by carrying the

a

message of the meeting home to husbands, friends, and
relatives
The NAM also produced

a

new film, widely distributed to

professional groups, educators and fraternal organizations,
entitled "Trouble,

U.S.A."

Like the club package,

the film

and accompanying discussion material drew on the McClellan

commitee evidence.
pretty picture," but

NAM advised viewers that "this is not
"a

a

true one" depicting events that were

"vitally affecting your own community." The documentary, it

continued, "was disturbing, might provoke indignation, but
it should encourage local constructive action to restore law

and order in your own community and in the

nation."^"'"

The right-to-work campaigns, the series of union

corruption hearings, and the NAM's activities thrust unions
into the limelight and fed a growing public discussion of
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organized labor's role in society.

The adoption of right-

to-work as the debate topic for the nation's colleges and
universities during the 1957-1958 academic year reflected
the issue's growing significance.

Not surprisingly, both

unions and business organizations provided source material
to debaters.

Conservative mass circulation magazines, like

the Saturday Evening Post

,

carried extensive coverage of the

Hearings and regularly published editorials condemning

unions.

The image of

a

labor movement out of control also

seeped into popular culture.

Annie

,

In the comic strip,

Orphan

for instance, there was the suggestion of tyrannical

behavior on the part of

a

union boss.^^

Public opinion polls conducted in late 1957 provided

tentative evidence that organized labor had lost
cant number of friends in the American populace.

a

signifiAn

American Institute of Public Opinon survey, conducted in
September 1957, showed

a

twelve-point drop in "pro-union"

sentiment across the country, the greatest defection
occurring in the highly industrialized East.

Reflecting on

the results of this poll, Mark Starr, Educational Director
of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,

observed that in the past the public's identification with
the "little guy and the underdog" had produced

amount of sympathy for unions."

a

"certain

Now, he worried that "all

this goodwill was in danger of being alienated by the alle-

gations about union monopoly and about the unethical

behavior of the union bosses. "^^
390

The passage of the Indiana Right-to-Work
Law and the

McClellan investigation goaded the AFL-CIO into
addressing
the "new and intensive anti-union campaign" of
"reactionary

forces and vested interest groups."

m

mid-1957,

as a way

to isolate the bulk of organized labor from allegations
of

corruption, the AFL-CIO adopted

a

code of ethical practices

for unions and then expelled three of the worst offenders --

the bakers, the laundry workers, and the teamsters.

Having

cleaned its house, the AFL-CIO argued against the need for
federal legislation.

But as attacks against labor inten-

sified, the Federation argued that the McClellan hearings

were "one-sided and overdramati zed, " and that the committee
ignored management corruption.

It also contended that the

press was using the committee's findings "to do
job on the trade union movement."

a

Union leaders,

hatchet
like Louis

Hollander of the New York State CIO Council, called for
organized labor "to offset the efforts of its enemies."
Labor must, declared Hollander, step up its public relations
and its education and community activities.

According to

Steelworkers President David McDonald, unions had to reach
the general public,

much of which remained "badly misin-

formed or uninformed about the real role that labor plays in
the nation."

He continued,

"too few people have any real

understanding of what labor is actually seeking to achieve
not only for its rank and file, but also for the betterment
"^^
of the entire nation.
..4

4
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In the

immediate aftermath of the merger, the
AFL-CIO
had put public relations on the back burner
despite

business

predictions of increased activity.

Spending for public

relations was less, not more, under the merged
budget, and
to save money the Federation briefly considered
dropping one
of its news broadcasts.

Pushed by the employer offensive,

the Federation reversed this trend in 1957.^^5 Previously,

national labor organizations provided little support to the
state central bodies fighting right-to-work,

Lenaghen,

when Robert

president of the Idaho State Federation of Labor,

sought AFL-CIO assistance, he was "frankly appalled at the
lack of a coordinated program to counter-balance the serious

attack which we were facing across the nation."

But when

the National Right to Work Committee's campaign reached the
UAW's home state of Michigan,

the AFL-CIO embarked upon a

program to "arouse and unify" the labor movement.
Executive Council set up

a

The

high level right-to-work subcom-

mittee instructed to "monitor state right-to-work agitation,
coordinate defense efforts, and aid repeal drives."

The

subcommittee resolved that the AFL-CIO "should engage in an
extensive campaign on

a

local,

state,

and national basis" to

bring "the true facts of this 'Right-to-Work Question'" to
the public's attention.

The campaign featured a series of

canned radio and television spots,

a

fifteen-minute documen-

tary, a series of popular leaflets, and a handbook and

speakers manual, summarizing the principal arguments.

Aware

that "labor alone will have difficulty winning this fight,"
392

^
the Federation also initiated and funded an "independent"

anti-right-to-work citizens group called the National
Council on Industrial Peace.

Led by such well known

liberals as Eleanor Roosevelt and New York Senator Herbert
Lehman, the NICP included employers, clergy, and professionals.

To raise money for all this activity the AFL-CIO

created a special fund "to combat the millions of dollars

being poured" into right-to-work campaigns by employer
groups 46
.

During 1958,

meshed with

a

the AFL-CIO's anti-right-to-work drive

more broadly gauged public relations campaign.

Upping its public relations budget by 58 percent to $1.2

million dollars

a year,

the Federation's revamped public

relations program looked a lot like that of its arch-rival,

The goal was to create

the NAM.

a

new image for labor that

stressed unions' "day-by-day contributions to the whole of

Commercials on the AFL-CIO's news programs,

society."

for

instance, emphasized labor's community services, using

"words of positve emotional value," like "freedom,"
"America,"

"democracy," and "neighbors."

AFL-CIO's new television program,

Similarily the

"America at Work,"

portrayed workers' contribution to "America's industrial
might."

stations,

This fifteen minute program, carried on 67

mirrored the NAM's "Industry on Parade."

its initial title was "Labor on Parade,"

Indeed,

Instead of show-

casing industries or companies, it highlighted the skill

393

anc

talent of workers on the job, while noting that they were
all union members.

official Albert

J.

One year into the program, AFL-CIO
Zack reported that program showed viewers

"hard-working, skilled, dedicated people who are union

members, thus destroying the propaganda myth of union

members concocted by our enemies. ""^^
To gain positive publicity from the press, in June 1958

the Federation began issuing one or two television news

releases each week to 100 stations throughout the country.
The stories publicized

a

range of AFL-CIO political issues,

including legislation for an increased minimun wage, school
construction, and housing, as well as stressing labor's

constructive community activities, such as blood bank
drives, Christmas parties, and the community services

program.

Like employers, the AFL-CIO also reached out to

opinion leaders.

It initiated a direct mail campaign aimed

at influential minority spokesmen, religious leaders, and

intellectuals, and established

a

Speakers' Bureau that

provided union officials to speak before religious, civic,
fraternal,

48
and school groups.

IV

The 1958 election served as the first test of labor's

new program.

The election took place within the context of

sharpening labor-management conflict not only in the political realm but in the shop as well.
the economy dropped into

a

Beginning in mia-1957,

recession even as inflation
394

surged. Meanwhile, segments of American
industry, like

steel, experienced their first serious wave of
foreign

competition.

climate with

Many employers met this weakening economic
a

determination to reduce labor costs.

without

totally abandoning human relations, managers shifted from
the more subtle anti-unionism of the earlier fifties to an

outright attack on organized labor.

The doubling of unfair

labor practice cases in the late fifties reflected this new
strategy.

In addition, companies adopted a more aggressive

position at the bargaining table, seeking to restore wage
flexiblity and to speed up production by abolishing restrictive work rules.
ment,

To the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Depart-

it was clear that employers were adopting "class war

methods on the bargaining front as the best way to bring
labor to its knees. ""^^

The struggle between business conservatives and labor

became one of the principal themes of the 1958 election.
Prior to the election, business stepped up its political
activity.

Some firms, state and local business associa-

tions, and a group sponsored by fifty major corporations

called the Effective Citizens Organization, set up workshops

promoting employer political participation.

In addition.

Republican politicans began an "experimental" program to
teach "practical politics" to junior executives from scores
of companies in three dozen targeted Congressional

districts.

At business gatherings througnout the country.
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leaders of
NAM and

h.^

conservative business

tlu^ Cha.nln^r

as Lemnol
to ycL

i

u, .jan

/a

L

like Lho

lon.s,

of Commerce, and such business
leaders

Boulwaro of General Khn^tric, exhorted
employers

inLo politics and Liyht for all

in

i

wore worth/'"

ilu>y

MJ58, the consoL va L i vo business

coiiu.iun

i

ty

goals were to promote right-to-work and to oioct

sympathetic to the enactment oi

a

pi

's

a

strict labor rel

iniary

Conqi-.^ss
ui

m

act.

More broadly, conservative employers hoped to undercui
labor's political power.

Practical Politics Task i\uco

Thc^

of the Manufacturers Association of Syracuse contt iui.d

unions

haci

lucMiibers"

"renonnc(-d

t

in pursuit oL

h(M

r

historic responsibility to

political powiM'.

Uii Senior Vice-President Archie

survive,

t

h(M.r

According to Gulf

Gray,

U.

th.it

"IL

we are to

labor's political power must be opposed by a

matching ioicr -- among the corporations

American l)usiness."

thLit

unions hiH-amc

indeed,

a

make up
major issue

in

the 1958 election as the campaign assumed the "coloration of
a

labor-management dogfight."

industrialists financed

pamphlet suuMriny

w.i

I

disscMii

r

twenty states.

i

number of localities,

a

nat on of
i

a

"notorious"

ter Hc^uther, who tMuploy(H-s tagged as

the "phantom candidate" Lor
tlian

In

a

variety

ol

oil ices

in mure

I

The Republican I'arty, which was the chief bend Lciary
of corporate political activity,
labor.

'I'lK^

K.

'publican Policy Comittee issued a monograph

entitled The Labor Bosses:
asserted that

joined in the attack on

Am erica's Third Party

,

which

the Democrats w(m<^ "domin.itiMl by c.M-tain

politico-labor bosses and left-wing extremists."
choice,

it warned,

The

was between the Republican Party or going

down "the left lane which leads to socialism."

Vice-

President Richard Nixon played up this theme in speeches
across the country.

Some of the most intense battles between business and
labor took place in those states voting on right- to- work.

Right-to- work advocates had turned to the referendum as

a

means of placing the question on the ballot in California,
Idaho,

Washington, Colorado, Ohio, and Kansas.

support for the campaigns was crucial.
instance, Boeing Aircraft revived

a

Business

In Washington,

for

lagging drive for signa-

tures for the ballot referendum. Three weeks before the

deadline for filing petitions, Boeing Aircraft sent

a

letter

to all supervisors enclosing copies of the petition and

instructing them to get additional names.

Some twenty other

industries joined Boeing in this movement.

Washington busi-

ness leaders also formed an organization of "minute men" and

built

a

war chest of ha 1 f -a-mi

1 1

ion dollars.

The General

Electric Company at the Hanford Atomic Works in Wasnington
aided the campaign by sending

a

letter to their 9,000

employees urging them to support the initiative.

Similarly,

in California, GE sponsored a newspaper advertising

campaign,

becoming the first major corporation in the state
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to endorse the right-to- work proposal.
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Perhaps the most telling battle over right-to- work
took

place in Ohio.

In early 1958,

buoyed by the previous year's

right-to-work victory in Indiana, the Ohio Chamber of

Commerce formed the Ohioans for Right-to- Work (ORW), and
began collecting signatures to place an amendment to the

state constitution on the ballot in November.

The Ohio

Manufacturers' Association, some city Chambers, and several

companies backed the ORW, feeling that right-to-work laws in
both Ohio and Indiana could start

a

major trend.

Among the

firms active in the drive were several that had been leaders
in the business community's campaign to reshape the climate

of opinion, including General Electric, Timken Roller

Bearing, and Armco Steel.

Timken blanketed their plant

cities with the story of right-to-work, and all of their

advertising carried the slogan, "The Right-to-Work Shall Not
be Abridged or Made Impotent."

The Company also spearheaded

the movement to get signatures on the petitions, circulating

the first 400 petitions issued.

Business support for

right-to-work, however, was not unanamious.

firms steered clear of the issue, and
business leaders like Charles

against

P.

a

Many large

few moderate

Taft came out strongly

r ight-to-work.

Organized labor met the challenge by forming the United

Organized Labor of Ohio (UOLO) in late March 1958.

The UOLO

argued that the real issue behind right-to- work was not the
union shop or individual rights but whether unions had
right to exist.

a

To defend against the anti-union drive,
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Ohio trade unionists followed
First,

a

two-pronged strategy.

they mounted a major effort to register union
members

and their families to ensure a high working-class
turnout on

election day.
defenders.

Second,

Blacks,

labor looked to the community for

for instance, rallied to the side of

unions; the Ohio State Association of Colored Women's Clubs

and the NAACP condemned right-to- work and aided the union

drive to mobilize the minority vote.

City councils, frater-

nal orders, and civic organizations, among other organiza-

tions, also passed resolutions condemning the amendment.

Much of the religious community came out on labor's
behalf.

Catholic support was strongest.

six Catholic Bishops of Ohio issued

a

In March 1958,

the

statement asserting

that the proposed amendment "would not solve our problems
but might lead to more intensifed struggle."

Catholic

clergymen were active in the fight against right-to-work,
often denouncing it from the pulpit.

The Ohio Council of

Churches also opposed the right-to-work proposal, but the

UOLO felt that its story was not getting to the Protestant
ministers.

In a bid for their support,

trade unionists

contacted their own pastors and the UOLO distributed the
Ohio Council's statement to clergy throughout the state.

Religious support often translated into broader public
appeals.

The labor paper. The Chronicle, pointed out that

"The R-T-W proposal is not just
politics.

a

matter of economics or

It lies at the very basis of man's relation to
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man.

Endless numbers of religious leaders of every
faith,

looking beyond the material aspects of the issue,
have

condemned

V iqh t-to-work

as immoral."

On Sundays after

services, UAW Local 12 members in Toledo passed out
the
Bishops' statement in front of Catholic churches and the

Ohio Council's statement at Protestant churches. '^^
Both sides conducted intense public relciLiuns

campaigns.

The ORW and the UOLO deployed speakers through-

out the state, distributed millions of pieces of literature,

and ran ads in newspapers and on the radio and television.
By late summer,

however, the

to be prevailing.

in August

r

i

qh t-to-wor k proponents seemed

they filed the petit

iy'j8,

ifMis

to place the rigivt-to- work issue on the ballot, linving

collected 100,000 more signatures than required.

in

49

counties, they had twice as many signatures as needed.

Feeling that victory was assured, the ORW slakened its

public relations drive and placed more emphasis on
Some Republicans

recruiting political allies.

Ohio and

in

elsewhere were leary of closely associating themselves with
an issue as divisive as

r

i

g

ht-to-work.

Business leaders

like, Charles Hook of Armco, however, worked hard te get Lhe

support

ol

proiuLneiiL

Republican [politicians.

Hook praised

Republican gubernatorial candidate William O'Neil
endorsed the ORW and conducted
of

"a

1

who had

m.irvelous campaign in face

opposition of the labor bosses."
In contrast,

relations (HTorts.

the labor movement redouhh^d its
Th(^

[lOr.n
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[)ul)lic

kicked off tho "home-stretch

drive" with

mass rally on September 7th in Columbus
and

formation of

thc^

by

a

thc^

Ai.-|,-Cl(^

a

pro-labor citizens committee, subsidized

national office.

Campaicjn

literature empha-

sized the dire economic consequcMices of riyht-to-work.

Aware thai forty percent of the electorate were "housewives," unions aimea

a

special appeal Lo Uumh,

lio

hi

nq

i

"Kaffee Klatches" and distributing pamphlets like "Hrs. Ohio

Homemaker:

Beware the guirk in 'Right-to-Work,

"

whicli

emphasized that right-to-work undermined unions.

Once that

happened, wages invariably foil, weakening family security.
WomcMrr, Activities Division of the state AFL-CTO did

Thc>

mucli of

tht^

volunteer work necessary in brinqinq labor's

message Lo women and the rest of the public,
October,

in late

the right-to-work proponents shilLcd from arguing

for the issue on the basis of protecting individual freedom
to

a

"strident attack against unionism."

l

n

doing so,

the

ORW inadvertently provided proof of the labor movement's
contention that the business community's primary goal was
tiie

destruction of trade unionism.
On election day 1958 the Republican rnrty and

conservative business community suffer od
r lyht-

Voters rejected

prevail.

a

small

major dofoaf.

to-work referendums in five of the six

states where it was on the ballot.

business faced

a

tlie

Only in Kansas, wliere

labor movement, did right-to-work

Nationwide, Republican losses were massive, with

Democrats achieving their largest gains in congressional

4Ul

elections since 1936.

The continuing economic slump

certainly contributed to Republican losses.
the attack on the labor movement.

Crucial too was

The right-to-work drive

and the Republican attack on unions united the labor
move-

ment and stimulated union political activity across the
nation.

Important also to labor's success was the creation

of broad-based liberal coalitions.

in Ohio,

the support of

community groups, minorities, and the clergy proved significant.

One analysis of the vote, for instance, found that

the opposition of the Catholic bishops to right-to-work had
an significant impact on the way Catholics voted.

The election taught the business community that while

there was certainly outrage over the abuses uncovered by the

investigations, the public still accepted the legitimacy of
unions and was uncomfortable with

organized labor as an institution.

a

blatant attack on

Future efforts to limit

the power of labor needed to differentiate between unions as

institutions and the abuses of labor leaders.

Moreover,

business leaders needed to cleave more closely to the idea
that they sought not only to contain the "monopoly" power of
unions but also desired to protect the democratic rights of

individual workers.
V
In spite of the victories won by labor and the Demo-

crats in the 1958 elections, business leaders renewed their

campaign for restrictive new labor legislation in the 86th
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congress.

the

1

They immediately applied the lessons
learned from

958 right-to-work campaigns to this
struggle.

One

advantage for business was the much broader
base of support
within the country for labor reform than
right-to-work.
The

McClellan hearings had convinced even the friends
of labor,
like John Kennedy and other liberals, that greater
regulation of unions was necessary.

what form such regulation would take.

The major question was

There was general

agreement that reform should make the labor movement more

democratic in its internal affairs.

By early 1958, even the

AFL-CIO had come around to accepting the need for legislation, but only laws aimed solely at the correction of the

most flagrant abuses revealed by the McClellan investigation.

Employers and their conservative allies in Congress

wanted more.

They hoped to move beyond internal regulation

of unions, to further restricting the powers of labor in

collective bargaining.

The NAM, for instance, wanted to

make all secondary boycotts and organizational picketing
illegal.

During 1958, Congress first considered labor

reform, and the Senate passed

a

mild measure, the Kennedy-

Ives bill, that was acceptable to labor.

This bill required

publication of detailed financial reports by unions and
regulated union trusteeships and elections.

An unusual

coalition of employer groups, conservatives, and unions
still opposed to any regulation, including the Teamsters and
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0

Mine workers, however, rallied against
the bill, helping to
defeat it in the House of Representati
ves.^

In early

1

959,

labor reform was back on the
nation's

agenda.

Although it had issued an interim
report in March
1958, the McClellan Committee continued its
hearing

through

keeping the issue of union corruption
before the
public's eyes.
At the same time, the NAM, the Chamber
of
Commerce, and other business organizations
continued to do
1959,

their part in raising public consciousness about
labor
abuses.

It became clear that there was little chance
of

unions avoiding

a

labor reform law, as

commitment to doing

a

something about labor management problems became

a

litmus

test of political respons ib li ty for both Republicans and

Democracts.

Nevertheless, the business community faced

tough political assignment.

a

Republican Party losses in the

1958 election had resulted in the seating of

seemingly liberal pro-labor inclinations.

a

Congress with

As a result,

the

AFL-CIO approached the political battle confident that there
was little chance of Congress passing

a

punitive

law.^-'-

During the spring and summer of 1959 several labor

reform bills were introduced and debated in the House and
Senate.

The labor movement was divided; the AFL-CIO suppor-

ted "soft" legislation while other segments of the labor

movement pursued

entirely different agendas.

The Mine

Workers continued to fight all legislation, while other
inaividual unions within the Federation lobbied for their

own interests.

Almost to the end, the AFL-CIO believed that
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it haa enough congressional support to render unnecessary
a

massive drive to mobilize the public in labor's defense.
Unions relied instead on high level consultation between

congressional and labor leadership and on lobbying to
influence individual legislators.

Throughout the struggle,

however, labor tended to be disorganized, rigid, and so
zealous in lobbying that it antagonized rather than won
support.

At one point,

the teamsters had 400 lobbyists on

Capitol Hill lecturing and threatening the legislators.^^
The forces advocating a strict labor reform bill that

incorporated the demands of employers were much more united
than labor.

The Eisenhower administration provided vigorous

and effective legislative leadership, while maintaining

close liaison with business groups.

On cue from the admin-

istration, employer organizations mobilized their members to

place steady but more subtle influence on legislators.

Management lobbyists stayed in the background and relied on

somewhat less intimidating forms of communication, mail and
telephone contacts.

They emphasized over and over again

that "the people" wanted

a

strong law.

At a crucial moment,

when the House began debate on labor legislation. President

Eisenhower delivered

a

televised address in which he

endorsed the pro-management Landrum-Gr if f in bill and urged
the public to demand "strong" labor reform legislation.

perhaps one of Eisenhower's most political speeches, he

presented his appeal as

a

"non-partisan" one.
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As a lame

In

duck president, he could easily claim to have
"no political
motivations" and to speak for the people.
Eisenhower's
request brought

a

tremendous volume of mail and gave

"legitimacy to the fight for the Landrum-Grif f in bill,"

making "it hard for its opponents to resist. "^^
The White House also helped coordinate the public rela-

tions drive for labor reform.

Outnumbered in Congress, the

Republicans realized that they needed widespread public
support to achieve their goals.

The Eisenhower

administration found friends in the press.

Most newspapers

editorally supported tough labor reform legislation and the
press continued to provide extensive coverage of labor
corruption.

The employer associations, however, were the

foot soldiers in this campaign to arouse public opinion to

demand

a

strict labor bill.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce,

the NAM, the American Retail Federation and the National

Small Business Men's Association coordinated their efforts
"to an unprecedented extent."

They were aided by state and

city groups as well as individual employers.
to flood Congress with mail demanding

a

Their goal was

tough bill.

Trade

associations sponsored newspaper advertising and provided
legislative kits to members that included posters,
pamphlets, prepared speeches, advertisements and letters for

distribution to employes.

In one critical Congressional

district, a corporation sent its formen out "to ring

neighbor's doorbells."

The company claimed that this tactic

resulted in 3000 letters in one week, urging
406

a

stiff bill.^"^

.

Radio and television were also
important.
in April, as
Congress began consideration of labor
reform legislation,

Armstrong Cork Company's Circle Theatre
ran an hour-long
drama about labor racketeering entitled
"The Sound of

Violence."

it concluded with an appeal

from Senator John

McClellan to "do something about the evils shown."

L.

The

program was rerun in July, and employer associations
ran

advertisements and sent out over four million letters urging
the public to watch and write to their legislators.

Beginning in August, spot ads featuring Congressmen Landrum
and Griffin and Senator McClellan ran frequently in 35

crucial congressional districts.

McClellan had played

role in the shift in Congress from

a

mild to

a

much stronger

bill when he presented in an "impassioned speech"

rights" for the laboring man.

business promoted.

It was this

a key

a

"bill of

theme that

One Administration spokesman recalled,

"We wanted this to look like the people against the labor

bosses and not Big Labor against Big Business."

Thus,

conservatives did not again make the mistake of an outright
attack on unions but emphasized defending the rights of the
individual
The public responded with

a

tremendous deluge of mail.

Congressmen reported receiving more mail on
than on any other previous issue.

lnI)or

During one week in August

1959, one million letters inundated the Capital.

the letters advocated

a

tough labor law.
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reform

Most of

Alarmed, the

AFL-CIO began distributing

a

leaflet entitled "Get Crooks

-

Not Unions" and urged union members to
write to their legislators.
Still, there was little pro-labor
mail.
early

m

September 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Grif
f in Act
which substantially reflected the interests
of

business.

It was a major defeat for labor.

To Mark Starr of the

ILGWU the adoption of the Landrum-Grif fin Act showed
how the
image of labor had been successfully smeared in the
public
mind.

He believed that as a result of the business campaign

in the schools, churches, and communities a "large
segment
of the general public" accepted the fallacy that "labor

unions were

a

monopoly run by union bosses" and that "labor

bosses not only had too much power but were also corrupt."
The AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Action also concluded

that unions had "sat passively in the galleries while the

structure was set up to give labor

a

public smearing."

Labor then came into the struggle "unprepared and unor-

ganized and was out-smarted and out-maneuvered by Business
and Industry who operated in a more skillful manner, with

greater resources, better teamwork, and better support and

cooperation from Members of the House and Senate. "^^
The business community agreed that the passage of the

Landrum-Grif fin Act was the political payoff of their
efforts to forge

a

more favorable climate of public opinion.

According to NAM Vice President Charles

overwhelming

R.

public opinion" combined with

Sligh,
a

"a

determined

President and an effective conservative coalition of
408

wave of

Republicans and Democrats "forced
Congress to take labor
reform seriously."
Similarily, nAiM Executive Rudolph
F.
Bannow concluded that "the major cause"
for passage "was a
great upwelling of public opinion,
stimulated

...

by the

great conservative leadership of President
Eisenhower and
helped along by the acitivity of politically
conscious

businessmen "^^
.

The struggles over right-to-work and labor
reform

demonstrated how far business had come in the years
since
the strike wave of 1946.
Business had achieved solid
results from its last campaign of the fifties to limit
the

power of labor.

While most of the 1958 right-to- work

initiatives were defeated, the fact that business was able
to generate enough support to place the question on the

ballot in northern, industrialized states reflected

a

considerable shift in attitudes about organized labor.

Landrum-Grif f in further proved, at least to business
leaders,

that they had decisively shaped public opinion.

Public opinion had played

a

central role in the passage of

legislation that placed further limitations on the power of
labor.

Although unions had won significant electoral

victories in 1958, they found little political support in
the halls of Congress.

Indeed,

labor fought

a

rearguard

battle against the erosion of its status and power; its

voice in public debate was weak and its ability to offer
compelling alternate vision was apparently absent.
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The

a

business community had contained the

threat

a

united labor

movement posed to its agenda for the
nation's political and
economic future.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
In 1959 labor journalist Bert
Cochran observed that

"the businessman's intellectual reconquest
of America" after

World War II" was

"a

more remarkable achievement than was

his reassertion of long exercised power after
World War
In 1945,

I."l

business had faced an aggressive labor movement

that sought the resurgence of New Deal liberalism.

Unions

called for full employment, social planning and the expansion of the welfare state, essentially

a

fundamental

reconstuction of American society orchestrated through the

continued growth of state power.

The business community,

however,

set out to build agreement around an alternative

agenda.

In doing so it sought not only to recast the

political economy of post-war America, but also to reshape
the ideas, images, and attitudes through which Americans

understood their world.

Employers wanted support for the

belief that economic decisions should be made in corporate
board rooms, not in legislative committee chambers.

Pros-

perity was to be achieved through reliance on individual
initiative and the natural harmony of workers and managers
inherent in business's interpretation of the free enterprise
system.

According to many industrialists,

a

socially

responsible capitalism, relying upon increases in productivity and economic growth rather than on the redistribution
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Of income, would solve society's
problems and brxng the good
life to all.

These ideas made up

a

associated with the 1950s.

part of the consensus often
This work contends that this

consensus was politically constructed and
was in large part
the result of the business community's
"intellectual
reconquest" of America.

It had its origins in a variety of

campaigns conducted by American business (and
consistently
in opposition to labor) to shape the
public's political,
social, and economic ideas.

primary goals.

First,

The business community had two

it hoped to destroy or discredit the

ideological underpinnings of New Deal liberalism.

Secondly,

it wanted to undermine the legitimacy and power of
organized

labor.

Unions posed a significant challenge not only in the

shop but in the political realm as the backbone of the
Democratic Party coalition.

Industrialists would accomplish

these goals through campaigns to sell Americans on the

virtues of individualism as opposed to collectivism, freedom
as opposed to state control, and the centrality of the free

enterprise sytem to the American way of life.
The most obvious efforts to shape ideology and to

create

a

more conservative, consensual political climate

took place at the national level.
zations,

National business organi-

like the Advertising Council and the National

Association of Manufacturers orchestrated multi-million
dollar public relations campaigns that relied on newspapers,
magazines, radio and later television to sell business and
423

capitalism.

Yet,

even as they conducted these
national mass
media campaigns, business leaders
recognized the limitations
of relying on this strategy alone.
They believed that
employers needed an even more direct
connection with the
public.
The most logical place to begin was
within the
plant with their own workers serving as
a captive audience.
Even employers who recognized unions
believed that organized
labor fundamentally challenged their ability
to shape worker
attitudes and provide political leadership.
Thus, moderate
as well as conservative business leaders
sought to increase

worker productivity and undermine union power by creating

a

separate company identity or company consciousness among
their employees.

To win workers' allegiance, managers in

a

wide range of firms reshaped their personnel policies by
blending the insights of human relations with the techniques
of welfare capitalism.

Economic education campaigns sought

to build worker alleigance to the firm and to the American

economic system while welfarism provided tangible evidence
of employer concern for workers, expanding the community of

interests beyond the immediate confines of the factory to

encompass the worker's leisure and home life.
Fearing for lost authority beyond their factory gates,

employers also instituted sophisticated community relations

programs that both promoted the free enterprise system and
built good will for individual firms.

In January 1960,

National Industrial Conference Board President John
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S.

Sinclair concluded that as

a

result of these effort business

had probably "never enjoyed a more
favorable climate of
public opinion."
part, he admitted, this mellowing
of

m

public attitudes towards business was the
result of
continuing prosperity.
Equally important

in "the gradual

recession of distrust" was industry's willingness
to help
alleviate social problems particularly in the
fields of

health and education and its "efforts to assume
the role of
good neighbor in the communities in which it operates. "^

Organized labor also sought to shape worker consciousness,

attempting to compete for worker loyalty and public

sympathy both within the factory and in the community.
During the depression and in World War II, unions had become
an increasingly potent force not only in the plant and in

national politics but also in local communities, establishing connections that grew in the postwar era with such

important institutions as the Community Chests.

Later,

particularly as attacks against labor increased in the
fifties, unions also began to emulate business, conducting

their own public public relations campaigns.

Organized

labor attempted to resist the business community's new

consensus, promoting the notion that worker success and

security as well as America's future depended on the collective power of organized labor and on the continued ability
of the state to regulate business.

The labor movement could never match the resources

available to the leaders of American business, however.
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As

result, the political and cultural
landscape of the postwar era was increasingly dominated by
the images and ideas
a

produced by

a

mobilized business leadership.

This indeed

marked "the businessman's intellectual
reconquest of
America." How far this reconquest went,
how deeply
it was, remains unclear.

rooted

We know what business leaders

wanted workers and other American to believe.
less about what they actually did believe,

We know much

for even the most

sophisticated polls (and most of those conducted in the
1950s were scarcely sophisticated) do not begin to plumb the

private reservoirs of dissent and disengagement that charac-

terized American popular culture.

what we do know is that

the images and ideas of business were pervasive, filling

much of America's cultural space with

a

series of selec-

tively distorted symbols that made it difficult, if not
impossible,

for Americans to discover and articulate

competing visions of the American polity.
at least,

America"

To this degree,

the "businessman's intellectual reconquest of

succeeded.
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